Summary
The requirements of military legitimacy reflect the right that must take precedence over might to ensure mission success in operations other than war. Values, cultural and legal standards, and public support provide standards and a context for decision-making.
These requirements are different in times of war and peace due to the predominance of civil-military issues and political objectives in peacetime. Determining what might is right in ambiguous and unforgiving peacetime environments requires an understanding of the concept of military legitimacy and its requirements.The doctrinal principles of operations other than war, with the important addition of civil-military relations, illustrate the relevance of the requirements of military legitimacy to mission success. These principles of military legitimacy emphasize the predominance of political objectives, and the need for unity of effort (especially interagency and civil-military activities) and perseverance to mobilize the public support required to achieve those objectives. Balancing restraint in the use of force with the requirements of security to achieve military and political objectives without sacrificing public support is the greatest challenge of military legitimacy. When public support is essential to mission success civil-military relations are the measure of victory or defeat; and civil affairs represents both civil-military operations and the forces that conduct them.
The national values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are at the core of military legitimacy. They are the virtues that gave US national strategy the moral highground over communism during the Cold War; but their application in the new strategic environment raises unanswered questions that will challenge civilian and military leaders in the new millennium.
Notes
1. This principle is usually attributed to Carl von Clausewitz.
See Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 84. In spite of his recognition of the political objectives of warfare, General Clausewitz never considered the viability of operations other than war. He was convinced that once the military became an instrument of national policy, the only option was to apply unlimited force. While Clausewitz opened the door to an understanding of the political nature of warfare, his failure to appreciate the limited use of military force renders his classic strategy inapplicable to operations other than war. See B. H. Liddel Hart, 'National Object and Military Aim', Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Chapter 21; also Sam C. Sarkesian, 'Organizational Strategy and Low Intensity Conflicts', Special Operations in US Strategy, edited by Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (New York: National Defense University Press, National Strategic Information Center, Inc., 1984), p. 274.2. Barry Crane et al., 'Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict', Special Warfare (Summer 1989), p. 5.
3. Former President Bush emphasized the importance of national values to US security policy in the preface of the National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, August 1991): '[O]ur values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose. It is our deepest belief that all nations and peoples seek political and economic freedom; that governments must rest their rightful authority on the consent of the governed, and must live in peace with their neighbors.' President Clinton has confirmed the national values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as principles of US security policy. See Stephen John Stedman in 'The New Interventionists', Foreign Affairs (America Around the World 1992/1993), p. 1.
4.
See FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Army (1956), para 3a (military necessity); para 34 (unnecessary suffering); and para 41 (proportionality); for the application of the principles of discrimination and proportionality to peacetime military operations, see William V. O'Brien, Special Operations in the 1980s: American Legal, Political, and Cultural Constraints, Special Operations in US Strategy (National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 53, 69-73. See also, Student Text on Military Law and Justice, Required readings in Military Science IV, Department of Law, US Military Academy, West Point, NY (June 1992), Chapter 5.5. See FM 100-1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army (May 1986), Chapter 4; and FM 22-100, Military Leadership (co-ordinating draft), Department of the Army, June 1988), Chapter 4.
6. Robert L. Maginnis, 'A Chasm of Values', Military Review (February 1993), pp. 2-11. Maginnis defines liminality as a technical pyschological term for rite of passage. After arguing that 'societal trends indicate a fundamental change in national values [that are] significantly different than the Army's values', 'Maginnis issues a call to arms to isolate the military from changing civilian values: 'The Army must preserve its integrity as an institution by resisting any tendency to accommodate these changed values.' The danger of such a paranoid view of civilian values to military legitimacy and leadership is discussed in Chapter 5.
7. Richard H. Kohn, 'Women in Combat, Homosexuals in Uniform: The Challenge of Military Leadership', Parameters (Spring 1993), pp. 2-4.
8. On the importance of local public support to mission success see FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Final Draft, October 1990), pp. 2-29, 30. The new FM 100-5 reaffirms the need for military forces to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, and the danger that military success that detracts from political legitimacy may undermine long-term strategic aims.
FM 100-5, p. 13-4.9. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), p. 22; Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), p. 44.
10. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', supra n. 9, p. 49.
11. On cultural issues in LIC, James K. Bruton and Wayne D. Zajac, 'Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low Intensity Conflict', Special Warfare (April 1988), p. 29.
12. Kaplan, supra, n. 9, p. 46.
13. Ibid., pp. 72-74.
14. A.J. Bacevich has emphasized the role of 'the people' in contemporary warfare in 'New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism', Parameters (December 1990), pp. 12, 19. On the role of public support in the Vietnam War, see Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1989,p.4.
15. FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Final Draft, October 1990), pp. 2-29, 30. The new FM 100-5 reaffirms the need for military forces to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, and the danger that military success which detracts from political legitimacy may undermine long-term strategic aims. FM 100-5, p. 13-4.
16. JCS PUB 3-07, see n. 1 to Chapter 2, p. I-19.
17. JCS PUB 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989. For application of LIC to operations other than war, see Horace L. Hunter, Jr., 'Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War', Military Review (November 1993), p. 18; James R. Locher, II, 'Low Intensity Conflict: Challenges for the 1990s', Defense 91 (July/August 1991), p. 19; also, Barnes, 'The Politics of LIC', Military Review (February 1988), p. 2.
18. The doctrinal principles and imperatives are set forth in the references in n. 1 to Chapter 2.
19. See JCS PUB 3-07, p. I-26.
20. See, generally, Barnes, 'Military Legitimacy and the Diplomat Warrior', Small Wars and Insurgencies (Spring-Summer 1993), p.
1.21. FM 100-5, p. 13-4; JCS PUB 3-07, p. I-26; FM 100-20, p. I-9.
22. FM 100-20, p. I-85.
23. As to primacy of the military instrument, see JCS PUB 3-07, p. I-25; as to political dominance, see FM 100-20, p. I-8.
24. FM 100-23, p, 1-8.
25. JCS PUB 3-07, pp. I-25. On cultural issues in LIC, James K. Bruton and Wayne D. Zajac, 'Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low Intensity Conflict', Special Warfare (April 1988), p. 29. In his list of principles governing hostilities short of war, John B. Hunt did not use the term 'objective', but instead used the 'primacy of the political instrument'; they are interchangeable concepts. See Hunt, 'Hostilities Short of War', supra n. 1 to Chapter 2, at pp. 44-45.
26. FM 100-23, p. 1-14.
27. FM 100-5, p. 13-4.
28. FM 100-23, p. 1-15.
29. See, generally, Barnes, 'Military Legitimacy and the Diplomat Warrior', supra, n, 20, pp. 14-15.
30. FM 100-5, p. 13-4. See also Horace L. Hunter, Jr., 'Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War', Military Review, supra n. 17, pp. 18, 20; also Hunt, 'Hostilities Short of War', supra, n. 1 to Chapter 2, p. 46; and Barnes, 'The Politics of LIC', supra, n. 17, pp. 4-8.
31. FM 100-5, p. 13-4.
32. FM 100-23, p. 1-18.
33. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by the competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989. For a comprehensive discussion of ROE, see OPLAW Handbook, at n. 23 of Chapter 3, pp. H-92 et seq., and Mark S. Martins, 'Rules of Engagement for Land Forces', Military Law Review, Vol. 143 (Winter 1994), p. 4. On human rights generally, see OPLAW Handbook at Tab W (pp. W-247 et seq.). The ROE of Desert Shield (peacetime) and Desert Storm (wartime) illustrate the contrasting requirements of restraint in peacetime; a summary of each was distributed to soldiers in the Gulf, and reprinted in Student Text on Military Law and Justice, Required Readings in Military Science IV, Department of Law, US Military Academy at West Point (1992), pp.
3-4, 3-5. For a discussion of operational law and ROE in Desert Storm, see Steven Keeva, 'Lawyers in the War Room', The ABA Journal (December 1991), p. 52. By way of contrast, see a discussion of the legal issues and ROE required in Somalia in F. M. Lorenz, 'Law and Anarchy in Somalia', Parameters (Winter 1993-94), p. 27, and Jonathan T. Dwarken, 'Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope', Military Review (September 1994), p. 26. For the application of the principles of discrimination and proportionality to peacetime military operations, see William V. O'Brien, 'Special Operations in the 1980s: American Legal, Political, and Cultural Constraints', Special Operations in US Strategy (National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 53,58; also Barnes, 'Military Legitimacy and the Diplomat Warrior', supra, n. 20, pp. 11-16.34. FM 100-5, p. 13-4.
35. JCS PUB 3-07, pp I-24; I-27.
36. FM 100-23, p. 1-16.
37. FM 100-23, pp. 1-16, 1-17; see Dwarken article, n. 33, supra.
38. FM 100-20, pp. 1-13, 1-14.
39. The six Weinberger standards were applied to Desert Shield!Storm by Thomas R. Dubois, 'The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait', Parameters (Winter 1991-92), p. 24.
40. FM 100-5, p. 13-4.
41. FM 100-23, p. 1-16.
42. John T. Fischel and Edmund S. Cowan, 'Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America', Military Review (January 1988), p. 41. The authors use the term civil-military operations which has essentially the same meaning as civil affairs in this context.
43. Civil affairs (CA) and civil-military operations (CMO) are closely related terms that are used interchangeably in this context. CA involves all activities involving the interface between military and civilian personnel; it is defined by law as a special operations activity. CMO is a generic term referring to the use of military forces to perform traditionally non-military activities. See JCS PUB 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, Final Draft, November 1990, Chapter 1, paras 1 and 3; discussed in Barnes, 'Military Legitimacy and the Diplomat Warrior', supra n. 20, p. 7. See also FM 100-5, pp. 2-21.
44. JCS PUB 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs (final draft), November 1990, pp. I—1, I-2 (hereinafter JCS PUB 3-57). For an overview of CA activities as they relate to legitimacy in a peacetime environment, see Barnes, 'Civil Affairs: Diplomat Warriors in Contemporary Conflict', Special Warfare (Winter 1991), pp. 4, 6-9.
45. JCS PUB 3-57, p. I-7.