Kuhn and the Social Sciences
There has been intensive discussion about the possibility of applying the Kuhnian model to the human and social sciences. Kuhn himself did not promote an extension of his views to other than natural sciences.
According to him, the hermeneutic reinterpretation is the essence of the human and social sciences. They are permanently searching for a deeper understanding of their field. Actually, they are interpretative and thus hermeneutic sciences. Although the natural sciences have to interpret their findings, that interpretation has a different role. An established interpretation (selfunderstanding) is a precondition of the natural sciences, and the re-interpretation is a result of a scientific revolution, whereas, due to the simple fact that the social and political systems are changing in a way that calls for new interpretations, the social and human sciences are always at the stage of re-interpretation (Kuhn 1991, 17, Bird 21).Notwithstanding Kuhn's criticism, his model has some advantages as far as the social and human sciences are concerned. The main reason is that the model permits a quite liberal conception of what science is compared to the standard picture. Kuhn also rejected the idea of the decisive role of rules as determining scientific outcomes. This view leaves room for different factors external to science, making it possible to explain the development of other branches of science and not just the natural sciences (Bird 19).
It seems to me that Kuhn underestimated the stable features of the human and social sciences. It is widely accepted that the target of those sciences, and that of DSL, is changing all the time. As we have seen before, this does not mean that DSL loses its structural features as a science. Therefore, the fundamental question does not concern the applicability of the Kuhnian model in general so much as the possibility (and necessity) of re-interpreting Kuhn's basic concepts so that they can be applied to DSL.
For instance, the idea of a matrix seems to be useful for the needs of DSL, whereas a direct application of the Kuhnian notion of a matrix would go against Kuhn's original thoughts. This is why, as regards DSL, it is important to first specify the notion of the matrix applicable to DSL, and, second, to identify the theory articulated in the matrix of DSL. Let us begin with the notion of the matrix. In its Kuhnian sense, the matrix is comprised of the following elements:1. Symbolic generalisations - that is, ways of verbal conceptualisations of the necessary elements needed by the matrix;
2. a communal (not solely individual) commitment to the structuring models of a certain branch of science;
3. a similar commitment to the values holding the scientific community together, as well as to the norms and instructions that direct science, and
4. shared scientific exemplars - that is, paradigmatic solutions that highlight the way normal science solves problems that may appear (Aarnio 1997, 253).
The matrix is elastic, but without limits and without any “paradigmatic” commitments the discipline at hand would not be possible. In this sense, the matrix is the “normative” foundation of every discipline. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the more specified the matrix of a certain discipline becomes, the more vulnerable it is to “extra-scientific” critique. It can also easily be worn out, regardless of whether a replacement matrix is on its way.