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Inde

a fortiori reasoning 15, 111, 113, 119-23,

129, 162, 163 abduced rules 105-6 absurd intended meanings 46-8 norms constraining 52-3, 63-4 actual meanings 76-7 Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co.

115-16 advisory rules 6 affect heuristic 152 Alexander, L. 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 22, 23, 24,

25, 35, 75, 135, 138 algorithmic textualism 71-5 Altman, A. 12 ambiguity 12, 25, 59-60 algorithmic textualism and 74-5 analogical reasoning 2, 15, 111-30, 145,

146, 148, 163, 164, 166

a fortiori constraint 15, 111, 113, 119-23, 129, 162, 163

case to case 112-30 distinguishing precedent rules 111, 113, 125-8, 129-30, 159-61, 162, 163 improving judicial rule-making 156-8, 159, 162

questions about its existence 129-30 reasons account, see reasons account of decision-making

similarity 111, 113, 114-19, 129, 163 anchoring 152 apparent laws 60

Arkansas legislature 22, 25-6, 47, 73 Arrow's theorem 59

Ashwander doctrine 55-6 attribution errors 153 author

hypothetical, see hypothetical author

idealized 76, 80-81

need to identify 70-71

need to posit existence of 69-70 authoritative meanings 76-7 authority question 82 authority through acceptance 107 availability heuristic 98, 151

Bankowski, Z. 130-31 Bassham, A. 30-33 bias, cognitive 98-9, 150-53 bicameralism 40 body of legal rules 15 Bratman, M. 163 broad rules 103-4 Burton, S. 14-15

Campbell, T.D. 7 canonical texts

intended meaning, see intended meaning

non-intentionalist interpretation, see non-intentionalist interpretation overruling precedent rules 110 case-to-case analogies 112-30 Cernauskas v. Fletcher 47, 73 changing body of law 144 Chapman, G.B. 152 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United

States 47

classification of facts 14-15 cognitive biases 98-9, 150-53 coherence 137

Coke, E. 1

common law 1, 2-3, 149

analogical reasoning, see analogical reasoning

judicial practice, see judicial practice legal principles, see legal principles natural reasoning, see natural reasoning rule model, see rule model of decision-making comparison, see analogical reasoning complexity of decision-making 99-100 conflicting multiple intended meanings 46, 49-51

norms for failed law 58-61 consistency 92, 143 Constitution, see United States Constitution

constitutional issues, interpreting to avoid 55-6

constraining norms, see norms constraining intended meanings context 75

contextual changes 36-40 convention-based legal principles 140-41

coordination 90-91

benefits of rules 96-100

problems 7 corrections of rule-maker's intent 35-41,

62-3 counterfactual intentions/beliefs 31, 32,

33

custodial interrogation 36-7

deductive reasoning 2, 15, 18, 93-100, 134, 156, 167

comparison with natural reasoning 94-100

see also rule model of common law reasoning

defective rules 147 delegation of rule-making power 8 deliberation, review of 107 determinacy

of intended meanings 28-30 challenges to 30-44

of rules 11-16, 30, 94-5, 125, 141-2, 164

‘deviant' meanings 71 dilemma of rules 9-11, 17 disagreement 8 distinguishing precedent rules 111,

113, 125-8, 129-30, 159-61, 162, 163

Dworkin, R.

80, 111, 131-3, 136, 137-8, 139, 143

Dworkinian principles 131-7

problems of weight and problems of fit 137-40 dynamic interpretation 2, 81-3

effectuation of specific policies 53-6 emendations 35-41, 62-3 emotional response 152 empirical reasoning 2, 15, 88, 90-93, 100, 167; see also natural reasoning enforcement 11 epistemological question 82 Epstein, R.A. 62 equal treatment 91-2, 113, 114, 143 errors 9, 48, 95, 108

attribution errors 153

Eskridge, W. 81-2 expectations 90-91 expertise of private actors 96 of rule-makers 95-6

facticity of intentions 42-4, 63

facts

bias in favour of salient facts 98, 151 missing facts 120

prior classification of 14-15 weighing 121-2, 129 factual presuppositions 38-40 failed law, norms for 58-61 fairness 84, 143, 154 fidelity in translation 36-40 Fifth Amendment 31, 36-7 firearms 22-3 Fish, S. 23, 43 Fiss, O. 140 fit 131, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 145

problems of 137-9

form, norms of 56-8, 59, 61, 64

Frickey, P. 81-2

Fuller, L.L. 13

Fumerton, R.A. 9

gap between rule-making authority and rule subjects 10-11

generality of intentions, levels of 33-5, 61-4

Greenawalt, K. 28 Grice, P. 21, 23 Guthrie, C. 152

habit 11

Hart, H.L.A. 8, 30 holdings 148 Horty, J. 113, 120, 123 humility, structural 38 Humphrey, J.A. 41 hypothetical author 69-71, 75 idealized reader 78-9 and interpreting posited rules 25-6, 27 norms constraining intended meanings 53-5

idealized author 76, 80-81 idealized reader 76, 78-80, 81, 83 implicitly posited rules 105-6 improvement of precedent rules 127-8 impure textualism 65-6, 71-81 individual actors 8-9 infelicities of intended meaning 46-64 absurd, unjust and pointless intended meanings 46-8, 52-3, 63-4 conflicting multiple intended meanings 46, 49-51, 58-61

norms constraining intended meaning as antidotes 52-64

procedural constraints 56-64 substantive constraints 52-6, 63-4 opaque intended meanings 46, 48-9 integrity 139, 143 intended meaning 2, 20-64, 85 challenges to the determinacy of 30-44 ‘deviant' meanings 71 as the goal of legal interpretation 21-7 infelicities of, see infelicities of intended meaning judicial rules 106

Kripkenstein critique 41-2 levels of generality of intentions 33-5, 61-4 multiplicity of 30-33, 46, 49-51, 58-61 and original public meaning 83-5 rule of law-restricted intentionalism 75, 76-7, 81, 83

state of mind that constitutes the lawmaker's intended meaning 28-30

textual meaning and 70-71 translation 35-41

intention-free textualism, impossibility of 65, 66-71

interpretation 2, 47, 64, 166 doctrine of interpreting statutes to avoid having to resolve constitutional questions 55-6 judicial rules 106 non-intentionalist, see non- intentionalist interpretation of posited rules, see intended meaning interpretive norms 25-6, 61-3; see also norms constraining intended meanings

interrogation, custodial 36-7 intuition 117-19 irony 24 irrationality 163-4

Johnson, E.J.

152

judicial opinions 101, 104, 105, 106 judicial practice 2-3, 146-65 distinguishing precedent rules 159-61, 162, 163

imperfect rule-making 148, 149-55 cognitive bias 150-53 salience of a particular case 149-50, 157

weaknesses of judicial rule-making

155

improving judicial rule-making 148-9, 156-62

indirect effects of customary practice 162

scope of precedent rules 158-9 searching for analogies, reasons or legal principles 156-8 overruling precedent rules 153-5, 159, 164

rationality and sustainability of common law practice 162-5 judicial rules, see rule model of common law reasoning

Kahneman, D. 98

Kavka, G.S. 5 Kress, K.J. 138 Kripke, S.A. 13, 41 Kripkenstein critique 41-4

Lamond, G. 123 language 13, 24, 25

texts cannot declare the language in which they are written 68-9 law, nature of 16-18 Lawson, G. 27 legal accessibility 57-8 legal constraint 12 legal presuppositions, changes in 36-40 legal principles 111-12, 130-45, 146, 163, 167

Dworkinian 131-40

improving judicial rule-making 156-8, 162

pernicious effects of 141-2

problems of weight and problems of fit 137-41

why proposed justifications fail 142-4

why they should not have a role in judicial decision-making 145 legal reasons, see reasons account of decision-making legislative history 66, 67 lenity, doctrine of 54-5 Lessig, L. 36-40, 62 levels of generality of intentions 33-5, 61-4

Levi, E. 113, 117 limiting judicial rule-making 106-7 Llewellyn, K. 15

MacCormick, D.N. 130-31 man-on-the-street interpretation 76, 77-8, 81

Manning, J. 68 Marmor, A. 65

Marshall, G. 130-31

meaning 13

intended, see intended meaning semantic intentions 31-3 speaker's 21-7, 65

utterance 23-4, 27, 72

‘median' member of the public 76, 77-8, 81

mental state of the rule-maker 28-30 Kripkenstein critique 41-4

Miranda v. Arizona 36-7 misbehavior 7-8

moderate intentionalists 32 modification of precedent rules 127-9, 153-5, 159-61

Moore, M.S. 87

moral reasoning 2, 15, 81, 88-93, 141, 167; see also natural reasoning morality 5-6, 17

morally best principles 131, 135, 136, 138-9, 144; see also legal principles multi-member rule-making bodies 46, 49-51, 106

idealized reader 79, 80 norms for failed law 58-61 multiplicity of intended meanings 30-33, 46, 49-51, 58-61

natural law 16-17

natural reasoning 15-16, 87-100, 111, 143-4, 146, 167, 168

and broad rules 104

in the common law 88-93

compared with deductive reasoning 94-100

improving judicial rule-making 156, 157-8

role of judges 94

nature of law 16-18

Nix v.

Hedden 22

non-algorithmic textualists 75-81 non-intentionalist interpretation

65-85

dynamic interpretation of canonical legal rules 2, 81-3

original public meaning 83-5 textualism, see textualism

norms constraining intended meanings

52-64

procedural constraints 56-64 levels of generality of rule-makers' intentions 61-4 norms for failed law 58-61 norms of form 56-8, 59, 61, 64 substantive constraints 52-6, 63-4 avoiding substantively infelicitous results 52-3 effectuating specific policies 53-6

‘objectified' intent 66-8 obsolete rules 63-4 ontological question 82 opaque intended meanings 46, 48-9 opinions, judicial 101, 104, 105, 106 original public meaning 83-5 over-inclusive rules 35, 147 overruling precedent rules 104, 107-10, 159, 164

prospective 103 when to overrule 109, 110, 153-5

particularism

pure 99 rule-sensitive 10, 93, 97-100

Penner, J. 141 perceptions of similarity 117 pluralism 8 pointless intended meanings 46-8 policy effectuation 53-6 political (value) presuppositions 38-40 positivism 16-18

presumptive 11

Posner, R. 81 Postema, G.J. 11 practical reason interpretation (dynamic interpretation) 2, 81-3

Prakash, S. 22, 24, 25, 75 precedent rules 88, 156

distinguishing 111, 113, 125-8, 129-30, 159-61, 162, 163 identifying 104-6 overruling, see overruling precedent rules

scope of 158-9 preconstitutional constraints 52 presumptive positivism 11 principles, legal, see legal principles prior classification of facts 14-15 private actors' expertise 96 procedural constraints 56-64 professional consensus 140-41 prospective rules 102-3 psychological mechanisms 11 pure textualism, impossibility of 65, 66-71

purpose 13-14 interpretation of rules and 29, 32-3, 35, 62-3

Rachlinski, J.J. 152

rationality of common law practice 162-5

Raz, J. 113, 127-8 reasonable person 85 reasons account of decision-making 2, 111-12, 113-14, 123-5, 129, 146, 163, 166-7

comparison with legal principles 130,

133

improving judicial rule-making 156-8, 162

reference 32

reflective equilibrium 88-90, 135, 141 regress 109

retroactive decision-making 143-4 rich semantic intentions 32 rule of law-restricted intentionalism 75, 76-7, 81, 83

rule-making authority 5-9 dilemma of rules 9-11 rule model of common law reasoning 87-8, 111, 143-4

comparison between natural reasoning and deductive reasoning 94-100 judicial practice, see judicial practice puzzles affecting 101-10

identifying precedent rules 104-6 limiting judicial rule-making 106-7 overruling precedent rules 107-10 rule-making 101-4 reasoning under rules 93-4

role of judges 94

see also deductive reasoning rule-sensitive particularism 10, 93, 97-100

rule skepticism 12, 14 rule subjects 9-11 rules 3, 63-4, 131, 156, 168

broad 103-4 defective 147 determinacy of 11-16, 30, 94-5, 125, 141-2, 164

differences from legal principles 134-5, 143-4

dilemma of 9-11, 17

impure textualism and construction of rules by interpreters 71-81 interpretation of posited rules 20-45 irrationality and 163-4 obsolete 63-4

over-inclusive 35, 147 overridden by legal principles 142 precedent rules, see precedent rules prospective 102-3 settlement 6-9

salience of a particular case 149-50, 157 salient facts, bias in favour of 98, 151 sanctions 11

Scalia, A.

66-8

Schauer, F. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 93, 154, 155, 165

scope beliefs/intentions 31, 32 scope of precedent rules 158-9 selection effects 154-5 self-deception 11, 163-4 self-incrimination, privilege against 36-7 semantic autonomy 13, 14, 15 semantic intentions 31-3 sense, and reference 32

settlement 5-9, 17, 18, 27, 46-7, 119 benefits of rules 14, 96-100

Seventeenth Amendment 22, 25, 47, 73 Shain, R. 32

Sherwin, E. 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 135, 163 similarity 111, 113, 114-19, 129, 163 single event, familiarity with a 152-3 Smith v. US 22-3

socialization 11

Solum, L. 83

spare semantic intentions 32 speaker's meaning 21-7, 65 standards 3, 8, 15-16, 18, 64, 87, 100

interpretation of 34

limited authority 96-7

and overruling 110 state of mind, see mental state of the rule-maker

state sovereignty 37 structural humility 38 subjective intent of the enacting legislature 66, 67

substantive constraints 52-6, 63-4 Sunstein, C. 82 sustainability of common law practice 162-5

symbols 24-7 sympathy 154

ten-dollar cap on attorneys' fees 37, 38 tendency, of facts 121

Tenth Amendment 37 texts

inability to declare the language in which they are written 68-9

inability to declare that they are texts 69-70

textualism 2, 47, 57, 65-81

algorithmic 71-5

four non-algorithmic textualists 75-81 impossibility of pure textualism 65, 66-71

impure 65-6, 71-81

tomatoes 22 translation of rule-maker's intent 35-41 transparency 42

Tversky, A. 98

under-inclusiveness 35

United States Code 37

United States Constitution 69-70

Fifth Amendment 31, 36-7

Seventeenth Amendment 22, 25, 47, 73 Tenth Amendment 37

United States v. Locke 47-8

unjust intended meanings 46-8

norms constraining 52-3, 63-4

utilitarianism 122

utterance meaning 23-4, 27, 72

value (political) presuppositions 38-40

veterans' ten-dollar cap on attorneys' fees

37, 38

voting norms 56-7

weight of legal principles 131, 135, 143 problems of 137, 139-41

Weinreb, L.

12, 115-16, 117, 150

Westen, P. 13

Wistrich, A.J. 152

Yablon, C.M. 42

Zipursky, B.C. 16

Titles in the Elgar Advanced Introductions series include:

International Political Economy

Benjamin J. Cohen

The Austrian School of Economics Randall G. Holcombe

Cultural Economics

Ruth Towse

Law and Development

Michael J. Trebilcock and Mariana

Mota Prado

International Humanitarian Law

Robert Kolb

International Trade Law

Michael J. Trebilcock

Post Keynesian Economics

J.E. King

International Intellectual Property

Susy Frankel and Daniel J. Gervais

Public Management and

Administration

Christopher Pollitt

Organised Crime

Leslie Holmes

Nationalism

Liah Greenfeld

Social Policy

Daniel Beland and Rianne Mahon

Globalisation

Jonathan Michie

Entrepreneurial Finance

Hans Landstrom

International Conflict and Security Law

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Comparative Constitutional Law

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International Human Rights Law Dinah L. Shelton

Entrepreneurship

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International Tax Law

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Public Policy

B. Guy Peters

The Law of International

Organizations

Jan Klabbers

International Environmental Law

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International Sales Law

Clayton P. Gillette

Corporate Venturing

Robert D. Hisrich

Public Choice

Randall G. Holcombe

Private Law

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Consumer Behavior Analysis

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Behavioral Economics

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Cost-Benefit Analysis

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Environmental Impact Assessment Angus Morrison-Saunders

Comparative Constitutional Law

Second Edition

Mark Tushnet

National Innovation Systems Cristina Chaminade, Bengt-Ake Lundvall and Shagufta Haneef

Ecological Economics

Matthias Ruth

Private International Law and

Procedure

Peter Hay

Freedom of Expression

Mark Tushnet

Law and Globalisation

Jaakko Husa

Regional Innovation Systems Bjorn T. Asheim, Arne Isaksen and Michaela Trippl

International Political Economy Second Edition

Benjamin J. Cohen

International Tax Law

Second Edition

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Social Innovation

Frank Moulaert and Diana

MacCallum

The Creative City

Charles Landry

International Trade Law

Michael J. Trebilcock and Joel Trachtman

European Union Law

Jacques Ziller

Planning Theory

Robert A. Beauregard

Tourism Destination Management

Chris Ryan

International Investment Law

August Reinisch

Sustainable Tourism

David Weaver

Austrian School of Economics

Second Edition

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U.S. Criminal Procedure

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Platform Economics

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Vito Tanzi

Feminist Economics

Joyce P. Jacobsen

Human Dignity and Law

James R. May and Erin Daly

Space Law

Frans G. von der Dunk

National Accounting

John M. Hartwick

Legal Research Methods

Ernst Hirsch Ballin

Privacy Law

Megan Richardson

International Human Rights Law

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Dinah L. Shelton

Law and Artificial Intelligence Woodrow Barfield and Ugo Pagallo

Politics of International Human

Rights

David P. Forsythe

Community-based Conservation

Fikret Berkes

Global Production Networks

Neil M. Coe

Mental Health Law

Michael L. Perlin

Law and Literature

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Creative Industries

John Hartley

Global Administration Law

Sabino Cassese

Housing Studies

William A.V. Clark

Global Sports Law

Stephen F. Ross

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B. Guy Peters

Empirical Legal Research

Herbert M. Kritzer

Cities

Peter J. Taylor

Law and Entrepreneurship

Shubha Ghosh

Mobilities

Mimi Sheller

Technology Policy

Albert N. Link and James Cunningham

Urban Transport Planning

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Source: Alexander Larry, Sherwin Emily. Advanced Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Edward Elgar,2021. — 200 p.. 2021
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