Political and Military Objectives

When political and military objectives have not been made clear, commanders have often chosen inappropriate means to achieve them which have compromised military legitimacy. Vietnam is the classic case, where the lack of clear objectives allowed the body count to replace local public support as the measure of success.

President Bush demonstrated an understanding of the strategic dimension of legitimacy when he initiated Restore Hope in December 1991. Largely because political and military objectives were reasonably clear and understood by all concerned, phase one of the Somalia humanitarian assistance mission ended on a successful note in May 1993.

In the second phase President Clinton had a more difficult time with the strategic requirements of legitimacy. There were no clear US political objectives and no defined end state for US and other UN forces in Somalia. After the conclusion of Restore Hope it was not clear whether the UN mission was nation assistance, peacekeeping or peace enforcement; there was clearly no government to support and no peace to keep.

The dictates of PDD 25 would not have allowed US combat forces in such an ambiguous situation, but in the midst of uncertainty they remained, until mission creep eroded restraint and US forces abandoned the defensive. It was reminiscent of the fateful transition period in Vietnam: there was no public debate and no stated change in strategic objectives. If strategic decisions were made, they were not publicized.

The legitimacy of the US presence in Somalia was lost following the abortive 1993 raid in Mogadishu when the American public witnessed the body of a US soldier being dragged through the streets of that city. The strategic error of the US (and the UN) was the failure to clarify political and military objectives, complicated by the lack of any end state for the military forces involved.

Without clear strategic guidance combat commanders can be expected to use overwhelming force to achieve tactical military objectives without regard for political objectives. In Somalia it resulted in the ignominious withdrawal of US forces in March 1994, with the remaining UN forces withdrawn a year later.

In Latin America the US has avoided the pitfalls of mission creep. General Joulwan has recognized the importance of the requirements of military legitimacy and described the strategic objective of USSOUTHCOM as a political one that fosters

... a community of free, stable and prosperous nations acting in concert with one another while representing the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principle of sovereignty and international law.³