Summary

The new strategic environment presents new challenges for US policy-makers and the military. While the pervasive Soviet threat has dissipated, in its place have sprung new, more ambiguous, but no less dangerous regional threats to world peace and security.

Peacetime military strategies and capabilities must be an integral part of US foreign policy. Operations other than war rely on civil-military activities to achieve the public support required for military legitimacy. These activities complement combat operations. They allow the military to be a positive and constructive peacetime force that can promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Before new military strategies and leadership models can be developed for the challenges of the new millennium, the concept of military legitimacy and its component parts must first be understood. The next chapter describes the requirements of military legitimacy and translates them into seven principles essential for mission success in operations other than war.

Notes

1. JCS PUB 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Final Draft, January 1990), p. 1-6 (hereinafter referred to as JCS PUB 3-07); also quoted in FM 100-20 (AFP 3-20), Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Headquarters, Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 1 December 1989, at pp. 1-9; FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, at p. 13-4 (hereinafter referred to as FM 100-5); and FM 100-23, Peace Operations (draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, 26 January 1994, at p.

2. Judith Miller has concluded that militant Islam (Islamic fundamentalism) is a threat to democracy and human rights and should be opposed by the US. 'Despite their rhetorical commitment to democracy and pluralism, virtually all militant Islamists oppose both.' Ms. Miller cites others who see Islam by nature as 'fierce and militant', and Islamic law in opposition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and beyond reform. While militant Islamists may support democracy (majority rule) to attain power, they are opposed to minority rights. Judith Miller, 'The Challenge of Radical Islam', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1993), pp. 43, 45, 50-51.

3. Samuel P. Huntingdon, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), p. 22.

4. Walter Laqueur sees Russian nationalism as '... one firmly believing that Russia's rightful role as a great power can only be saved by a strong authoritarian government.' Walter Laqueur, 'Russian Nationalism', Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992-93), p. 103.

5. Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), p. 44.

6. Colin L. Powell, 'US Forces: Challenges Ahead', Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992-93), pp. 35, 41.

7. The activities of operations other than war are listed in FM 100-5, pp. 13-4 -13-8.

8. Special operations missions are listed in JCS PUB 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (draft), January 1994, pp. II—2—II—15.

9. Peace operations activities are listed in FM 100-23, pp. 2-1-2-17.

10. The ten special operations activities are provided in 10 USC 167; see JCS PUB 3-05, supra n. 43.

11. See CA activities listed in Chapter 2, JCS PUB 3-57.

12. See JCS PUB 3-57, pp. I-1, I-7, II—3, IV-6. Army doctrine for the legal aspects of CA operations is provided in FM 27-100, Legal Operations, September 1991, at Chapter 11; related doctrine is found in Chapter 7 (legal operations in LIC) and Chapter 9 (legal operations in special operations).

13. See JCS PUB 3-57, at pp. II—3, 4; see also Barnes, 'Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors in Contemporary Conflict', Special Warfare (Winter 1991), at p. 9.

14. Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, Final Report (Ft Monroe, VA, TRADOC, August 1986), Chapter 4, p. 8; cited by Michael T. Klare, 'The Interventionist Impulse: US Military Doctrine for Low Intensity Warfare', Low Intensity Conflict (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 75-76; also by Barnes, 'Legitimacy and the Lawyer in Low Intensity Conflict: Civil Affairs Legal Support', The Army Lawyer (October 1988), p. 5, n. 1.

15. Ibid. (JCS PUB 3-57) at pp. II—5, 6. The 20 Functional specialty skill areas for CA operations are divided into four groups:

(1) Public Administration Skill Area, which includes public administration, public safety, public health, labor, legal, public welfare, public finance, public education and civil defense.

(2) Economics Skill Area, which includes civilian supply, food and agriculture, economics and commerce, and property control.

(3) Public Facilities Skill Area, which includes public works and utilities, public communications, and public transportation.

(4) Other Functional Specialty Skill Areas, which include displaced persons, monuments and archives, cultural affairs, and civil information. Idem at pp. D-1 - D-3.

16. Ibid. at pp. II-6, 7.

17. See 'Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War', Symposium Proceedings, held 25-27 October 1991 at US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC.

18. Idem.

19. Andrew S. Natsios, 'The International Humanitarian Response System', Parameters (Spring 1995), pp. 68, 79.

20. 42 USC 5121 et seq. (The Robert Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act); DOD Directive 3025.1, Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies within the US, 1980; AR 500-60, Disaster Relief, 1981. The complexity of the above law and regulations is discussed by Maxwell Alston in 'Military Support to Civil Authorities: New Dimensions for the 1990s', The Officer (October 1991), p.

21. FM 100-5, p. 13-6.

22. Raymond E. Bell has proposed a CA brigade provide command and control for a regional security assistance force tailored for nation assistance. See Bell, 'To Be In Charge', Military Review (April 1988), p. 12.

23. 10 USC 40(c). For an overview of the law governing HCA, see draft Operational Law Handbook (JA 422, 1993) prepared by the Center for Law and Military Operations and the International Law Division at The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, Charlottesville, VA, at pp. L-140, O-159, 160, and Tab V (pp. 240 et seq.).

24. The Comptroller General's report and resulting HCA legislation is discussed by Fran W. Walterhouse, 'Using Humanitarian Activities as a Force Multi- plier and a Means of Promoting Stability in Developing Countries', The Army Lawyer, January 1993, pp. 16, 24-25. See also Barnes, 'Civic Action, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Disaster Relief: Military Priorities in Low Intensity Conflict', Special Warfare (Fall 1989), pp. 34-35.

25. 10 USC 405. The Act provides preconditions for HCA: It requires a determination by the secretary of the military department concerned that the activities will promote the national security of both the US and the host nation, and also promote 'the specific operational readiness skills' of participating military personnel (10 USC 401(a) (1)). The Secretary of State must approve all requests for military HCA activities and later give Congress a full report on them (10 USC 401(b) (d)). Another precondition is that military HCA 'shall complement and not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance' (10 USC 401(a) (2)). Confusion is added to complexity by three separate funding authorities that were enacted at different times and never reconciled: the first limits funding to specific appropriations for HCA as described above (see 10 USC 401(c) (1)); the second authority allows de minimus HCA to be funded from O & M funds for activities that have 'been commonplace on foreign exercises for decades' (10 USC 401(c) (2)); seen.

26. For a collection of articles on military civic action, see Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, edited by John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Chapter4.

27. See Natsios, supra n. 19 at p. 78. The legal authorities for the Somalia Relief Operation cited by the DOD general counsel included the UN Charter and federal laws governing foreign disaster relief. See Operational Law Handbook, supra no. 23, pp. V-241-242; the federal statutes are listed on p. V-240.

28. See 22 USC 2292b and EO #12, 163, Federal Register 56, 678 (1979), reprinted in 22 USC 2381. For discussion see Walterhouse, supra n. 24, pp. 23-24. See also 31 USC 1535.

29. See generally, FM 27-10, Chapters 5 and 6.

30. Processing requests for political asylum and refuge are State Department responsibilities, and detailed guidance for handling such requests is provided in DOD Directive No. 2000.1, 1972, and AR 550-1, 1981, both of which are entitled Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge.

31. Sections 502B(b), 502B(d) (1), and 116(d) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2304), and the Harkin Amendment to that Act, Section 116(a).

32. See AR 12-15, para 13-3 (Acts of Misconduct by Foreign Personnel).

33. For the merits of a SAF in LIC, see William R. Johnson, Jr. and Eugene N. Russell, 'An Army Strategy and Structure', Military Review (August 1986), p. 69. For a discussion of how a CA unit might provide command and control of a SAF, see Bell, To Be In Charge, supra n. 22.

34. FM 100-5, 13-6. The Posse Comitatus Act is at 10 USC 1385; 18 USC 1541-1548. For other legal authorities governing civil disturbance operations, see draft Operational Law Handbook, n. 23 supra, at pp. S-210-211. The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act have been relaxed somewhat by recent legislation to allow military support of counter-drug operations in the US (National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990, Title XI, Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support, PL 101-456).

35. FM 100-5, p. 13-6.

36. See Abraham D. Sofaer, 'Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense', Special Warfare (Fall 1989), pp. 12-25. Generally see Richard J. Erikson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International Terrorism (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, July 1989).

37. FM 100-23, pp. 1-2, 1-14 - 1-19. The Secretary General of the UN has described peace operations as the key elements in his 'Agenda for Peace' and his later 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace' (see Reports of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and Security Council, 17 June 1992 and 3 January 1995); see also Ruggie, n, 40 infra.

38. Ibid at p. 1-2.

39. Idem.

40. Elaine Sciolone, 'New US Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the UN', New York Times, 6 May 1994, p. A-1. John Gerard Ruggie has argued that the UN needs a more effective coercive capability for peace enforcement to deny aggression when deterrence and discussion fail; see Ruggie, 'Wandering the Void: Charting the UN's New Strategic Role', Foreign Affairs (November/December 1993), p. 26.

41. FM 100-23, pp. 1-3, 1-4; FM 100-5, p. 13-7. On the need for strict neutrality in peacekeeping and the contrasting requirements for peace enforcement, see William W. Allen, Antoine D. Johnson, and John T. Nelsen, II, 'Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations', Military Review (October 1993), pp. 53, 55, 58.

42. FM 100-23, p. 1-3; see Ruggie, n. 40 supra.

43. FM 100-23 at pp. 1-3, 1-4.

44. The six Weinberger standards were applied to Desert Shield/Storm by Thomas R. Dubois, 'The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait', Parameters (Winter 1991-92), p. 24.