Implications of Collective Moral Responsibility for Group Members: (1) A Radical Disjunction Between Our Responsibility and Mine
Suppose that we—collectively—did something wrong, were not coerced into doing so, and knew, or should have known, that it was wrong, and that one can infer from this that we are to blame for doing what we did.
As we shall explain, given Gilbert’s understanding of the relevant terms, it is possible that I am not personally blameworthy in any way in connection with our action. It is also possible that I am personally blameworthy in connection with it. Finally, it is possible that insofar as I am blameworthy, I am either more or less blameworthy than many others: our blameworthiness does not imply an equality of personal blameworthiness for all, even when all are personally blameworthy to some degree. You may have wholeheartedly instigated our action; I may have made some effort not to participate, though I did not do as much in that regard as could reasonably have been expected of me. And so on.There are several ways of disjoining collective blameworthiness from that of a given member, given Gilbert’s understanding of the relevant terms. Some of these ways apply given other such understandings, but we focus on the implications of Gilbert’s perspective here. In our discussion the unqualified “we” and cognate terms refer to the people in question, considered collectively, and “I” refers to any given member.
Under at least the following three conditions my culpability may be non-existent, or minimal, in relation to our performance of some action for which we may be blamed, perhaps strongly.
First, I may be non-culpably ignorant of what we are doing or how we are doing it. Such ignorance is particularly likely in cases of larger groups where an action was ordered by authorities and carried out by members other than myself in ways that I cannot have been expected to notice. It is also possible in smaller groups, particularly with respect to the means by which our goal is carried out.
Second, though I knew what was happening, I may have done all I could reasonably be expected to do to stop the action or minimize its effects. Perhaps I organized a large protest march, or hid potential victims, at considerable risk to myself.
Third, I may have had no real choice with respect to participation. For instance, my life or that of a family member or members may have been threatened. In some cases less than that would be enough. A threat to fire me from my job, say, might suffice to excuse me for participating. As Gilbert has argued I can be genuinely ready to co-commit myself with others in such circumstances.30 There is a further factor that is always apt to mitigate my culpability in the context of our blameworthiness. The very existence of our collective goal put a considerable amount of pressure upon me to participate in the relevant collective action, for at least the following reasons.
Any joint commitment normatively constrains the parties to act accordingly, irrespective of their personal desires and inclinations. Thus there is always some reason to participate, though this may be overridden, and massively overridden, by other considerations.
Further, joint commitment is a primary, if not the primary context for trust, on the one hand, and betrayal, on the other (Gilbert 2006b: 149—52). A given party may be reluctant to do something that his fellows may well count as a betrayal.
Joint commitment is also a primary site of accountability: the members are answerable to one another for their conformity or otherwise, as the parties will understand (Gilbert 2006b: 253). So, if Jill suddenly stops acting in ways to promote their bank robbery, and Jane calls her to account—asking her why she is so acting, implying that she needs an excuse—Jill cannot appropriately respond “That’s none of your business.” Knowing this, Jill may want to avoid being called to account by Jane.
Relatedly, Jane has standing to rebuke Jill for stopping, and to demand that she get a move on.
In other terms, Jane has a right to Jill’s conformity to the commitment, and Jill an equivalent obligation to Jane to comply. A given party may be reluctant to violate the others’ rights and default on his own obligations to her, or at least not want to be rebuked for non-conformity or subjected to relevant demands which may be expressed publicly in front of other members, and potentially by physical means.A further consideration offering some mitigation of a member’s personal blame in the context of a group’s wrongdoing is this. Collective goals will often be associated with supportive collective moral beliefs. Let us assume that the goal was morally untenable, and that the supportive collective moral beliefs are false. Whether or not the existence of these beliefs absolves us from blame, they put further pressure on me to participate in our action.
As said, the pressures on an individual from within the system of collective goals, beliefs, and so on within which he is embedded may be quite strong, and mitigate his culpability for participating in a blameworthy collective action. That is not to say that in certain circumstances he will not at the end of the day be more or less blameworthy for his participation: everything depends on the details of the case.
Someone may think that my being a member of a blameworthy group—being and continuing to be party to the relevant joint commitments—suffices to lay some blame on me. Here again, everything depends on the details of the case.
It is possible to be party to a joint commitment while having no real choice in the matter.31 One must have been ready to do so, but the kind of readiness at issue can exist when there are no feasible alternatives. In that case my being party to the relevant joint commitment may not be culpable.
Further, since I cannot unilaterally rescind our joint commitment, absent special background understandings, my failure to rescind it cannot be blamed. I may, of course, be blameworthy for conforming to it, or for failing to urge others to join in its rescinding,
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