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Introduction

People tend to be comfortable praising or blaming both individuals and groups for their actions. The case of groups, however, has occasioned a number of special concerns. For instance, if a group is to blame for its bad action, does that mean all of its members are at least to some extent personally to blame? Or are its individual members somehow relieved of any blameworthiness in the matter? Neither of these options seems right.

Surely all members need not be blame­worthy? Some, for instance, may have tried their best to prevent the action in question. Surely, at the same time, all members may be blameworthy?

What are the implications for group members of the praise- or blameworthiness of a group’s action? More succinctly: what are the implications for group members of collective moral responsibility?

Margaret Gilbert has discussed this question in several places, beginning with her book On Social Facts (Gilbert 1989: esp. 425—427).1 She has also focused on related questions having to do with the emotions that may be prompted by a group’s praise- or blameworthy action.

One of these questions is this. If my group acted badly, but I myself did nothing wrong, does it make sense for me to feel guilt over the group’s action?2 Another question is: What exactly do we mean when we ascribe such emotions as guilt, remorse, and pride to groups? For example, what do we mean when we say “The committee is proud of what it did”?3

This chapter offers an overview of Gilbert’s work on collective moral responsibility and related topics. We start by setting out a working account of moral responsibility. We then outline Gilbert’s account of acting together and related notions and set out a corresponding account of collective moral responsibility. Given this account, we consider the implications for group members of the praise- or blameworthiness of a group’s action, focusing on the latter. We then review Gilbert’s answers to the questions about emotions noted above. At some points in our discussion, and in the concluding section, we respond to concerns that have been or might be expressed in relation to Gilbert’s work in this area. This is a fair amount to cover, and we should emphasize at the outset that many of the topics in question deserve a longer treatment.

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Source: Bazargan-Forward Saba, Tollefsen Deborah (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge,2020. — 538 p.. 2020

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