Legal battlefields after the 1994 genocide In Rwanda
Ordinary courts
From December 2016, the new GoR started to adjudicate suspects that it had arrested within its territory before the national courts. There were hardly any judges left.
The bar was also decimated during the genocide. Most cases resulted in long prison sentences and executions.Gacaca2
Because of the weak legal infrastructure, it soon became clear that it would take decades before a court could adjudicate all genocide suspects, who were locked in overcrowded prisons (Tertsakian 2008). As a solution, the GoR revived an old tradition: Gacaca, a form of ‘on the grass' community justice (Reyntjens 1990).
In a short period, the GoR installed thousands of peoples' courts and trained lay judges to decide cases of genocide suspects. The suspects were brought from prison to appear in front of the local community where the crimes were committed. In ten years, the gacaca courts dealt with almost two million cases through procedures of ‘justice without lawyers'.
Today, the ordinary Rwandan courts deal with the national genocide cases. They also have jurisdiction to review gacaca decisions that have resulted in obvious mistakes. The Specialised Chamber for International Crimes of the High Court will deal with extradition and (most of the) expulsion cases. This Court—financed by the Dutch government—is scheduled to open in Nyanza in 2018.
The ICTR
The United Nations created the ICTR in Arusha for the trials against the main organisers of the genocide (‘the big fish').
Rwanda was the only member of the Security Council that voted against this location abroad because it claimed that these heinous acts should be adjudicated in the country where they took place.
In the twenty years of its existence, the ICTR has adjudicated 92 individuals, which led to 62 convictions and 14 acquittals. The ICTR has not been an unqualified success (Cruvellier 2010; Bouwknegt 2017, chap.
4). The procedures lasted very long (7,5 years on average and as long as 13,5 years), were very costly, and verdicts were often unconvincing or in contradiction with earlier ICTR decisions (see the critical analysis of Bouwknegt 2017, 204n5ff.).For the supply of witnesses, the ICTR was largely dependent on Rwanda's cooperation. A witness protection scheme was installed, and most witnesses were examined behind closed doors. The GoR did not cooperate full-heartedly with the ICTR. It was successful in preventing alleged RPF crimes from being brought before the ICTR. The government argued that this would fuel genocide denial. Carla del Ponte, who wanted to investigate RPF crimes, lost her job as Prosecutor in 2003 (Del Ponte and Sudetic 2009).
On December 31, 2015, the ICTR formally closed down. The remaining duties of the Tribunal were handed over to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT).
The ICTR referred three of the seven remaining cases to Rwanda after the GoR had adjusted its legal system.
Other countries
Genocide is the crime of crimes and impunity is not an option, according to international law. Therefore, host countries must either try genocide suspects or extradite them to Rwanda. Adjudicating in the host country is a complex and costly legal affair. Extradition on the request of Rwanda is cheaper but is only possible after the permission of a national judge.
When gacaca courts and the ICTR had closed down, the spotlight was put on the Rwandan legal system. France (to which the ICTR also referred cases) and Germany adjudicated genocide crimes themselves, based on universal jurisdiction. Canada deported Leon Mugesera and Henri Jean- Claude Seyoboka to Rwanda and tried Munyaneza and Mungwarere itself (Bouwknegt 2017, n. 4).
The ICTR's referrals and the ECtHR's Ahorugeze decision,3 for which the Dutch government lobbied intensively, created a favourable legal climate in Europe to extradite suspects to Rwanda (e.g., in Norway and Denmark).
It is not easy to determine the exact numbers of extradition requests. In 2017, the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA) informed the Rwandan Senate that over a 10-year period it submitted 835 extradition requests to foreign states. Out of the 126 requests to African States, only three resulted in extradition. About 20 cases were granted for proceedings in Rwanda (National Public Prosecution Authority, n.d.).