Perseverance Versus the Quick Fix
Nation assistance and peace operations require perseverance, but strikes and raids do not. When given a choice the American public and its elected representatives have indicated a preference for the combat quick fix rather than more extended non-combat operations.
In spite of security policy (the Weinberger Doctrine and PDD 25) that discourages the use of combat forces, the law and public sentiment encourage quick and dirty solutions to security problems overseas - so long as they are effective and produce few US casualties.The War Powers Act limits to 60 days any commitment of US forces '... where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances' without the approval of Congress.7 It is easy to understand why presidents have opted for overwhelming combat force in Vietnam, Grenada and Panama rather than for some measured but sustained force that might have achieved the same objectives with less violence and expense. The same impatience with US military commitments helps explain the Mogadishu debacle.
The lesson learned is that for both legal and political reasons extended non-combat operations should be avoided where hostilities are imminent. PDD 25 has confirmed that preference into policy. But Provide Comfort, the humanitarian and security assistance operation initiated after Desert Storm to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq from a vengeful Saddam Hussein, is an exception that proves the rule. It has quietly (except for the tragic friendly fire accident in 1994) accomplished its objectives, demonstrating the importance of perseverance to military and political legitimacy in operations other than war.
The danger of impatience to military and political legitimacy is illustrated by the abortive Mogadishu raid in October 1993. Had US forces maintained a defensive posture in Somalia they might not have won, but neither would they have lost.
The win/lose dichotomy is irrelevant to the political objectives of operations other than war so long as combat forces do not take the offensive; when applied by impatient commanders it runs counter to the principle of restraint, escalating the level of violence and undermining military legitimacy.8Experience has taught that when perseverance is required for mission success, as in nation assistance and peace operations, the requirements of military legitimacy become more difficult, while compliance is even more critical to mission success. Avoiding mission creep, complying with the law and prevailing cultural norms, and maintaining public support over a long period of time require diplomat warriors of unusual patience, ability and understanding.
General Joulwan has confirmed the need for perseverance to achieve US security objectives in Latin America:
Success in USSOUTHCOM's AOR in operations other than war will be measured by lasting improvements in host nation stability, prosperity and respect for individual rights rather than short-term military victories. Perseverance won the peace in El Salvador, and perseverance is required to sustain the peace. Changes come slowly. Bringing them about requires a long-term commitment to help, nurture and reinforce success, just as a commander would do on a conventional battlefield.9
Culture clash has proven to be a continuing threat to military legitimacy in extended military operations. In late 1990 during the Desert Shield build-up there were few local civilians in the desert to complicate issues of military legitimacy. Even so there were numerous culture clashes: Christian and Jewish religious services created a stir among Islamic Saudis; and recreational activities involving alcoholic beverages created even more serious problems. Finally, the relative equality and independence of women in the US military was too much for conservative Saudis to tolerate. Had Desert Storm not subordinated cultural concerns to the war effort and a quick victory not allowed most US forces to be withdrawn shortly thereafter, the legitimacy of the US presence would have been in jeopardy.
In GITMO and in Somalia there were cultural clashes along religious and racial lines, and language was often a barrier to resolving these conflicts. Behavioral standards in these unfamiliar cultural environments were not those to which US forces were accustomed, and civilian riots resulted when communication and security measures failed. Linguists were essential but rarely part of military units; and few military leaders had the language capability needed. Experience in both GITMO and Somalia confirmed that effective leadership requires a combination of perseverance, understanding, tolerance and firm action.