Military Legitimacy and Public Support

Public support has proved to be both a requirement and a measure of military legitimacy from the jungles of Vietnam to the deserts of the Persian Gulf, even to the killing fields of Somalia.

Colonel (Retired) Harry G. Summers Jr., attributed the US failure in Vietnam largely to the unwillingness of President Johnson to mobilize the reserves and the national will when he escalated the US commitment from nation assistance to war - a war the president thought would be low profile and fought by professionals and draftees.¹

Almost 20 years later President Bush mobilized the reserves and went to Congress for a resolution of support before ordering the Desert Storm offensive. The support of the American people for the war effort was mobilized with the reserves and the Congressional resolution of January 1991, which authorized the president to use offensive force.

The loss of public support for US involvement in Somalia following the abortive raid in Mogadishu in October 1993 was reminiscent of Vietnam. That painful lesson in legitimacy will be discussed further under the principles of objective and restraint.

Public support in the area of operations has proven to be even more important in nation assistance than in combat. Normally that support is essential to the legitimacy of the host government, and requires that US efforts be low profile to be effective. General George A. Joulwan has emphasized the need for US forces in Latin America to take a subordinate role in nation assistance:

US agencies cannot become the recognized or perceived authority within any host nation, otherwise the legitimacy of the host nation's government is undermined. For the same reasons, USSOUTHCOM [US Southern Command] assists with the professional development of a host nation's military force while taking care not to assume its role. The concern for legitimacy underscores USSOUTHCOM's assistance role in the theater.²