Agricultural Policies as Structures of Violence

The CPK premised that economic success - and, by extension, political success - depended on its agricultural sector. As explained in its ‘Four-Year Plan', developed between 21 July and 2 August 1976, the CPK identified two economic objectives.

During the 1950s and 1960s many former colonies, but especially those adhering to the Non-Aligned Movement, embarked on a particular economic strategy known as import-substitution industrialisation (ISI).^[909] Proponents of ISI argued that less-developed countries should initially substitute domestic production of previously imported, simple consumer goods and then sub­stitute through domestic production for a wider range of more sophisticated manufactured items.^[910] In other words, advocates of ISI promoted an eco­nomic strategy predicated on self-sufficiency. Variously understood within broader theories of dependency or underdevelopment, the argument was this: For decades if not centuries the economies of colonies were held in check by unfair trade arrangements and production processes that consigned the colonies to positions of subservience within the global economy.

In practice, ISI constitutes a form of self-imposed isolation and it is this economic strategy I maintain the CPK initiated from 1975 onwards. An internal document dated 8 May 1976 states clearly that ‘We will decrease importing items next year, including cotton and jute, because we are working hard to produce ours. We will import only some important items such as chemical fertiliser, plastic, acid, iron factory, and other raw materials.'^[911] According to this document, such a strategy was deemed most appropriate; indeed, to solve the currency problem, it was determined that solutions were not to be found ‘by taking loans from the West or eastern Europe', for in so doing the CPK would lose their ‘self-reliant stance'.^[912]

Having adopted a policy of import-substitution, the CPK next directed its attention to those items that could be effectively produced, both for domestic consumption and for foreign trade. On the home front, plans called for the promotion of items necessary to facilitate the people's livelihood: plates, pots, spoons, mosquito-nets, shovels, hoes and so on. In practice, most of these industries never materialised, although textile factories and some machine shops were in operation. Internationally, documents indicate that the CPK was receptive to any number of imported goods but that economic efficien­cies would be the determining factor in deciding the conditions of foreign trade.

Within a system of production for exchange, it matters little if linen or coats are produced; whichever offers the best opportunity for capital accu­mulation will, in principle, be produced. Marx refers to this tendency as ‘indifference to use-value' and the CPK was in many respects indifferent to use-value. In a document entitled ‘Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976', it is noted that

We can export and sell many products such as kapok, shrimp, squid, elephant fish, and turtles. All of these products can earn foreign exchange. There are great possibilities for exporting peanuts, wheat, corn, sesame, and beans. The objective would be to save up these products for export. Almost anything can be exported, so long as we don't consume it ourselves, but set it aside.^[913]

The report further details that ‘We have the potential to achieve full quotas in rubber, cement, railroads and salt. We have progressed nicely, almost with empty hands. We have achieved good results. But the possibilities are even greater. We must expand the Plan. Our line is to stress industry and the working class as the basis.'^[914]

For the CPK, agriculture - but especially rice - was determined to be the country's comparative advantage. During a speech delivered in June 1976 at an assembly of cadres of the Western Zone, the speaker (most likely Pol Pot) discussed the importance of rapid agricultural development. The speaker explains: ‘National construction proceeds along the lines laid down by the Party. The important point of this is building up our agriculture, which is backward, into modern agriculture within ten to fifteen years.'^[915] This point is developed at greater length in the Four-Year Plan, whereby it is noted that Democratic Kampuchea is replete with ‘such things as land, livestock, natural resources, water sources such as lakes, rivers and ponds' and that these ‘natural characteristics have given us great advantages compared with China, Vietnam, or Africa.

Returning to the twin objectives established by the CPK it becomes clear that policy decisions were based on calculations of expected economic productivity. Foremost was the proposed increase in rice production - an objective that was pivotal to the CPK's overall strategy of state building. This is vividly illustrated in a series of remarks prepared and delivered by Pol Pot to a special meeting of the CPK ‘centre' during 21-23 August 1976. Here, Pol Pot considers ‘the production of rice as it is related to rice fields'. He explains:

We have greater resources than other countries in terms of rice fields. Furthermore, the strength of our rice fields is that we have more of them than others do. The strength of our agriculture is greater than that of other countries in this respect... It is the Party's wish to transform agriculture from a backward type to a modern type in 10-15 years. A long-term strategy must be worked out. We are working [here] on a Four-Year Plan in order to set off in the direction of achieving this 10-15 year target.⁴⁶

The CPK determined that Democratic Kampuchea would need to triple rice productivity, to a national average yield of 3 tons per hectare per year.

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per year.

For the CPK, an overriding difficulty associated with increased rice pro­duction - and, by extension, the economic development and defence of Democratic Kampuchea - was the ‘problem of water'. According to the Four- Year Plan, it was necessary to ‘increase the degree of mastery over the water problem from one year to another until it reaches 100 per cent by 1980 for first-class rice land and reaches 40-50 per cent for ordinary rice land'.⁴⁸ Following a table of calculations indicating the annual percentage increase projected between 1977 and 1980, the text continues: ‘In order to gain mastery over water there must be a network of dykes and canals as the basis. There must also be canals, reservoirs and irrigation pumps stationed in accordance with our strategy.'⁴⁹ The rapid and massive development of irrigation was thus paramount, necessitating the completion of thousands of dykes, dams, canals and reservoirs throughout the country. This necessitated a constant moving of men and women to satisfy ever-changing labour needs.

The rapid expansion of agriculture and irrigation systems was to be achieved through the standardisation of labour and a matching implementa­tion of food rations. Consequently, under the CPK, various social classifica­tions were established. And for many men, women and children, the consequences of these administrative practices were grave indeed. Most prominent throughout Democratic Kampuchea was the separation between ‘base' people and ‘new’ people. ‘Base' people, also known as ‘old' people, were those who either participated in the revolution and/or lived in geo­graphic zones liberated and controlled by the Khmer Rouge during the war. ‘New’ people (also identified as ‘17 April’ people) consisted of those men and women who were evacuated from the cities and towns following the Khmer Rouge victory. Rhetoric of equality notwithstanding, these designations could literally mean the difference between life and death. ‘Base’ people, for example, were eligible for ‘full rights’, meaning that they were allowed to vote and run for local elections. They could become chiefs of cooperatives and generally had access to better food rations and medical care. ‘New’ people, conversely, received less food, were treated more harshly, had fewer rights, and were directly killed more readily than ‘old’ people.^[918]

Labourers were further classified as either kemlang ping (full strength) or kemlang ksaoy (weak strength), with the former consisting mostly of adults and the latter consisting of small children and the elderly. Those designated as full-strength were further classified into two subgroups: kemlang 1, which consisted of young, able-bodied, single men and women who comprised mobile work brigades (kong chhlat); and kemlang 2, composed of married, able-bodied men and women who were divided by sex but generally worked closer to the village. The heaviest tasks were generally reserved for kemlang 1 persons. These work-teams were segregated by sex; males belonged to kong boroh and females to kong neary. These brigades were set to work primarily on land-clearance, the digging of canals and reservoirs, and the construction of dams and dykes. As the name implies, people assigned to mobile work brigades often lived outside of villages, in temporary work-camps also seg­regated by sex. Kemlang 2 workers generally worked closer to their villages, performing such tasks as local wood-cutting (for building materials or fuel), preparation and cultivation of agricultural fields, and maintenance of irrigation schemes. These tasks were also, but not always, segregated by sex; women, for example, reaped the rice while threshing was performed by the men.^[919] Lastly, the ‘weak strength' labourers (kemlang 3) were given lighter tasks. Elderly workers were grouped into work-teams known generically as senah chun; male groups were termed senah chun boroh and female groups senah chun neary. Duties for members of senah chun groups included sewing, gardening, collecting small pieces of wood and caring for children. Depending on the conditions and the attitudes of the cooperative chief, some elderly workers might be required to labour in the rice fields or engage in other, more strenuous work. Children under 14 years of age were assigned to work groups known as kong komar, with boys and girls separated into kong komara and kong khomarei, respectively. Children were responsible for watch­ing over cows and water buffalo, light digging in gardens and fields, collecting firewood, and gathering cow dung for fertiliser.^[920]

The Khmer Rouge division of labour was matched with a corresponding system of food rations, namely, a fourfold system was devised to distribute food rations based on type of workforce. Those workers classified in the No. 1 system would be allocated three cans of rice per day; those in the No. 2 system, two and a half cans; No. 3, two cans; and No. 4, one and a half cans.^[921] This numeric system refers to the type of labour involved; those people performing the heaviest manual labour, in principle, were to receive the highest rations. The lightest tasks, performed by the elderly or the sick, received the smallest rations. Pregnant women, or women who had just given birth, were at times given higher rations. Ostensibly, two side dishes (either soup or dried food) were to be provided to all workers; desserts were to be offered once every three days. Moreover, detailed work-schedules were devised - although not necessarily implemented - that determined how many days of work were required, and for how long a period, for society as a whole. In this way, the CPK determined the average amount of surplus that could be produced for the country as a whole. Consequently, the CPK was able to calculate work-quotas, such as the amount of soil to be excavated, the amount of forest to be cleared, or the hectarage of fields to be planted and harvested. Often, these quotas were calculated collectively, based on the work-group in question. A work-team of fifteen ‘full-strength' women, for example, may be assigned to reap one hectare of rice per day.

Apart from the imposition of food rations, the Khmer Rouge prohibited by deadly means all other means of subsistence. With few exceptions, notably for ‘base' people or more trusted cadres, people were prevented from cultivating personal gardens or from foraging for food. In effect, through the establishment of supervised cooperatives everyone in time became dependent upon the Party to satisfy even their most basic of provisions. That adequate food, medicine and other materials were in short supply contributed to the prevalence of illness, injury and death. Moreover, horrific conditions played a role in the ever-expanding terror as the Khmer Rouge sought to tighten its grip on a disintegrating society.