History and Terminology
To situate the relatively new role of narrative in this debate, it is important to begin by clarifying some terms and assumptions. First, when philosophers apply ideas from the study of narrative to their own perennial questions, they employ what we might call a “narrative approach.” The narrative approach is varied and includes figures such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Martha Nussbaum (1990), Paul Ricoeur (1994), Richard Rorty (1989), Marya Schechtman (1996), Charles Taylor (1989), and Margaret Urban Walker (1998), among others.
While there are legitimate criticisms of the narrative approach,2 in this chapter I do not attempt to defend the approach itself; instead, I promote the methodological value of implementing such an approach when exploring questions of group-related moral responsibility.Broadly speaking, there are three primary objections to the notion that groups are central to questions of moral responsibility. First, there is the idea that groups are nothing more than an aggregation of individuals and do not have minds of their own with which to form intentions; therefore, any responsibility simply disperses to the relevant individuals who actively perpetrated the harm in question. We can call this the reductive objection. Second, if group responsibility distributes equally to all members, regardless of their connection to the harm in question and simply in virtue of membership, then group responsibility is obviously unfair. We can call this the normative objection. Third, whether responsibility distributes to members or not, ascribing group responsibility is liable to exacerbate rather than repair intergroup harms. This is the practical objection. It will be my task here to propose how taking a narrative approach can help address all three objections.
To date, the debate over collective responsibility has largely concentrated on the first objection and the question of whether a group can form intentions, thereby qualifying as a moral agent in its own right.
Following Peter French, groups have been divided into simple “aggregates” that do not survive varying membership (e.g., mobs, people on the beach right now) or more complex “conglomerates” that have a decision procedure for forming intentions (e.g., mission statements, operating manuals, etc.) and whose “identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of the persons in the organization” (1984: 13). Thus, the groups under consideration are typically highly organized (e.g., committees, corporations, nations) or are small “plural” groups (e.g., two people moving a piano).3 Those who find that some groups can count as agents may be labeled “collectivists” and those who deny this may be labeled “individualists.” Both individualists and collectivists seem to agree that groups must be more than simple aggregates if they are to factor into our determinations of moral responsibility.Some collectivists assert that groups can qualify as full agents and potentially be morally responsible in a manner that is over and above their members (i.e., the non-distributive form).4 Early in the debate, the phrase “collective responsibility” was typically applied only to the nondistributive form; however, the debate has evolved to include many other forms of group-related moral responsibility. For example, one can argue for a form of group-related responsibility that distributes to members (i.e., shared responsibility).5 Shares might be distributed equally or they might be distributed in proportion to one’s relationship to the harm. When speaking about both non-distributive and distributive forms, I use the more generic phrase “group responsibility.” Non-distributive forms typically require that the group itself qualify as an agent, while importantly, distributive forms do not.6 Nonetheless, the distributive and shared form, if it is to apply to large groups, must still explain how these groups are more than simple aggregates to address fully the reductive objection; otherwise, shared moral responsibility may be limited to small groups of active perpetrators who share an intention to do harm (e.g., co-conspirators in a bank robbery, only the active perpetrators of a hate crime). Moreover, the defender of shared responsibility must have a means of addressing the normative and practical objections. As I indicate below, shifting to a narrative approach can help counter all three objections to shared responsibility, especially for larger groups that do not neatly fit French’s taxonomy. Indeed, many social groups that interest us—races, genders, ethnicities, religions—do not seem to fit. These intermediate sorts of groups do not have explicit decision procedures yet they do survive varying membership and achieve a kind of stability over time. How do we interpret such groups when it comes to questions of moral responsibility? Taking a narrative approach can provide one answer.
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