<<
>>

Conclusion

The new Asia that emerged from the ruins left by the Pacific War was therefore a continent that, despite the overthrowing of Western European and Japanese imperialism, remained susceptible to aggressive outside influences.

In part, this was due to the security interests of the two superpowers, who advanced into the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Japanese Empire and came into competition over the spoils. However, it would be wrong to categorize Asia's plight as entirely the result of its being one of the areas of the world where American and Soviet interests collided, because events within the continent itself also played a key role in bringing the superpowers in. Ironically, one of the major stimuli that provoked superpower interest was the rise of indigenous nationalism, for the United States in particular found the radical Asian nationalists difficult to comprehend, often seeing them as nothing more than puppets of Moscow.

More than any other episode, it was the victory of the CCP which concentrated American and Soviet attention on the region, thus provoking the descent into a Cold War mentality. Indeed, it is important to understand that it was the CCP's own hostility towards the United States, and the fact that Washington reciprocated this animosity, which came to categorize the intensity of the Cold War in the region. This Sino-American antagonism arose from more than simple ideological differences, for the Chinese Revolution was as much a triumph for radical nationalism as it was for communism. What emerged therefore in 1949 was a strong, deeply nationalistic China that was no longer prepared to be a stage upon which the Great Powers played out their rivalries. In a sense, therefore, the troubled relationship between the PRC and the United States can be seen as the most extreme example of the problems created by the West's inability to come to terms with Asian nationalism.

This can be seen in the way in which Washington reacted to the creation of the PRC, for, instead of recognizing the strength of Chinese nationalism, it classified the Beijing regime as being Moscow's stooge. Similar confusion was later to mark American policy in Vietnam, where again more emphasis was put on the communist than the nationalist side of the revolution.

The emergence of communist China had a profound effect on the United States, which perceived that this new regime necessarily posed a threat to its key interest in Asia, the security of Japan. The result was that Washington sought to contain the Chinese menace; indeed, the importance of Japan was such that, in order to defend its markets and sources of raw materials, America was prepared to extend its anti-Chinese shield ever further into Asia. In turn, its concentration upon Japan helped to deepen Cold War animosities, for the rebuilding of the Japanese economy only increased Chinese and Russian suspicion of the United States, thus cementing their military and political ties.

Third World

A collective term of French origin for those states that are part of neither the developed capitalist world nor the communist bloc. It includes the states of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia. Also referred to as ‘the South' in contrast to the developed ‘North'.

From 1949 therefore the Cold War began to colour international relations in Asia, but this was not a development that was generally welcomed by the newly independent states which had just freed themselves from the grip of Western and Japanese colonialism. In the tense environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s, some of these new countries, such as India and Indonesia, resented the pressure exerted on them to choose between entering either the American or the Russian camp, for they had not removed one sort of imperialism only to replace it with another. Moreover, these states were not convinced by the Cold War paradigm expounded by the superpowers, for what they saw in the Sino-American con­frontation was an attempt by the United States to deny the legitimate aspirations of Asian nationalism.

In this attitude lay the roots of what would become Third World neutralism.

Recommended reading

At present there is no international history text that covers all of the subjects raised in this chapter. Useful general studies that approach these events from an American perspective include Ronald McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and US Foreign Policy in Asia (New York, 1993), Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York, 1985) and Andrew Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: The Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY, 1987). To gauge the relative importance of East and South-East Asia to the United States in the context of the Cold War, see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, CA, 1992) and Robert McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York, 1999).

For decolonization in South Asia, see M. J. Akbar, Nehru: The Making of India (London, 1989), Ayesha Jayal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, 1985), R. J. Moore, Escape from India: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem (Oxford, 1983), Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (Oxford, 1987) and the chapter by Judith Brown in Judith Brown and W Roger Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999). For South­East Asia, see Nick Cullather, Illusions ofInfluence: The Political Economy of United States—Philippines Relations, 1942—1960 (Stanford, CA, 1994), Robin Jeffrey (ed.), Asia: The Winning of Independence (London, 1981), Robert McMahon, Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945—1949 (Ithaca, NY, 1981), Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia, 1945—49 (London, 1994), Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948—60 (London, 1975) and the chapter by A.

J. Stockwell in Judith Brown and W Roger Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999) (for readings on Indochina).

see Chapter 12

On the Chinese Civil War, the best studies of the domestic context are Suzanne Pepper, The Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945—1949 (Berkeley, CA, 1978) and Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946—1950 (Stanford, CA, 2003). In regard to the international aspects of the origins of the war, see Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet- American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946(New York, 1993) and Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States and their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, 1996). For general texts on the CCP's foreign policy and its relations with Stalin, see Michael Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York, 1996), Michael Sheng, Battling Imperialism: Mao, Stalin and the United States (Princeton, NJ, 1997) and Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Stanford, CA, 1999). On the ‘lost chance' thesis, see the symposium in Diplomatic History (1997), vol. 21, pp. 71—115, which contains useful essays by Chen, Garver, Sheng and Westad. Contrasting outlooks on the American domestic debate about China policy can be found in Nancy Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1948-1950 (New York, 1983) and Thomas Christiansen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino- American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ, 1996). Chinese attitudes towards America are powerfully conveyed in Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making ofthe Sino-American Confrontation (New York, 1994). For the ‘reverse course' in the American occupation of Japan and its effects on policy towards South-East Asia, see the recommended reading in Chapter 14.

The classic exposition of the Korean War as a civil conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins ofthe Korean War, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ, 1981 and 1990). Other useful works that explain the complex nature of Korean nationalism and attitudes towards modernization include C. I. Eugene Kim and D. E. Mortimore (eds), Korea’s Response to Japan: The Colonial Period, 1910—1945 (Kalamazoo, 1977), Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria (Durham, NC, 2005), Michael Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth Century Odyssey (Honolulu, HI, 2007) and Andre Schimd, Korea between Empires, 1895—1919 (New York, 2002). A different perspective that emphasizes the Sino-Soviet role in the conflict is Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, CA, 1993). A good synthesis of the arguments about the conflict can be found in Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London, 1996). On the course of the war, see William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ, 1995), Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY, 1990) and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950—1953 (Lawrence, KS, 1995).

For further reading, see the historiographical essay by Robert McMahon, ‘The Cold War in Asia: Towards a New Synthesis’, in Michael Hogan (ed.), America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (New York,

1995) and the relevant chapters in Warren Cohen (ed.), Pacific Passage: The Study ofAmerican—East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (New York,

1996).

<< | >>
Source: Best Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Routledge,2008. — 638 p.. 2008

More on the topic Conclusion:

  1. Conclusion
  2. Conclusion
  3. Conclusion
  4. CONCLUSION
  5. Conclusion
  6. Conclusion
  7. Conclusion
  8. Conclusion
  9. Conclusion: where to next?
  10. Conclusion