The Principles of Military Legitimacy
The requirements of military legitimacy are not explicitly stated in military doctrine, but they are implicit in the principles of operations other than war listed in Chapter 13 of FM 100-5.
With the addition of civil-military relations, the principles of legitimacy, objective, unity of effort, perseverance, restraint and security illustrate the characteristics of military legitimacy and provide a doctrinal context for demonstrating the relevance of legitimacy to operations other than war at strategic and operational levels. In Chapter 6 these principles are used as the frame of reference for lessons learned in legitimacy. Evolution from low intensity conflictTerminology for operations other than war may be new, but the principles are not. They have been adapted from the imperatives of low intensity conflict, or LIC. Conceptually, LIC doctrine remains relevant to the contemporary environment of violent peace:
Low intensity conflict - (DOD) Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.17
The principles of operations other than war (OOTW) are derived from established LIC imperatives as shown below. This doctrinal evolution has blurred any real distinction between special operations in LIC and conventional operations other than war. And the use of the same principles in developing doctrine on peace operations indicates their universal application to the full range of military operations conducted in peacetime and conflict environments.18
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is by definition the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict, making it the first and foremost principle of operations other than war.19 Military legitimacy is not a doctrinal term; it was coined to relate the concept of legitimacy to military operations and leadership.
It reflects the central role of civil-military relations to mission success in peacetime.20Military doctrine begins by warning military leaders that legitimacy cannot be imposed by force of arms, and that short-cut attempts to solve problems related to legitimacy may compromise strategic objectives:
Legitimacy derives from the perception that [military] authority is genuine, effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can decree [or force] legitimacy for itself [or others], but it can create and sustain legitimacy by its actions.21
LIC doctrine emphasizes legitimacy as an essential ingredient of leadership, and confirms the importance of public support to strategic objectives:
In order to accomplish their larger objectives in LIC, military leaders must consider the effect of all their actions on public opinion. The legitimacy of the actions of an armed force, or even individual members of the force can have far-reaching effects on the legitimacy of the political system that the force supports. The leader must ensure that his [or her] troops understand that a tactically successful operation can also be strategically counterproductive because of the way in which they executed it and how the people perceived its execution.22
The remaining principles are inextricably bound with the concept of military legitimacy. As illustrated by the following doctrine, these principles relate the requirements of legitimacy to operational and strategic issues. Objective
Objective is the second principle, but it should be read as political objectives based on LIC imperatives of primacy of the political instrument and political dominance.23 It is the predominance of political over military objectives in peacetime that makes legitimacy the central concern of all parties in a conflict. Compliance with all requirements of military legitimacy is necessary to achieve political objectives, with a special emphasis on the law, cultural norms, national values and public support.
Objective also refers to the 'end state' of a military mission: the required conditions for attaining strategic objectives or for passing the mission on to another instrument of national power. In operations other than war as well as special operations in LIC and peace operations, the end state relates the mission to US or international political objectives. Military operations will always complement diplomatic, economic or humanitarian efforts.24
Joint doctrine on LIC emphasizes the importance of political objectives and cultural standards to effective leadership, even to the point of recommending that leaders not feel bound by the constraints of traditional doctrine to achieve legitimacy:
In LIC operations political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders and their staff officers must understand the specific political objectives and the impact of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action which legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be outside what traditional military doctrine encompasses. Such an approach demands an understanding of the host nation culture, customs, and policies. A principal source of advice in this area is the civil affairs staff officer and the supporting civil affairs unit commander.25
The principle of objective requires that the end state of peacetime operations be clearly defined at the strategic level to prevent 'mission creep', the dangerous tendency for commanders to shift missions usually using more force than authorized - when it appears expedient. Such mission clarity is more difficult in peacetime than wartime.
Unlike wartime military objectives that can be defined in clear and quantitative terms (for example, taking and holding terrain), the end states of most peacetime operations have political objectives that are more qualitative and ambiguous. This ambiguity results in a tendency for military commanders to substitute inappropriate military objectives and criteria for success, which in turn can lead to the excessive use of force and loss of legitimacy.
The body count in Vietnam was such an inappropriate measure of success, and the same tendency to substitute military criteria for political objectives was evident in US combat operations in Somalia.The need for clarity in defining political objectives in military terms is closely related to the principles of unity of effort and restraint discussed below:
A clearly defined and attainable objective - with a precise understanding of what constitutes success - is critical when the US is involved in peace operations. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission failure as well as those that yield success. Commanders must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.26 Unity of effort
This is the third principle of operations other than war. It has an organizational orientation, but is closely related to political objectives and civil-military relations. Unity of effort is analogous with unity of command, a principle of combat operations; but operations other than war involve a wide variety of military and civilian personnel, which makes traditional concepts of unity of command impractical. Still, mission success depends upon a co-ordinated effort, requiring military leaders who can combine military proficiency with the finesse of a diplomat:
Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command relationships may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of co-operation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.27
The international dimension of many operations other than war, especially peace operations, makes unity of effort even more complex:
Whenever possible, commanders should seek to establish a command structure that takes account of, and provides coherence to, all activities in the area.
As well as military operations this command structure should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian activities involved in the peace operations. Without such a command structure military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. This will necessitate extensive liaison with all the involved parties as well as reliable communications. Because peace operations will often be conducted at the small-unit level it is important that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.28The demanding qualities of leadership required to achieve unity of effort in operations other than war require bridging the formidable gap between military and diplomatic matters as well as overcoming barriers of culture and language. These exceptional requirements of leadership will be discussed in Chapter 5. Perseverance
Perseverance, or patience, is the fourth principle of operations other than war. Political objectives do not often lend themselves to a quick-fix, but US law and political expediency have traditionally favored short and decisive applications of combat force in peacetime. While perseverance may be an ideal, short-term operations are more likely to be the norm in the future. The US public has traditionally been impatient with peacetime military operations, especially when they involve American casualties.
This impatience is reflected in the law: The War Powers Act (50 USC 1541-1548) requires the president to consult with Congress before committing US forces '... where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances...' and limits US military involvement in such situations to 60 days without the approval of Congress. The US strikes into Grenada (Urgent Fury) and Panama (Just Cause) reflect the bias of presidents and Congress towards quick and dirty combat solutions to peacetime security issues rather than more protracted and controversial alternatives, such as nation assistance, that rely on non-combat activities.29
External military force cannot create the political legitimacy required for lasting peace: that legitimacy ultimately depends upon broad-based indigenous public support, a condition lacking in contemporary conflicts based on intractable cultural (religious and ethnic) differences.
Helping indigenous forces establish law and order out of chaos and then mobilizing the public support required for stable government depends upon long-range political objectives and the perseverance to achieve them. Army doctrine cautions commanders to be patient in such situations, avoiding combat if it threatens long-term strategic objectives:Commanders must assess quick contingency response options against their contribution to long-term, strategic objectives. This does not preclude decisive military action but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action.30
Commanders are warned that short-sighted quick fixes can threaten strategic aims:
If committed forces solve an immediate problem within a nation or region but detract from the legitimacy of the government in so doing, they have acted detrimentally against long-term, strategic aims.31
Perseverance is especially important to legitimacy in peace operations:
Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on [peace] operations. This principle requires patience and the willingness to amend traditional measures of success and victory with the new ones that gauge social and political progress, preventions of humanitarian catastrophe, and considerations of post-conflict peace-building measures.32 Restraint
The fifth principle, restraint, is the most important component of military legitimacy relating to the use of force. Excessive force can cause collateral damage which undermines the public support required for political objectives.
Restraint at both strategic and operational levels is based on principles derived from the Just War tradition: discrimination and proportionality.
Discrimination relates to the choice of targets at operational and tactical levels. The same principles considered in determining whether lethal force can legitimately be used against a specific target to achieve military objectives can be used at the strategic level to determine just cause - whether military force is a legitimate means to achieve national political objectives.
Proportionality requires that military force be proportional to military objectives at operational and tactical levels; it is closely related to right intention, which applies proportionality to balance the military means and methods used to achieve political objectives at the strategic level. Right intention requires the least force necessary to achieve strategic objectives. Both right intention and proportionality require more restraint on the use of lethal force in peacetime than in wartime.
Standards of restraint are incorporated in rules of engagement (ROE) which are tailored to each operation. Peacetime ROE are much more restrictive than wartime ROE because of the primacy of political objectives and the need for public support to achieve them. ROE reflect offensive military force to be the norm in wartime with defensive force the norm in peacetime.33
In operations other than war, these ROE will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals.34
The restricted use of force has long been an LIC imperative which underscores the importance of the law and ROE as requirements of military legitimacy:
The nature of the LIC environment imposes greater limits on the use of military power than is usually the case with conventional warfare. This is reflected in the legal restrictions and the operational and social restraints usually encountered in LIC. Military operations in the LIC environment may be highly visible and politically sensitive. They require particular attention to international, US, and host nation law including multinational and bilateral agreements and Congressional authorizations and appropriations.... Excessive violence can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals.35
In peace operations the principle of restraint is especially important to legitimacy:
Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force will adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The ROE, and reasons for them, need to be understood and regularly practised by all soldiers since a single thoughtless act could have critical political consequences.36
In peace operations there must be a clear distinction between the defensive and offensive use of force. Self-defense is the norm, but even when offensive force is authorized the principle of proportionality requires that leaders exercise restraint:
In peacekeeping operations, force will be used only in self-defense. In peace enforcement operations the use of [offensive] armed force may prove necessary, but presents many dangers. Armed action will almost certainly prejudice the acceptability [e.g., legitimacy] of the troops carrying it out and could have far-reaching international consequences. Since force invariably attracts a response in kind, its use may also escalate tension and violence in the local area and embroil peace operation troops in a harmful long-term conflict that is irrelevant to their aims. For that reason the use of force will always be a last resort and should only be used when all other means of persuasion are exhausted. Decisions made by commanders concerning the use of force are likely to be critical to the nature and conduct of operations. In all cases the application of force will be proportional to the threat and restrained. In peace operations every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions which are conducive to peace and not to destroy an enemy.37
At the strategic level, decisions involving the commitment of US forces require the exercise of restraint. These strategic decisions involve complex ethical, moral and political issues which require the application of the requirements of legitimacy, particularly the law, national values, and the principles of just cause, discrimination and proportionality:
LIC more than war will often present the US and its armed forces with difficult ethical and moral decisions. The type of aggression encountered in LIC is not as blatant as that in war. Subversion, sabotage, assassination, and guerrilla operations encountered in another country may pose a threat to US interests, but the threat to national survival may be neither imminent nor obvious. The US response to this threat must be consistent with US and international law and US national values. The response of the US to these threats may be controversial because there may be legitimate grievances that provoke them. Nonetheless, the decision to stand aside is as profound in its effect as the decision to become involved. The decision to act... is essentially a political one. International law and custom presume that an incumbent government is legitimate and legally constituted. A policy of involvement by an outside power must demonstrate its legitimacy. The basis for the international use of force is self-defense or the defense of others. [emphasis added]38
The Weinberger Doctrine and PDD 25 reflect a US policy of strategic restraint. They have adapted the principles of just cause (strategic discrimination) and right intention (strategic proportionality) to make combat the military measure of last resort in peacetime. Just cause for the commitment of combat forces is dependent upon a threat to US survival or vital security interests. Right intention requires that the size, composition and disposition of military force be proportional to the threat, and that US combat forces are the military means of last resort. In addition to restraint, the Weinberger Doctrine emphasizes the need for clear political and military objectives and the public support and perseverance required to achieve them.
General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has attributed US successes in peacetime engagement to understanding the primacy of political objectives and co-ordinating military operations with diplomatic and economic efforts to achieve those objectives:
The reason for our success is that in every instance we have carefully matched the use of military force to our political objectives... When force is used deftly - in smooth co-ordination with diplomatic and economic policy - bullets may never have to fly. Pulling triggers should always be toward the end of the plan.39 Security
Security, the sixth principle of operations other than war, complements the principle of restraint. While lethal force must be restrained to achieve political objectives in peacetime operations, that restraint must be balanced with the need for security, or self-defense:
Regardless of their mission, commanders must protect their forces at all times. The intrinsic right of self-defense always applies.40
Commanders may be responsible for protecting more than their own commands; they may also be responsible for the security of civilians in their area of operations. If so, the requirements of civil law and order make diplomacy and good civil-military relations prerequisites for legitimacy:
Security... derives from more than physical protective measures. A force's security will be significantly enhanced by the force's perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built between the force and the other parties involved in the peace operation, and the force's credibility in the international arena, which derives from an effective public affairs, psychological operations and civil affairs program. In a peace operation context, force projection may extend beyond the commander's forces. Security may have to be provided while performing civic and humanitarian projects and may be extended to civil agencies and non-governmental agencies.41
As it relates to legitimacy and the public support required for political objectives, security applies more to civilians than military forces. Providing security for persons and property is the first priority of political legitimacy. In the absence of effective civil law enforcement the military has a moral if not a legal obligation to provide security as an integral part of all operations other than war.
Security is a central facet of the war of moral legitimacy... [It] must be linked to village-level self-development programs supported by civic action and backed by regular military forces.42
If the predictions of Robert Kaplan in 'The Coming Anarchy' prove to be correct, primal violence and the disintegration of traditional military forces could make security the predominant requirement of military legitimacy in future operations other than war - a contrast with the predominance of restraint in the past. Civil-military relations
Civil-military relations are not included in FM 100-5, but should be the seventh principle of operations other than war. If there is one dominant characteristic of military operations other than war that distinguishes them from war-fighting, it is that they focus on civilians rather than enemy combatants. The inter-relationship between the military and civilians can make the difference between military victory and political defeat in peacetime military operations.
In wartime, civil-military relations are secondary to defeating the enemy with overwhelming force. But in peacetime, when public support for political objectives both at home and in the area of operations is more important than defeating an ambiguous enemy, civil-military relations become the primary focus of legitimacy.
The primacy of civil-mmtary relations in peacetime explains why most operations other than war are civil-military operations. They reflect all the principles discussed above: the public support and perseverance required to achieve political objectives, unity of effort (especially with civilian leaders), restraints on the use of force to avoid collateral damage and security for the civilian populace.
Civil affairs, or CA, refers to both civil-military operations and the forces that conduct them.43 As mentioned in the previous chapter, CA provides the interface between military forces and civilians that is critical to legitimacy in operations other than war. CA doctrine emphasizes civil-military relations as a command responsibility and includes those activities described in Chapter 2 that project military leaders into the unfamiliar domain of civilian politics:
Civil Affairs is a responsibility of command. CA involves all activities associated with the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and population in a friendly or occupied country or area where military forces are stationed or employed.44
More than any other military discipline, CA requires compliance with the law as a mission objective, specifically,
to assist command compliance with OPLAW requirements by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding property and other damages to usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and suffering in so far as military circumstances permit.45
The requirements and principles of legitimacy in operations other than war underscore the importance of CA as both a concept and capability needed for mission success in the new strategic environment.