Madura as Garrison and Tax Base
Recent historical work paints a portrait of a people subject to oppressive taxation, an ever-present danger of military conscription, and nonexistent or arbitrary rule of law, all compounded by marginal natural resources (Jonge 1993).
The hardships endured by the Madurese peasantry quite often went beyond those endured by other Indonesian groups.Beginning when Madurese retainers aided in routing the Mogul invasion in 1293, Madura was to provide soldiers for overseas expeditions under the auspices of indigenous princes and the Dutch colonial power. In 1677, rebellious Madurese liberated the island, only to come under the rule of the Dutch East India Company between 1705 and 1743. This new status left the Madurese principalities with a new degree of independence and security vis-a-vis Java, but in time meant increasingly burdensome obligations and growing isolation from the outside world.
By the eighteenth century, the Dutch had realized the value of Madurese troops who could be counted on as loyal, brave, and ruthless allies in putting down revolts by Javanese, Chinese, Balinese, and other subjects (Smith 1997). Madurese mercenaries were to see action many times from 1742 until their last mission in 1923 to suppress a railway strike in Java. The role played by the Madurese in colonial armies would not only have a lasting effect on the reputation of their society as a whole, but would also have ramifications on the welfare of the island. “Voluntary” conscription was voluntary only in theory, and the threat of forced conscription caused many eligible men to flee the island to Java. One source cited military conscription in the early nineteenth century as partly responsible for effecting a one-third decrease in Madura's population in the space of a mere six years (Smith 1997).
Subordination to the Dutch provided protection from the Javanese, but the price was an obligation to provide soldiers, tribute, and goods at below market value.
Since Madura's forests were insignificant to the Dutch, and the area suitable for rice cultivation small, the colonial government sought other items of value that were available locally, either free or for prices well under market value. When compulsorily delivered produce was resold, the government could often reap profits of 300 to 400 percent (Smith 1997).With opium, gambling, and other highly profitable sources of revenue controlled by the colonial power, regents could only turn to the peasantry to meet the deliveries imposed on them. All irrigated land (sawah) was under the control of the regent. Part was given as salary fields for the regent's lower officials and servants, and part was sharecropped out on behalf of the regent. Peasants held hereditary rights to dry fields (tegal) as long as they paid their taxes. The most important of these were a poll tax, the proceeds of which went to the regent himself, and a land tax, much of which was distributed in appanage. In time, a growing parasitic class of nobility, appanage-holders, and village chiefs developed. The system proliferated in pyramidal fashion in the eighteenth century as tax farmers from the towns delegated their rights to representatives. Nothing prevented the latter from adding taxes of their own or farming out their rights to local tax farmers (Jonge 1986). Villagers also made yearly offerings to guardians of sacred tombs (bhuju,).