Historiographical and Historical Contexts
On the face of it, the proposition that warfare and associated violence were important features of late antiquity might seem uncontentious, given that the centuries in question - early third to early seventh century ce - included the barbarian invasions which contributed to the downfall of the Western Empire in the fifth century and the Islamic invasions which severely weakened the Eastern Empire in the seventh.
However, that proposition is one which cannot be taken for granted without discussion, not least because of the way in which late antiquity has evolved as a field of historical study.In historiographical terms, the field of late antiquity has a relatively recent pedigree, becoming established as a recognised period of historical study only in the last half-century. This reflects above all the influence of the scholarship of Peter Brown, starting with his seminal overview The World of Late Antiquity (1971). The centuries encompassed by late antiquity had of course received scholarly attention previously, but usually in a disjointed and dismissive manner, with different chronological and geographical elements being treated as adjuncts to other fields of historical study, whether it be the final declining centuries of Roman history leading inexorably to the fall of the Western Empire in 476 ce, the ‘dark ages' out of which the early medieval West emerged, or developments in the eastern Mediterranean arising from the foundation of Constantinople which formed the prolegomena to the history of an inferior Byzantine Empire.
By contrast, Brown's World of Late Antiquity took a more integrated and focused approach to the period, which it presented as one of resilience and creativity - a positive vision which helped to spawn a vast array of scholarship and establish late antiquity as a historical field in its own right.1 Brown's positive vision, however, was one which emphasised social and cultural transformation, and privileged developments in religious life and artistic expression over more traditional narratives focused on political and military events.
At the same time, the assumption that barbarian invaders were intent on destroying Roman civilisation was being questioned, alongside minimising of their numbers, with the cumulative consequence that the violence of the barbarian invasions was increasingly downplayed. The most prominent reflection of this approach was Walter Goffart's 1980 study of barbarian settlement in the Western Empire, with its telling subtitle, The Techniques of Accommodation, its opening description of that settlement as a ‘peaceful and smooth process', and its closing suggestion that the fifth century was ‘less memorable for invasions than for the incorporation of barbarian protectors into the fabric of the West'.[502] [503]While this approach can be seen as an understandable attempt to provide a more balanced view of the impact of the barbarian invasions in place of traditional stereotypes of marauding hordes flooding into the empire and wreaking death and destruction, it in turn provoked a reaction from those who thought it was important not to lose sight of the violence that accompanied the invasions - ‘the horrors of war', to quote the title of an early chapter in one of the most sustained ripostes to the minimising school of thought: Bryan Ward-Perkins's provocatively titled The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization. This appeared in 2005, but the beginnings of a reaction can be seen in the early 1990s, with a renewed emphasis on the violent dimension of interaction between barbarian groups and the Roman Empire.[504]
Since this debate has concerned the impact of the barbarian invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries, it has primarily focused on the western half of the empire. However, a more holistic perspective, encompassing both the east and the full chronological range of late antiquity, from the third to the seventh centuries, can leave no doubt as to the importance of warfare and violence in late antiquity.
Above all there is the Persian dimension. It was the overthrow of the Parthian Arsacid regime by the Sasanian Persians in the 220s which marked a significant reconfiguration of the strategic position of the Roman Empire - and for the worse. Remarkably quickly, the new regime in Persia began pursuing a more aggressive strategy towards the empire, inflicting a succession of major defeats by the middle of the third century and contributing significantly to imperial instability. At the other end of late antiquity, the early part of the seventh century, prior to the Islamic invasions, witnessed more than two decades of war between the Roman Empire and Persia during which Persian forces occupied all the eastern provinces of the empire and even laid siege to Constantinople itself in 626 ce. The emperor Heraclius managed to hold out against the Persian forces and then surprisingly quickly turned the tables on their overstretched resources to secure an unlikely victory in 628, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this protracted war left both powers in a weakened state which facilitated the unexpected Arab successes of the 630s. In the intervening centuries the tempo of warfare between the Roman Empire and Persia varied significantly, with, for example, the fifth century largely peaceful, but there can be no doubt that the interactions of these two powers generated significant periods of hard- fought conflict.[505]Nor were barbarian invasions from the north limited to the fourth and fifth centuries. The mid third century had also seen major inroads along the Rhine and Danube, and across the Black Sea, which had further contributed to the empire's instability, even if order was eventually restored by the end of the century with minimal territorial losses. Similarly in the latter part of the sixth and early seventh centuries the empire faced significant challenges from nomadic Avars and Slavs in the lower Danube basin. Furthermore, although expansionist warfare of the type familiar from the Roman Republic was rare on the part of the empire during late antiquity, there was a significant exception during the mid sixth century when the emperor Justinian launched campaigns to regain control of the western provinces lost to barbarian invaders during the fifth century, and these campaigns resulted in significant warfare and violence in North Africa and Italy.
Finally, in addition to conflict with external enemies, there were also major instances of civil war in nearly every century of late antiquity.[506]Late antiquity was, then, a phase of Roman history when warfare was particularly prevalent. This has been implicit in the outline provided in the preceding paragraphs, but it can be reinforced by comparing late antiquity with the period which preceded it - the Principate (late first century bce to early third century ce). This was the period traditionally associated with the phrase ‘Pax Romana'. Although the idea of a Roman peace was an ideological construct fostered in the interests of emperors and imperial rule, and by no means meant an end to military-related violence in the Roman world,[507] it was the case that the Roman Empire of the Principate waged expansionist wars far less frequently than had been the case during the Republic and experienced only limited enemy incursions, while the period also marked an end to the chronic civil wars which had devastated the final century of the Republic, even if there were brief, albeit bloody, recurrences in 68-9 and 192-3 ce. There were also some significant provincial revolts, notably in Judaea and Britain, but these were exceptional.
Why, then, was there an intensification of warfare during late antiquity? As far as external conflict is concerned, the emergence of Sasanian Persia in the east was undoubtedly of fundamental importance. For the first time since the Middle Republican period (third and second centuries bce), the Roman Empire confronted an enemy commanding comparable material and military resources which enabled it to pose a very serious challenge to Roman power. It was, moreover, a particularly aggressive opponent, especially during the first century after its emergence, and while that can in part be attributed to the determination of successive Persian rulers to consolidate the position of their new regime by the tried and tested method of military success,[508] it was also a response to repeated Roman aggression against the Parthian Arsacid regime in the second century, during which Roman armies had three times invaded deep into Parthian territory, thereby increasingly discrediting the Arsacids and helping to lay the ground for their overthrow by the Sasanians.
So while the impact of Sasanian Persia might seem to be an exogenous factor outside of Roman control, the empire had inadvertently played a significant role in its creation.The same can be said about the parallel impact of barbarian groups from the north in the third century. The economically under-developed and politically fragmented communities north of the empire in the first century gradually enhanced their agricultural productivity and population size, so that, with increasing social stratification and political centralisation, they were able to pose more serious military threats to the empire by the mid third century. Those developments owed much to the effects of commercial and diplomatic interchange with the empire, which facilitated improvements in agriculture and channelled imperial subsidies to clearly identifiable leaders. The empire understandably preferred to deal with individuals whose authority held substantial sway because this made the conclusion and maintenance of agreements easier - but it also had the unintended consequence of encouraging the emergence of more powerful barbarian groups. And because the empire's approach to relations with these barbarian groups was fundamentally exploitative (e.g. a significant element of commercial interchange was the channelling of barbarian slaves into the empire) and also involved periodic bouts of imperial military aggression, these more powerful barbarian groups were by no means favourably disposed towards the empire. Indeed, as in Persia, leadership was validated through successful warfare.[509]
The external military challenges of the mid third century in turn contributed significantly to an increased incidence of civil war within the empire. Emperors had traditionally been drawn from the senatorial elite, among whom military competence was valued but of less importance as a qualification for imperial office than dynastic ties. The multiple problems the empire faced on its frontiers during this period very quickly changed this, so that military experience became a desideratum (to the extent that it trumped all other requirements, including senatorial status).
In this way, attaining imperial office became a realistic goal for senior military officers of ability and ambition, even if from a lower social background. Greater competition for imperial office ensued, and since the competitors were military men with troops under their command, periodic bouts of civil war were an almost inevitable consequence. This was particularly the case during the mid third century, but it remained a reasonably regular occurrence during the fourth and fifth centuries, despite the efforts of emperors to reestablish the principle of dynastic continuity. It was less of a problem during the sixth century, largely, it seems, because emperors adopted a strategy of placing individuals connected to them by ties of blood or marriage in positions of senior military command, but there was a recrudescence in the early seventh century against a background of renewed military crisis, on a scale comparable to that of the mid third century.[510]