The Evolution of National Values in Diplomacy

Do not say I will treat him as he has treated me;

Proverbs 24:29

Always treat others as you would like them to treat you; that is the meaning of the law...

Matthew 7:12

Democracy, human rights and the rule of law have been US values since the birth of the nation and are enshrined in the Constitution.

Cardinal de Richelieu, as first minister or France,, introduced realpolitik to Europe with the concept of raison d'eat, and he acknowledged it to be the diplomatic equivalent of the maxim that might makes right:

In matters of state, he who has the power often has the right, and he who is weak can only with difficulty keep from being wrong in the opinion of the majority of the world.²

Kissinger noted little moral difference between Richelieu's raison d'etat and the prevailing concept of Just War which sanctified wars of that period based on their intent. The will of warfare was all-important to its legitimacy: those who participated in wars that were intended to kill the guilty could not be held accountable for harming the innocent.³ It might be said that religion had given war a bad name, and Richelieu at least restored reason to warfare that had been as irrational as it had been inhumane.

Early American presidents had nothing but contempt for Richelieu and his realpolitik successors who promoted the view that the ends of the state justified the means:

America ascribed the frequency of European wars to the prevalence of governmental institutions which denied the values of freedom and human dignity.⁴

Thomas Jefferson rejected the European idea that morality was for people and not nation-states, and advocated the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In the words of Thomas Jefferson, a 'just and solid republican government' in America would be 'a standing monument and example' for all the peoples of the world.⁵

Following the War Between the States and an era of US imperialism, Woodrow Wilson put democratic ideals at the heart of US foreign policy, and following the First World War these ideals were force-fed to a war-weary Europe through the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson's unbounded idealism went beyond promoting equal rights for people; he promoted equal rights among nation-states, to be institutionalized in a world organization that would provide collective security through the enforcement of international law. The League of Nations was the precursor of the United Nations, but its failure to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War testified to the limits of idealism in foreign policy.

The Second World War illustrated the irrelevance of national values in total war; there is no substitute for victory when national survival is threatened. But shortly after ordering the Enola Gay to vaporize Hiroshima, President Truman revived national moral values as a driving force behind US foreign policy:

American foreign policy, as a reflection of the nation's moral values, was 'based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice', and on refusing to 'compromise with evil'. Invoking America's traditional equation of private with public morality, Truman promised that 'we shall not relent in our efforts to bring the Golden Rule into the international affairs of the world.'⁶

The Korean War was the first real test of US military resolve in the Cold War. As the primary justification for entering the conflict, President Truman cited the need to enforce the rule of law to prevent 'a return to the rule of force in international polities'. Kissinger interpreted this as a reaffirmation of the continuing commitment of America to its national values when deploying its military forces:

That America defends principle, not interests, law, and not power, has been a nearly sacrosanct tenet of America's rationale in committing its military forces, from the time of the two world wars through the escalation of its involvement in Vietnam in 1965 and the Gulf War in 1991.⁷

Vietnam presented the most vexing challenge for US national values.

According to Kissinger, US support for the overthrow of President Diem in 1963 'cast its involvement in Vietnam in concrete' by committing the US to fill the political vacuum with legitimate successors:

Ultimately, every revolutionary war is about governmental legitimacy; undermining it is the guerrillas' principal aim. Diem's overthrow handed that objective to Hanoi for free... [I]n the end, legitimacy involves an acceptance of authority without compulsion; its absence turns every contest into a contest of strength, [emphasis added]⁹

Vietnam produced its share of lessons learned in legitimacy, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Once US ground forces were committed to combat in 1965 the die was cast; nation-building became war-fighting, and any residue of moral values was lost in the pervasive ambiguity of a war without a clearly defined enemy. The US could not provide security for the Vietnamese people against relentless attacks from the Viet Cong and later the North Vietnamese army; and collateral damage caused by US offensive operations exacerbated the resentment of the Vietnamese people toward the US and a corrupt South Vietnamese government. By 1968 the moral high-ground had been lost, as evidenced by the erosion of public support in America.

Kissinger succinctly summarized the US dilemma, which was to

ignore the requirements and principles of military and political legitimacy:

Too idealistic to base its policy on national interest, and too focused on the requirements of general war in its strategic doctrine, America was unable to master an unfamiliar strategic problem in which the political and military objectives were entwined.

In 1993 a similar dilemma would be revisited in Somalia, and the results would be similarly tragic, albeit on a smaller scale.

Kissinger brings US diplomacy up to date with a reaffirmation of the national values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law to US foreign policy, applied with a touch of realpolitik. President Carter championed human rights as an element of diplomacy, but so did Presidents Reagan and Bush. Human rights helped end the Cold War: the so-called 'Basket' of human rights established by the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 was ultimately instrumental in toppling communist regimes in Eastern Europe.¹¹

The history of diplomacy has taught that the national values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law must be considered broad and flexible concepts with universal application, not limited to ethnocentric cultural standards drawn exclusively from US experience. Their unique relationship must also be understood. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are inextricably bound together; none can stand alone and fulfill the requirements of legitimacy. Democracy can be tyrannical if not coupled with the protection of minority human rights through the rule of law. But too much emphasis on the rights of individuals or groups can defeat the legitimate (and essential) collective interests of the state. And the rule of law can be tyrannical if its purposes are subverted to causes other than preserving democracy and human rights.

The remainder of this chapter considers democracy, human rights and the rule of law as strategic concepts that frame issues of political and military legitimacy, and illustrates why these libertarian values must balance the authoritarian values prevalent in the military. Promoting these national values is implicit in operations other than war, and involves both military-to-military and civil-military operations. These values are especially important in emerging democracies where militaries have a tradition of human rights abuses. Achieving US political objectives in such environments requires military leadership that understands the importance of the requirements of military legitimacy to mission success - leadership that can function as an extension of both the military and diplomatic corps.