Norms and interests

The negotiations over Francis’ release proved to be an episode; the war continued, interrupted by occasional peace treaties until 1559, when Francis’ and Charles’ successors concluded the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis What did they fight about? Admittedly, wealthy regions were at stake.

Admittedly, strategic considerations were also part of the picture and the line between them and the legal claims are not always easy to draw. An important motive was fear of other rulers planning attacks or growing too strong. During the period of the Reformation, religion played an important part, although modified by other considerations. The Catholic king of France normally supported the German Protestants in order to limit the emperor’s power and on occasions even concluded alliances with the Turks. Finally, it may be suggested that war was an aim in itself, apart from gains and losses. In peacetime, hunting was the most prestigious royal sport, but war was even more prestigious. What could be nobler and more challenging, particularly for a young man, ruling a great country and with great resources at his disposal, than to distinguish himself in the most dan­gerous and difficult of all sports, fighting in person as the leader of a great army against an enemy of equal skill and status? There are many celebrations of war from the Middle Ages and the early modern period, including the following by the poet Bertrand de Born from the twelfth century:

I tell you that I find no such savor in eating butter and sleeping, as when I hear cried ‘On them!’ and from both sides hear horses neighing through their head-guards, and hear shouted ‘To aid! To aid!’ and see the dead with lance truncheons, the pennants still on them, piercing their sides.⁴⁶

Francis’ behaviour at Pavia and on other occasions points in the same direction. Instead of seeking an easy victory against a demoralized army, he chooses the hon­ourable option of attacking a strongly fortified town and when this seems to fail, he regards it as dishonourable to give up. A number of other rulers behaved in the same way, although there were clearly different attitudes, including that of war as a necessary evil. Wars clearly did not aim at conquest of the enemy country or creating an all-European empire; in Hoffman’s terminology, they were ‘tournaments’, aiming at prestige in competition with some external enemy of equal size.⁴⁷

Considering the size of the two opposing parties in this war, it would seem to have been a desperate struggle by the king of France to avoid being absorbed by the overwhelming power of the Habsburgs, the rulers of Spain and its American Empire, Southern Italy, Germany, the Low Countries, Bohemia and parts of Hungary.

A central issue in early modern wars was succession to the throne. There were three such wars in the eighteenth century, respectively over the Spanish, Polish and Austrian successions. The first was essentially a great coalition of the enemies of Louis XIV’s France to prevent a further expansion of France, which, as we have seen, ended with a compromise. The second was an attempt to limit the Russian influence in Poland which failed, but gave France some territory in Italy. The third was the most dramatic, almost leading to the dissolution of the Austrian Empire (1740-48).

Charles VI of Austria (1711-40) had no son, only daughters, whereas succession to the Holy Roman Empire was agnatic. By contrast, there were a number of more distant relatives who might agree to divide the Empire between them. The Hungarians openly discussed the possibility of electing a king from another dynasty. To prevent this, Charles in 1713 proclaimed the Pragmatic Sanction, asserting the indivisibility of the Empire and the right of female succession to the throne in the absence of a male heir, and had it accepted by the estates of all Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian lands and by the European powers. However, as soon as Charles was dead, the ‘scrabble for Austria’ began. Frederick II of Prussia invaded Silesia late in 1740, thus introducing the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48).

Charles’ heir was his daughter, Maria Theresa, aged 23, who responded to the challenge with formidable energy and courage, mobilizing armies, negotiating with enemies and allies, and who finally managed to save the unity of the Empire, despite having to accept the loss of Silesia. In the most desperate situation, she appealed to the Hungarian nobility, previously not particularly friendly to the Emperor. She arrived in Pressburg (now Bratislava), the capital of Hungary at the time, dressed in Hungarian national costume and with the Hungarian flag over her head. The Hungarians were impressed, but demanded more than she was willing to give them: full independence. After a further emotional appeal, dressed for mourning and in tears, with the crown of St Stephen on her head and with the almost newborn Joseph (later Joseph II) on her lap, she succeeded in her appeal and received the troops she asked for. In addition, she received subsidies from Britain, which also joined the war, and gradually managed to improve the military situa­tion. Despite a number of French victories, the war ended in 1748 with status quo; the Austrian Empire remained intact, except for Silesia. Charles Albert of Bavaria died in 1745 and was succeeded as emperor by Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis Stephen, who in turn was succeeded by their son Joseph, at his death in 1765, while Maria Theresa was the actual ruler.

If Austria’s enemies had carried out their original plans, it would have led to a major transformation of the map of Europe, the extinction of one of the three great powers of Western and Central Europe. Even without Maria Theresa, how­ever, it might be suggested that this was after all an unlikely outcome; it was gen­erally difficult to arrive at an acceptance of a drastic change of territory in contemporary great power politics.

Frederick II of Prussia fought three wars over Silesia (1740—42, 1744—45 and 1756—63). The reason was the immense strategic and probably also economic importance of this region. It extended the borders of Prussia to the south in a way that enabled Prussian forces to threaten both Vienna and Prague. It separated Saxony from Poland, which of course made it extremely attractive to the duke of Saxony who was also king of Poland. One of Frederick’s motives for the invasion was to prevent a Saxon conquest. Silesia covered around 40,000 square km or around one-third of England and had one million inhabitants, which then increased the Prussian population by 50 per cent. It was also the wealthiest pro­vince of Austria with a productive agriculture, plenty of mineral resources and a famous textile industry. By conquering Silesia, Prussia took the step from being a medium-sized principality to the main rival of the emperor within the German realm.⁴⁹ By Frederick’s standards, Francis I was a military dilettante, wandering around to find an adversary of sufficient status to fight him, whereas Frederick had organized his army as well as the rest of his country down to the minutest detail in order to be able to fight a prolonged war. Frederick’s concept of honour was also different from that of Francis; it was the honour of the state rather than that of the king as a person. Frederick did not expose himself to danger on the battlefield to show his heroism but because he found it necessary for strategic reasons. Moreover, what distinguished him from his adversaries was his skill as a military organizer rather than as a general in the field.⁵⁰ Although Frederick was exceptional even in the eighteenth century, the comparison between the two rulers does indicate a trend in the direction of clearer strategic thinking.

As we have seen, the principles of hereditary succession and legitimate rights played an important part in the conflict between Francis I and Charles V. Dynastic connections also to some extent determined the alliance system. Spain and the Empire were normally allies as long as they were both ruled by the Habsburgs (1516—1700), whereas the same happened with France and Spain, once they both were ruled by the Bourbons (1700—1792). The dynastic principle was also funda­mental in the peace negotiations that ended the great wars of the following period. Peace negotiations during the Thirty Years War started in 1644, when delegates from the various parties met in Osnabrück and Münster, the Protestants in the former, the Catholics in the latter. The religious divisions at the time were suffi­ciently sharp to make a common conference impossible. Even so, there is a dra­matic contrast between the slaughter, cruelty and misery caused by the war going on at the same time and the elegantly dressed diplomats with their wigs and laces and plumed hats assuring each other in eloquent Latin, French or Spanish of their peaceful intentions and respect for the other party’s interests. Legal rights played a very important part in the negotiations. Although it was recognized that conquest might create a right, the delegates consistently avoided drawing any conclusions from this principle; some legal basis had to be found.⁵¹ Without bringing an end to European wars, it settled conditions in Germany for a long time and established a certain balance of power in Europe. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 is often regarded as the precise date when the European state system came into existence, including the around 400 German territories. Strictly speaking, this is not true; the only formal recognition of this kind in the treaty concerned the inde­pendence of the Dutch Republic from Spain. By contrast, the emperor was still regarded as the head of the German principalities, although this superiority had limited practical importance, as had already been the case for centuries.⁵²

At the peace conference of Utrecht in 1713, we can study the development of European diplomacy since 1648. There was no division between Catholics and Protestants; there was some basic agreement among the negotiators and a good personal relationship between them, as between the English Lord Bolingbroke and the French Marquis Torcy, both clever diplomats. There was little mention of general principles, which had played such an important part in 1648, but rather an attempt from all or at least most parties to reach solutions that might be mutually acceptable and prevent a renewal of the war. To some extent, the principle of a balance of power had replaced the strong focus on established rights.

Without going into details about the negotiations, a minor issue may be used for illustration, namely, the question of what was going to happen to the two Wit­telsbach electors, the duke of Bavaria and the archbishop of Cologne, who had fought with France against the emperor and were therefore regarded as traitors. Louis XIV tried his best to obtain a favourable settlement for them, despite the fact that the alliance with them had been of little value to him. He emphasized that he had pledged his word to aid them and addressed Queen Anne of England in person for their sake. The English had already compromised themselves by negotiating with the French behind the back of their allies⁵³ and were not inclined to provoke the emperor by acting on behalf of people he regarded as traitors, but were even­tually willing to some concessions because of French pressure. As Bolingbroke put it, it was necessary to do something for ‘the Elector of Bavaria, whose interest the old gentleman [Louis XIV] has... as much at heart as it is possible to believe’.⁵⁴ Various projects were proposed but all rejected by the emperor. In the end, the two princes had to resign themselves to the status quo; they were reinstated as imperial princes. As a whole, the conference must be regarded as reasonably suc­cessful; it had kept the Spanish Empire largely intact but secured its separation from France as well as establishing a barrier between France and the Dutch Republic in the form of the Austrian Netherlands.

Of course, peace conferences are occasions for politeness, diplomatic language and references to virtues and legal principles. Nevertheless, some of these declara­tions correspond to actual behaviour. This applies above all to the dynastic princi­ple. In the same way as the right of property and inheritance was a fundamental principle of law in the individual countries, the right of a dynasty to a certain principality or kingdom was fundamental in international politics. Two objections made to the importance of norms in early modern international politics are that Francis I broke his oath to Charles V at the Peace of Madrid and that Frederick II conquered Silesia without a legal claim.⁵⁵ The answer to this is, first, that the fact that norms are disobeyed does not mean that they do not exist and, second, that Francis had what his contemporaries regarded as a valid reason, namely, that the pope had declared that his oath was forced and consequently null and void. Con­cerning Frederick II, he might argue that the absence of a legitimate heir made the division of a composite monarchy legitimate. Although there are strategic expla­nations for the great alliance against him in the Seven Years War, both its size and its duration seem an argument that he was considered to have acted against the rules and was regarded as dangerous for that reason. Thus, the fundamental prin­ciple of early modern international politics was not the integrity of the state but the rights of the dynasty. In the same way as hereditary property was the basis of law within the various European countries, the right of a dynasty to rule a particular country was fundamental in international law. Crises of succession opened up possibilities for expansion based on more or less convincing claims, while an open challenge of the rights of a generally recognized heir was difficult to maintain.

The strongest argument in favour of the importance of norms is the continued existence of the around 400 German principalities. Of course, there are also some political reasons for this. Germany was a kind of buffer between two strong states, France and Habsburg Austria. During the Thirty Years War, France had fought Austria to prevent the emperor from taking control of Germany. In the following period, the emperor had some authority and influence in the area, while his main field of expansion was towards the south, the Ottoman Empire, eventually also the east, with the division of Poland. From a French point of view, the German prin­cipalities were too weak and divided to form a threat but might of course form a tempting aim for expansion, as particularly the Rhineland was both a wealthy area and situated close to the French border. Louis XIV made some attempts at expansion here, but experienced opposition from England as well as from the Dutch Republic. However, when the three eastern powers could agree about the division of Poland, it would not be inconceivable that some similar deal might have been made over Germany. Political considerations clearly played a part, but it is difficult to dismiss the importance of established rights.

The attitude of the German princes themselves may be illustrated by the fol­lowing quotation from the French delegates, D’Avaux and Servien, at the peace conference of Westphalia to Cardinal Mazarin:

We are obliged, by what little knowledge we have of the disposition of the princes of Germany, to represent to Your Eminence that it is very different from that of the princes of Italy, the latter, being very intelligent and well-advised, approving of, and wishing for, everything that may contribute to make them independent... but these [the German princes] are much more affected by love of their fatherland and cannot approve of foreigners dismembering the Empire, no matter what hope of gain we hold out to them, preferring. the substance of the body of which they are members to the advantage that each of them can obtain privately through the division of the Empire.⁵⁶

The norms in this case are based on the dynastic principle which in contemporary Europe was fundamental concerning the relationship between individuals as well as states. Although politically a fairly weak assembly of states, it was governed by rules about the princes’ hereditary rights, which, if broken, might lead to sanctions against the culprit under the leadership of the emperor (Reichsexekution). Militarily, this was not particularly effective, but there was a general acceptance of mutual rights, which served to preserve the system as such despite occasional transgressions of the rules.⁵⁷ As indicated by the quotation, there was also some sense of national identity in Germany despite the political division.⁵⁸

We can here point to the general argument for ordinary people to adhere to norms. If asked whether they would follow the norm if it cost them their life, most people would probably say no. However, in most cases it does not cost one’s life to follow the norm, but perhaps only some inconvenience, which may be cancelled by the risk of not following the norm. In other words, the existence of a norm means an extra cost in performing certain actions which at least in some cases makes people inclined to follow it. The difference between individuals and states is that the former are ruled by a superior authority whereas the latter are not. Still, in the same way as the idea of the state as absolutely sovereign was slow to develop, the same applies to the idea of anarchy between states. Typically, early modern wars were wars of succession. A succession presented an opportunity to add to one’s territory on the basis of more or less legitimate claims and in some cases, such as Frederick II’s conquest of Silesia, with no claim at all, but a situation where the lack of a legitimate successor to the imperial title made it possible to grab a piece of the empire’s possessions. In addition, honour was still important but eventually in a somewhat different form. To Francis I, like his medieval predecessors, honour was very personal, linked to his own performance in battle and his rights as a member of a particular dynasty. To Richelieu, Louis XIV and Frederick II, honour was more linked to the state as an abstract entity. The state had to defend its territory and interests to be respected by other states.

The existence of norms in such cases nevertheless has some connection with the principle of a balance of power that had gradually developed. A territory or a country would normally belong to a certain kindred or dynasty. If a claimant could show a connection to this dynasty, he might be opposed by others with similar claims and might have to fight for his claim. The importance of norms is expressed in the fact that an actor trying to expand his power against the norms is more dangerous than one who has a legitimate claim. The others will suspect the former of turning against themselves the next time, while the latter may be believed to be content by having his claim recognized. The other actors would therefore be likely to unite against any actor that tried seriously to disturb the balance. Consequently, the existence of the norms in question has some con­nection to the contemporary political situation, a number of relatively stable units in mutual competition, none of which was likely to establish a power monopoly or risk extinction. All would want to extend their power and territory but no one would want any of the others to do so. Consequently, there would always be a majority in favour of the status quo.

It may be objected to this conclusion that once France had got an efficient government after the Revolution, it embarked on a series of wars of conquest which for a time radically changed the map of Europe. The answer to this is that these military successes were largely the results of ideological change: the mobili­zation of the French people to fight for the nation and its freedom, and the rejec­tion of dynastic rights which led to changes of government as well as political borders, the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire and the suppression of a large number of German principalities, including the ecclesiastical ones. From a military point of view, a European continent dominated by France would not have been impossible in the period following the decline of the Habsburg Empire, but it would have necessitated both a more efficient state and the rejection of the dynastic principle. Thus, Hui is correct in pointing to inefficiency as a factor, to which, however, the dynastic principle should be added, combined with the prin­ciple of the balance of power. This latter was strengthened after the French defeat in 1814—15 and has played an important part in great power politics until the. 59

present.

Finally, let us consider the two cases of states that disappeared, namely, the Ita­lian city states and Poland. Both had in common that they lacked dynasties. The city republics were mostly suppressed or replaced by princes. Southern Italy and Sicily had well-established dynasties with links to others, notably that of Spain, which in periods led to personal unions with this country. Poland was a kingdom from the early eleventh century onwards but the monarchy was defined as elective in 1569. In contrast to most other elective kingdoms, Poland eventually became really elective, with no preference for the son of the previous king. The king’s power was also greatly reduced in the eighteenth century. This does not mean that the lack of a dynasty was the only explanation for the partition but it may have made it easier to achieve; it would create no dangerous precedent for the estab­lished dynasties. It would also have seemed to be a breach of the principle of the balance of power; under normal circumstances, powers like Britain and France would probably have reacted against it, but as it took place in 1793 and 1795, during the period of the French Revolution, neither of them had any possibility to interfere. The internal development of Poland, including the partition, will be discussed later.

The first step towards the partition of Poland was taken at the initiative of Fre­derick II of Prussia in 1772 who wanted to extend the coastline of his country and to join two of the three main parts of which it consisted. Another consideration, common to Austria and Prussia, was to limit the influence of Russia, which largely controlled Poland. Catharine the Great of Russia was therefore less in favour of the partition but found it necessary to accept it. Maria Theresa of Austria had moral objections but agreed. As Frederick put it: ‘Catherine and I are simply brigands; but I wonder how the Queen-Empress managed to square her confessor... She wept as she took, and the more she wept, the more she took.’⁶⁰ Frederick here gives an apt characterization of the three rulers. He was himself a power politician with limited respect for norms and established rights. Russia represented a different political culture, a more absolutist regime where, however, the dynasty was of little importance. The emperor elected his own successor and did not necessarily pick his nearest heir. Moreover, Russia was a new power with little reason to respect the traditional rights of the established rulers. By contrast, Maria Theresa was a tradi­tional monarch, who, in addition, had fought like a lioness for the possessions of her dynasty and in order to prevent the partition of her empire.