Unity of Effort and Interagency Operations
Nation assistance operations are interagency by their nature. Whether emergency disaster relief, continuing humanitarian and security assistance, or post-conflict, the military is but one element in nation assistance, and it is often subordinate to US civilian agencies.
Mission success requires unity of effort between all participants; diplomat warriors must lead from behind when working with US foreign service personnel and an indigenous population.In Just Cause problems developed when military planners failed to co-ordinate their operations with State Department officials:
To preserve operational security, the US Ambassador, the State Department, and other agencies of the government were not included in the initial planning process. This lack of coordination caused problems when different approaches surfaced during implementation. Senior SOUTHCOM leadership and the supporting task force failed to devote sufficient attention to integrating the civil-military operation with the tactical concept they had developed.4
In Desert Shield/Storm, after early indifference by military planners to overall political objectives and State Department responsibility for civil-military issues, CA reservists helped bridge the gap between military and dipomatic officials:
Despite opposition or indifference on the part of key players, the Kuwait Task Force [made up of senior CA officers] was established, and it worked closely with the Government of Kuwait to plan and prepare for Kuwait's liberation.5
The refugee control operation at Guantanimo Naval Base in 1992 (GITMO) and again in 1994 required co-ordination with numerous civilian agencies in the lead: the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Community Relations Service, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the International Organization of Migrants. In Somalia (Restore Hope), non-governmental organizations (relief agencies) had important and sometimes leading roles.
They were the primary service providers, and political advisors were often requested to help resolve difficult civil-military issues. Commanders at all levels had to practise the art of diplomacy, working closely with civilians, relating military activities to political objectives.Operations GITMO and Restore Hope both taught that in operations other than war, diplomat warriors were required to bridge the gap between the military and civilian agencies of government, as well as non-governmental organizations, and then relate to local civilians in an unfamiliar cultural environment, a mission that necessitated overcoming international barriers of language and custom.
General Joulwan has emphasized the importance of unity of effort in Latin America:
Most often, other US agencies will have the lead in operations other than war and will be supported with US military resources. Such is the case with USSOUTHCOM and other agencies committed in Central and South America - we support US ambassadors and their country teams, which are in the lead.6