NOTES

Chapter i. Ceuta, Bojador, and Beyond

1. The official version of Ceuta’s capture is recounted in Zurara, Conquests and Discoveries, 31- 115. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 15-19, discusses the significance of the expedition.

2. According to Zurara, King John considered waging war against Portugal’s nearer rival, Castile. But his youngest son pressed the case for attacking the Moors. Castile’s king, argued Prince Henry, is an enemy “only so by accident (being a Christian like ourselves), whereas the Infidels are our enemies by nature.” Conquests and Discoveries, 41. For the larger setting, see Kedar, Crusade and Mission.

3. Overviews of early European maritime initiatives are Scammell, The World Encompassed, Scammell, The First Imperial Age, and Phillips, Medieval Expansion of Europe. Detailed studies include Roesdahl, The Vikings, and Lane, Venice.

4. “Portugal was the first European country in which oversea exploration, whether with trade or conquest in mind, was actively supported over a long period by government.” Parry, Discovery of the Sea, 89.

5. Mauny, Navigations Medievales, discusses maritime exploration in this area before ships rounded Cape Bojador and returned to Europe.

6. See Zurara, Conquests and Discoveries, 119-253, and Parry, Discovery of the Sea, 89-107, on explorations sponsored by Prince Henry. For Cape Bojador’s reputation as the Cape of Fear and the significance of Gil Eannes’s voyage for later maritime exploration, see Chaunu, Euro­pean Expansion in the Later Middle Ages, 111-16.

7. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World.

8. There is, of course, no distinct boundary between Europe and Asia. Neither does any clear geographic or political marker separate Europe’s western portion from the rest of the conti­nent. By “western Europe” I mean the eight countries noted here, or more generally the segment of Europe west of 14 degrees of latitude east of Greenwich.

9. Parry, Discovery of the Sea; Wilford, The Mapmakers, 7-86. The evolving European worldview as explorers conveyed their findings to cartographers is beautifully illustrated in Campbell, Early Maps.

10. Alhough Russia and Japan held overseas possessions, their empires differed from west Euro­pean ones in important respects. Russia’s expansion was overwhelmingly overland. Its North American possessions, held for less than a century, were economically and strategically pe­ripheral and not central to Russia’s image of itself as a vast multicultural empire. In contrast, overseas possessions constituted the west European empires. Japan’s overseas empire comes closest to systems of rule discussed in this book. Japan could not have expanded except by sea, and its foreign policy initiatives from the 1870s onward were deliberately patterned on the west European model. But the scope of Japan’s power was regional rather than global, as seen by its proximity to its principal possessions: Korea, Shantung, and Taiwan. In the late sixteenth century the great military leader Hideyoshi devised a plan of conquest that included India, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and would have made Japan an imperial power on a par with any European state had it been carried out. But Hideyoshi failed to develop the navy his plan required. And his army failed to subdue the Koreans, first on the list of peoples marked for subjugation. Hideyoshi’s plan was abandoned at the very time several European powers were asserting themselves overseas. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 143-77.

11. A strength of the world-system approach pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein is its tendency to regard western Europe as a unit, with patterns of production and trade that enabled it to become the globe’s “core” economic zone.

12. The career of Central Asian conqueror Timur (ca. 1336-1405) provides horrific examples. Timur was famous for erecting towers from the skulls of enemy soldiers killed in battle and of civilians slain en masse following his army’s victories.

13. Steve Stern’s description of the Inca empire fits many non-European cases: “As a ‘redistribu­tive’ state, the Inca Empire absorbed surplus labor from a self-sufficient peasantry and dis­pensed the fruits of this labor to the royal population and its retainers, the army, peasants on corvee duty, strategic beneficiaries, and so forth, but without in general transforming local modes of production.” Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples, 22.

14. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism, 75.

15. For fascinating discussions of these transfers, see two works by Alfred Crosby— The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism—and Hobhouse, Seeds of Change. On the role of botani­cal gardens in improving and transferring tropical export crops in the nineteenth and twen­tieth centuries, see Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, chap. 7, and Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion.

16. For the transformative character of European rule in a wide variety of settings, see Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain; Curtin, Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex; Davis, Modem Industry and the African; Drabble, Rubber in Malaya; Gide, Travels in the Congo; Hecht, Continents in Collision; Huhne, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean; Keith, Conquest and Agrarian Change... on the Peruvian Coast; Moorehead, Fatal Impact:... the Invasion of the South Pacific, Murray, Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina; Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society; Sherman, Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America; and van der Kraan, Lombok.

17. Among numerous accounts of the disruptive effects of European settlement on indigenous societies are Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico; Hecht, Continents in Collision; Hemming, Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians; Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau; Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa; and Price, Western Invasions of the Pacific and Its Continents.

18. Erickson, Emigration from Europe, 1815-1914^01 comparative studies of European overseas settlement, see Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies; Denoon, Settler Capitalism:... Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere; and Platt and di Tella, eds., Argentina, Australia, and Canada.

19. “To consolidate their gains... the pastoral conquerors usually adopted the administrative models of the peoples that they had overcome. In practice this meant that the nomads of the western steppe followed Islamic prototypes, while those of the eastern steppe and desert borrowed the models of the Han Chinese.” Wolf, Europe and the People without History, 33. On Aztec adaptation to the cultural patterns of settled urban populations in the Valley of Mexico, see Fagan, The Aztecs, 27-63.

20. Exceptions, from the early period of expansion I term phase 1, include the syncretistic culture of British East India Company officials in India, Dutch East India Company officials in Java, and Portuguese prazeros in Mozambique. Other examples are adoption of Amerindian life­styles by some English and French colonists on the North American frontier. See, for example, Isaacman, Mozambique: Africanization of a European Institution, and Axtell, The Invasion Within, “The White Indians,” 302-27. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europeans were much less indined to adjust to other cultures or engage in sex across racial lines than in phase 1. Changing attitudes as they affected India are described in Ballhatchet, Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj.

21. Effects of the colonizers’ attitudes on colonized peoples’ self-images are sensitively discussed in Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks; Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized; Mazrui, The African Condition; Manganyi, Looking through the Keyhole; and Nandy, The Intimate Enemy.

22. See the appendix for these countries and criteria employed to assign starting and ending points of European rule. Different criteria would, of course, produce different results. I classify under the imperial heading territories with a wide range of legal statuses, including protecto­rates (e.g., French Morocco and the informal British protectorates over small emirates on the Arabian peninsula), mandate territories of the League of Nations (e.g., French Syria, British Transjordan, and Belgian Ruanda-Urundi), and U.N. trusteeship territories.

23. “International relations” and “international system” are more familiar terms than “interstate relations” and “interstate system,” hence will generally be used in this text. The latter terms, however, are more accurate and will be used as well. The world’s key political units are the territorially bounded, bureaucratically administered entities called states, not groups of people regarding themselves as historically coherent, culturally integrated nations. Indeed, the vast majority of the world’s states have not been nations for most of their history and are not so now. Most political movements designating themselves nationalist are formed to create a nation, not to celebrate its prior existence. See Seton-Watson, Nations and States, and Ander­son, Imagined Communities. I maintain the distinction between “state” and “nation” when discussing internal affairs of polities. But with regret I abandon it when discussing so-called international relations.

24. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. Huntington acknowledges western Europe’s historical dominance. But in my view he understates the extent to which ideas and institutions ac­companying Western expansion influenced the subsequent development of non-Western civilizations.

25. An official language is one approved by central government for use in its administrative offices and for printing official documents. Of the eighty-eight former colonies, sixty list a west European language as the only one with official status.

26. Gunnemark, Countries, Peoples, and Their Languages, 172-81.

27. The distinction between Asia and Oceania is necessarily vague and arbitrary. “Oceania” refers to islands of the central and south Pacific located a considerable distance from mainland Asia and influenced slightly, or not at all, by the major refigions of mainland Asia. The term covers Australia, New Zealand, and the islands of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia. By “Asia” I mean the mainland plus the islands currently comprising Indonesia and the Philippines.

28. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century, 213.

Chapter 2. Why Did the Overseas Empires Rise, Persist, and Fall?

1. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

2. On the dangers of stretching a concept beyond its original meaning, see Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review.

3. A devastating critique of Lenin’s methods and conclusions, from within the Marxist tradition, is Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. According to Warren, Marx’s nuanced analysis of the causes and effects of European overseas political conquests was more accurate than Lenin’s attack on anything and everything conceivably attributable to advanced capitalism. Yet it was Lenin whose views prevailed in the Communist and non-Communist Third World for decades, while Marx’s views were ignored by many who called themselves Marxist.

4. My conception parallels Doyle’s; see Empires, 12.

5. Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review. The authors argue persuasively that informal economic influence should be considered along with the British government’s formal political claims if one is to understand “the history of an expanding society” in the nineteenth century and “the radiations of the social energies of the British peoples” (5). The problem is not with their substantive argument but with their semantics: appropriating a single term, “imperialism,” to cover both phenomena.

6. Baumgart, Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880- 1914,6.

7. The most famous Phoenician colony, in this sense, was Carthage. Greek settlers founded Constantinople, Naples, Palermo, and Marseilles.

8. Almond, “Approaches to Developmental Causation,” in Almond et al., Crisis, Choice, and Change, 22,24. Tilly, Big Structures, 2.

9. Works of this genre published since 1980 include Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony; Barkey and von Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building; the English translation of Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism; Bull and Watson, eds., The Expan­sion of International Society; Cooper et ah, Confronting Historical Paradigms; Crosby, Ecological Imperialism; Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History; Curtin, Rise and Fall of the Planta­tion Complex; Denoon, Settler Capitalism; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel; Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change; Doyle, Empires; Ferro, Colonization: A Global History; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age; Hall, Powers and Liberties: Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West; Hodg­son, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History; Holland, European Decolonization, 1918-81; Huff, Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West; Jones, The European Miracle; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers... 1500 to 2000; Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy, 1500 to 1990; Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975; McNeill, The Pursuit of Power; Mann, Sources of Social Power, 2 vols.; Marx, Making Race and Nation; Ralston, Importing the European Army... into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914; Rosenberg and Birdsell, How the West Grew Rich; Scammell, The First Imperial Age; Scammell, The World Encompassed; Smith, Creating a World Economy... 1400-1825; Stavrianos, Global Rift; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, a.d. 990-1992; Tracy, ed., Political Economy of Merchant Empires... 1350-1750; Tracy, ed., Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade... 1350-1750; von Laue, World Revolution of Western­ization; Wolf, Europe and the People without History; and Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. Works from the 1960s and 1970s include Almond et al., Crisis, Choice, and Change; Black, Dynamics ofModernization; Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us; Crosby, The Columbian Exchange; Davis, Rise of the Atlantic Economies; Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires; Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Cen­tury; Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789; Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas; Hartz, ed., et al., Founding of New Societies; Hennessy, Frontier in Latin American History; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World—a New Economic History; Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, The Modem World-System II, and The Capitalist World-Economy. For conceptual and methodological problems involved in comparative his­torical analysis of large units, see Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons.

10. For a dear, cogent statement of what a theory is and what strengthens or weakens its explana­tory power, see Przeworski and Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, chap. 1.

11. This is an instance of the “principal-agent” problem, to employ legal terminology used in the current literature on organizations. See Wilson, Bureaucracy, 154-58, and Pratt and Zeck- hauser, Principals and Agents, 1-35.

12. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, 13.

13. These observations permit critical reflection on the fit between question, argument, and evidence in Jared Diamond’s acclaimed Guns, Germs, and Steel. The book’s central puzzle is posed by Yali, a New Guinea politician: why were his people colonized by Europeans and not the reverse? Diamond’s answer takes readers on a fascinating excursion through thirteen thousand years of history, with special emphasis on Eurasia’s advantages in the development and diffusion of innovations in agriculture, livestock management, and the like. But is not a thirteen-thousand-year answer far too comprehensive, considering that Europe’s expansion was compressed into a fraction of that time? Is not Eurasia too spatially comprehensive an explanatory category, considering that it was not people from any part of that vast land space, but only those from its distant western periphery, who came to dominate New Guinea’s indigenous peoples? Yali’s intriguing question could be more directly addressed by focusing on the last five centuries and on developments in Eurasia’s far western edge.

14. This line of reasoning employs John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement. If two effects are similar in an important respect, one searches for factors associated with both effects that plausibly helped cause both effects. In the complex, multiple-causation situations found in human societies, one should avoid claiming with certainty that all such factors are important causal agents. But it makes sense to privilege these factors over others associated with one effect but not the other, to say nothing of factors associated with neither. Mill, A System of Logic, book 2, chap. 8,279-91.

15. A more rigorous test of temporal comprehensiveness would examine phases 2 and 4 as well, since expansion also occurred in these periods. To keep an already formidable operation from becoming unmanageable, I focus on phases covering over 80 percent of the fifty-two decades separating Portugal’s conquest of Ceuta from Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia. Expansion in phases 1 and 3 is most amenable to analysis, moreover, because unmediated by trends in the other direction that mark phases 2 and 4.

16. Major theories are summarized in Wright, ed., The “New Imperialism.” See the critical dis­cussion in Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914, 3-87; and Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism.

17. This line of reasoning follows what J. S. Mill terms the indirect method of difference. When two effects differ in the respect one wants to study, one searches for factors associated with one effect but not both. These factors are highlighted because their presence in one situation and absence in the other may help account for the different outcome. This is the method underly­ing experimental designs. J. S. Mill, A System of Logic.

18. As Doyle (Empires, 12) argues, in order to understand interactions between a dominant metropole and a subordinate periphery, “it is quite as necessary to explain the weakness of the periphery as it is to explain the strength and motives of the metropole.”

19. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study; Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes. Works by Lenin and Wallerstein are cited in notes 1 and 9, respectively.

20. Frank, Capitalism and Under-Development in Latin America. The ideas of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British imperialists are discussed in Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, and Symonds, Oxford and Empire.

21.1 define an institution as a complex organization with an identifiable hierarchy, a primary pur­pose relating to the world outside the organization’s boundaries, and procedures and norms giving individuals associated with the organization incentives to support its primary purpose through their own actions. This definition is more structural and less comprehensive than the one North offers in Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, y “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” But it benefits from North’s emphasis on individual incentives and the role organizational procedures and norms play in shaping them.

22.1 do not assume that all societies share the same set of functional requisites for maintaining themselves over time. The notion of sectoral activities employed here is derived from an examination of historical events and sequences in several European countries. It is not de­duced from macrofunctionalist premises about how every society operates.

23. In all the cases just noted, except France and Haiti, the metropole emerged on the winning side. Though France eventually lost the Napoleonic Wars, it lost Haiti at a time when it had fought well enough in Europe to manage a stalemate with its enemies.

Chapter 3. Phase 1: Expansion, 1415-1773

1. Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, 23,29.

2. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700,111.

3. Hennessy, Frontier in Latin American History, esp. chap. 3, “Types of Frontier,” 54-109.

4. Because England’s rulers steadily extended their jurisdiction within the British Isles during phase 1, it is unclear at what point the polity ceases to become England and is more accurately designated Britain. For phase 11 use “England” unless the reference is to Parliament following the Union of England and Scotland in 1707.1 use “Britain” and “Great Britain” for subsequent phases.

5. Data from Kohn, Dictionary of Wars. For an overview, see Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler, parts 1 and 2. During the half century preceding its interna­tionally recognized independence from Spain, Holland conducted foreign affairs as a de facto independent state.

6. Data from Kohn, Dictionary of Wars. For detailed accounts of selected conflicts, see Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement... 1480-1630; Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800; Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800; and Earle, The Sack of Panama.

7. Davis, Rise of the Atlantic Economies, 54-55. Volume 1 of Cook and Borah, Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean, provides estimates cited here of population declines in Hispaniola (401) and New Spain (viii).

8. McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 121.

9. Headrick, Tools of Empire, 59-73; Curtin, Image of Africa: British Ideas and Actions, 1780-1850, 483-87; Curtin, Death by Migration, chap. 1.

10. By “race” I mean a socially defined category assigning special importance—typically, unequal social status—to physical differences among people with different continental origins. Race

has a subjective component, permitting definitions of its boundaries to change over time and from one place to another. But it also has an objective component, pointing to observable features that vary systematically among groups tracing ancestry to different continents. Racial categories are constructed. But they are not invented. That is, they are not based solely on the “inventing” group’s interests, projected desires, or misconceptions.

n. McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 344, gives estimates for the Iberian empires. Estimates for Peru are from Anna, Fall of the Royal Government in Peru, 16-17.

12. Perkins, Economy of Colonial America, 1-2. See also Nash, Red, White, and Black: the Peoples of Early America.

13. Estimates for Spanish and Portuguese territories are taken from McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 344. Estimates for the British West Indies and southern bna colonies are from Engerman, “Notes on the Patterns of Economic Growth in the British North American Colonies in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries,” in Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer, eds., Dis­parities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution, 47. See also Nash, Red, White, and Black, chap. 7.

14. Estimates for 1650 for the Iberian colonies are from McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 344; for Peru from Anna, Fall of the Royal Government, 17. Estimates of mestizos in New Spain vary widely. MacLaclan and Rodriguez, The Forging of the Cosmic Race, 197, cite Gonzalo Aguirre Beltran’s estimates (1972) of 6 percent in 1646,10 percent in 1742, and 11 percent in 1793. The much higher figure in the text is from Cook and Borah, Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean 2:266. See James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution for the social and economic role of mulattoes in Saint Domingue.

15. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 11-13.

16. Hennessy, Frontier in Latin American History, 19 and passim.

17. Ibid.

18. Two stimulating comparisons of South African and U.S. history are Fredrickson, White Su­premacy, and Lamar and Thompson, eds., The Frontier in History. On early cross-cultural encounters, see Elphick, Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa.

19. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. Not all items exchanged were deliberately transferred- disease viruses, for example. Neither were they all commercially viable. See the chapter en­titled “Weeds” in Crosby, Ecological Imperialism.

20. Schurz, The Manila Galleon. New World bullion stimulated not only a direct lateral trade with East Asia but also a substantial increase in vertical trade between Europe and East Asia. About half the four hundred million silver dollars imported from South America and Mexico into Europe between 1571 and 1821 was used to purchase Chinese products. Gemet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 485.

21. Tracy, Rise of Merchant Empires, 291.

22. An exception is sugar grown on New World plantations. Sugar shifted from a luxury to a middle-class consumption good because of the technical efficiency of plantation operations, the artificially low cost of slave labor, and the enormous volumes exported. See Mintz, Sweet­ness and Power, and Curtin, Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex.

23. The Industrial Revolution’s start is conventionally dated at about 1750. Its impact on England’s economy and society was minimal, however, until early phase 2. Steam engines incorporating James Watt’s invention in 1765 of a separate condensing vessel were not produced commer­cially until 1775. The first yarn-spinning mill employing Richard Arkwright’s spinning frame and carding machine began operations in 1772. Mass production of cotton in the Americas, complementing the new spinning and weaving technologies, awaited widespread adoption of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, invented in 1793.

24. James, The Black Jacobins, 66.

25. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea, 177.

26. Elkiss, Quest for an African Eldorado, 20.

27. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance, 50.

28. Quoted in Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, 19.

29. Axtell, The Invasion Within, 11.

30. Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosi, 1545-1650; Cole, The Potosi Mita; Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest. See Wallerstein, The Mod­ern World-System, 65-74, and passim for the contrast in modes of mobilizing and organizing labor in the west European “core” and the American colonial “periphery.”

31. Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies.

32. Sources on phase 1 chartered companies include Blusse and Gaastra, eds., Companies and Trade; Chaudhuri, The English East India Company... 1600-1640; Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800; Haudrere, La Compagnie Franfaise des Indes aux XVIIIeme Siecle, 1719-1795); Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740; Newman, Company of Adventurers: The Story of the Hudson’s Bay Company; Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century; Tracy, ed., Rise of Merchant Empires; and Tracy, ed., Political Economy of Merchant Empires.

33. Lippy et al., Christianity Comes to the Americas, 1492-1776,58,137.

34. For far-flung Jesuit activities, see Alden, The Making of an Enterprise: The Society ofJesus.

Chapter 4. Phase Two: Contraction, 1775-1824

1. Indirect beneficiaries of phase 2 independence movements are territories that broke from previously independent countries to become sovereign states on their own. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua defected peacefully from Mexico in 1823 as the United Provinces of Central America and became separate states in 1838. Panama was part of Colombia until, under intense U.S. pressure, it became a republic in 1903. Colombia, Venezu­ela, and Ecuador were joined as Gran Colombia during the struggle for independence. But Simon Bolivar’s experiment in pan-American solidarity collapsed when Venezuela and Ec­uador seceded in 1830.

2. The battle was actually fought on Charlestown’s Breed’s Hill, less elevated than Bunker Hill but closer to the harbor, which British troops controlled.

3. The phrase is Lipset’s; see The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Compara­tive Perspective.

4. Quoted in Crow, The Epic of Latin America, 526. See Bethell, “The Independence of Brazil,” in Bethell, ed., The Independence of Latin America, 155-94.

5. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, chaps. 4-6.

6. The so-called Straits Settlements included Penang (acquired 1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca, ceded by Holland to Britain in 1824.

7. War was waged for twenty-six of the forty-nine years: 1778-83,1793-1802,1803-14, and 1815.

8. For overviews, see Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 123-47, and his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 115-39. Kaiser, Politics and War, 212-63, focuses on Europe; Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815, on areas outside Europe.

9. The now-sovereign states where these conflicts occurred are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecua­dor, Haiti, Panama (as part of Colombia), Peru, the United States, and Venezuela. Because forces loyal to the metropole included soldiers recruited from a colony as well as those dis­patched by a metropole, many independence struggles were simultaneously civil wars. The so­cially radical revolts led by Hidalgo and Morelos in New Spain may be considered incipient in­dependence movements even though the leaders did not explicitly advocate a break with Spain.

10. Interestingly, the short-lived capture of Buenos Aires by a British naval force in 1806 triggered the first major movement in that city for freedom from all European powers. Individual Europeans acting on their own assisted independence movements against other metropoles. Perhaps most significant was Britain’s Lord Cochrane, a brilliant and daring sea commander who kept the Spanish navy at bay off the coasts of Chile and Peru at a critical juncture. Cochrane subsequently helped the Brazilians expel Portuguese land and sea forces that were unwilling to accept Brazil’s independence.

11. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 188-89, and Higgonet, Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism, 193; cited in Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada, 11.

12. Act of September 15,1821, cited as the original independence document for Costa Rica, Guate­mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Blaustein et al., Independence Documents of the World 1:138.

13. Davis, Slavery and Human Progress, 294. See the insightful comparison of slavery and abolition in Brazil, the United States, and South Africa in Marx, Making Race and Nation.

14. Stein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America, 158-62. Bums, Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. On the link between postindependence liberalism and land tenure policy in Mexico, see Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853, 224-34. The disastrous impact on El Salvador’s Indians of late nineteenth-century alienation of their communal lands is noted in Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America, 39-43 and passim.

15. See Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 1: esp. 21-88,183-213. As Prucha documents, pronouncements in the Republic’s early years showed willingness to include Indians as citizens if they abandoned their old ways and assimilated to the dominant culture as individuals. But assimilationist policies could not be implemented. Federal and state politicians persistently supported “their own kind,” settlers whose hunger for land on the Indian side of an ever-moving frontier was insatiable. For the triumph of Indian-removal policies even where Indians were prepared to assimilate to settler culture, see McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic, 1794-1833.

16. Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1806-26, 29. On the impact of the American Revo­lution on events elsewhere in the hemisphere, see Whitaker, The United States and the Indepen­dence of Latin America, 1800-1830; Knight, “The American Revolution and the Caribbean,” in Berlin and Hoffinan, eds., Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution, 237-61; and Rodriguez, “The Impact of the American Revolution on the Spanish- and Portuguese- Speaking World,” in Library of Congress, The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad, 101-25.

17. Quoted in Rodriguez, “The Impact of the American Revolution,” 116.

18. Ibid., 117.

19. In Blaustein, Independence Documents, 194.

20. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 152.

21. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, 29.

22. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, 190-91, quoted in Lipset, Continental Divide, 10. Moore, The Loyalists: Revolution, Exile, Settlement, describes the experience of those who left for Canada. Loyalists also settled in the British West Indies, bringing with them similar antirepublican sentiments.

23. By increasing the proportion of English-speakers in Canada, the Loyalist influx probably increased Britain’s capacity to control Quebec’s French-speakers. Moreover, concentrations of Loyalists in New Brunswick and Upper Canada meant that the francophone community was flanked on both east and west by people opposing uprisings or secessionist attempts on its part.

24. Craton, Testing the Chains.

Chapter 5. Phase 3: Expansion, 1824-1912

1. Estimates compiled from Clark, Balance Sheets of Imperialism, 6, 31. See table 1, 23-28, for more details. Square kilometers are recalculated as square miles.

2. The British already held the Straits Settlements, including Singapore, acquired in 1819. Until late phase 3 these possessions were valued as ports ensuring Britain’s dominance of the seas, not as entry points to the interior. Britain broke with the traditional enclave pattern in acquiring Arakan and Tenassirim, which stretched for hundreds of miles down the Bay of Bengal’s eastern edge and along the Malay Peninsula. The war in 1824-26 was the first of three. Subsequent conflicts in the 1850s and 1880s incorporated the entire Kingdom of Burma and numerous neighboring, mountain-dwelling ethnic groups into British India.

3. Headrick, Tools of Empire, 21. On the background to the first Anglo-Burmese War, see Cady, A History of Modem Burma, 68-75.

4. Landau, Moroccan Drama, 1900-1955, 53-82, describes the backdrop to formation of the protectorate. Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, stresses the military dimension.

5. Morris, Heaven’s Command: An Imperial Progress, 204. Morris adds that the railway image was “readily adopted by the Church of England too as a figure of salvationary progress:

The line to heaven by Christ was made With heavenly truth the Rails are laid. From Earth to Heaven the line extends To Life Eternal where it ends.”

On the railway boom and its overseas impact, see Headrick, Tools of Empire, chaps. 13,14; and Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, chap. 3.

6. Figure estimated from Clark, Balance Sheets, table 1,23.1 classify the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan as a British colony though Clark lists it as an “international area.” White-ruled dominions— Canada and associated provinces, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—accounted for 60 percent of the empire’s territory. South Africa became a dominion in 1910 when its four provinces formed a union. Whites controlled political life in South Africa as in the other dominions. But in contrast to the other cases whites were a minority group, with slightly over 20 percent of the population when the union was created.

7. Technically, the Congo Free State was under the personal rule of the Belgian king, Leopold II, until 1908. In that year formal control passed to the Belgian Parliament.

8. Barraclough, Introduction to Contemporary History, 36-38. What the author called the First Industrial Revolution, led by Britain, was based on iron, steam power, and mass-produced textiles. For a slightly different distinction between the two revolutions see Hobsbawm, Indus­try and Empire 2, chaps. 3,6.

9. On the most important acquisition, see Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Con­quest of the Philippines.

10. Black, Dynamics of Modernization, 71 and passim.

11. Myers and Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. The chapter by Lewis Gann compares Japanese and European empires. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910.

12. From Clark, Balance Sheets, table 1, 23-24.1 adjusted Clark’s data to exclude the metropole’s land area. The figure for Great Britain includes the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The U.S. figure does not include Alaska.

13. An international regime is defined by Stephen Krasner as “sets of implicit or explicit princi­ples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations con­verge in a given area of international relations.” Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 2. For colonialism from 1870 to 1914 as an instance of an international regime, see the essay by Donald J. Puchala and Raymond Hopkins in ibid.

14. Quoted in Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890,122.

15. For the complex diplomacy involved, see Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, chaps. 4,11.

16. On the strategic rivalry between Britain and Russia that was called at the time “the Great Game in Asia,” see Gillard, The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914, and Meyer and Brysac, Tournament of Shadows.

17. Quoted in Crosby, Ecological Imperialism, 208. On U.S. Indian policy in the nineteenth cen­tury, see Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians 1, chaps. 8,9; and Hecht, Continents in Collision, chaps. 7-12.

18. Quoted in Moorehead, The Fatal Impact: An Account of the Invasion of the South Pacific, 1767- 1840, 212. Morris, Heaven’s Command, 447-67, graphically describes the genocidal assault on Tasmania’s aboriginal population.

19. Headrick, Tools of Empire, 58-79. Curtin, Death by Migration.

20. Data derived from Clark, Balance Sheets, table 21, 52. These are gross emigration figures. Net outflow was substantially lower, as many would-be emigrants returned home. A comparative study of settler-controlled societies in South America, South Africa, and Australia in late phase 3 is Denoon, Settler Capitalism.

21. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, chaps. 2,4.

22. Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920; Midge, Indentured Labour in the Indian Ocean; Sandhu, Indians in Malaya; Emmer, Colonialism and Migration, part 2. With British encouragement Indians also migrated to the Caribbean basin, replacing former slaves on plantations in Trinidad and Guiana. The novelist V. S. Naipaul is descended from an Indian who migrated to Trinidad on a labor contract. See Naipaul, A House for Mr. Biswas.

23. On biological and cultural racist thinking in phase 3 and its justification on allegedly scientific grounds, see Curtin, ed., Imperialism, and Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance, part 2. See also Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race. Ballhatchet discusses changing sexual attitudes in India in Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj.

24. Mixed-blood groups were more numerous in parts of colonies of occupation that had been trading enclaves in phase 1. Examples include Goans descended from Indians and Portuguese, descendants of Sinhalese and Dutch in the vicinity of Colombo (Ceylon/Sri Lanka), Eurasians in Java, the Coloured population in and around South Africa’s Cape Town, and mestizos in the Angolan capital, Luanda. Mixed-blood populations emerged in these places not only because of the long period during which various groups interacted but also because Europeans in phase 1 were less obsessed than their nineteenth-century successors with maintaining racial purity.

25. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History, chaps. 9, 11, gives an excellent summary of changes in international commodity movements effected by the Industrial Revolution.

26. Data compiled from tables in Bairoch, “The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Industrial Revolution,” in Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer, eds., Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution, 7,8,12,14.

27. The extent of deindustrialization in India, and the extent to which this was due to deliberate British policy as distinct from market forces, are matters of debate. See Bagchi, “Deindustrial­ization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Implications,” Journal of De­velopment Studies. Bagchi estimates (139-40) that 18.5 percent of Gangetic Bihar’s population was engaged in handicraft industries in 1809-13, a figure that fell to 8.5 percent by 1901.

28. Cited in Nzemeke, British Imperialism and African Response: the Niger Valley, 1851-1905, Ap­pendix B, 361.

29. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 42.

30. Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History, 277,279.

31. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” 275.

32. In one important respect rising European demand for raw materials increased lateral links among non-European continents. With far more conscious intent and scientific rigor than in phase 1, nineteenth-century Europeans transferred plants from one place to another where it was hoped plants would thrive in plantation settings. Transferred crops included cinchona (for quinine), sugar cane, rubber, sisal, and tea. See the chapter entitled “Economic Botany and Tropical Plantations” in Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, 209-58.

33. Headrick, Tools of Empire, 100. Chap. 5 discusses the nineteenth-century “breechloader revolution.”

34. Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan, quoted in ibid., 118-19.

35. For an example of the intimidation effect, see the conclusion to Things Fall Apart, the histor­ical novel by one of Africa’s leading writers, Chinua Achebe.

36. Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies.

37. Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914,111-34; Persell, The French Colonial Lobby, 1889- 1938, chaps. 2,3. Especially influential were business interests from Marseilles and Lyon. See also Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au Temps des Grandes Compagnies Concessionaires, 1898- 1930.

38. Hynes, The Economics of Empire: Britain, Africa and the New Imperialism, 1870-95, 50-54. “There can be no doubt,” Hynes concludes (54), “that the government’s decision to annex Upper Burma in 1886 was influenced by pressure from commercial circles in Britain.”

39. Figures calculated from Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, 299-302. The opening chapter is appropriately entitled “The Missionary Occupation of East Africa.”

40. O’Donnell, Lavigerie in Tunisia: Interplay of Imperialist and Missionary. Fabri’s influence is noted in Stoecker, ed., German Imperialism in Africa, 21. David and Charles Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries, 634, and passim.

Chapter 6. Phase 4: Unstable Equilibrium, 1914-39

1. For wartime diplomacy regarding Arab-speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire, see Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956, 23-49, and Hurewitz, ed. and comp., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics 2, documents 8,10,13, and 15.

2. From Article 22 of the Covenant, reprinted in Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics 2:61-62 (document 24). The classic study is Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations. See also Chowduri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems.

3. Baer, The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War, and Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations. For the traditional European conception of the international political community and twentieth-century challenges to it, see Bull and Watson, eds., The Expansion of Interna­tional Society, esp. chaps. 6-8.

4. The evolution from British Empire to British Commonwealth is traced in Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, chaps. 1-8, and Judd and Slinn, The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth, 1902-80, parts 1-3. The interwar period is covered in Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939. By the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 Ireland also became a dominion. But its nationalist movement, Sinn Fein, regarded this status as a trick to sidetrack popular pressures for a complete break from London. Southern Ireland’s Constitution of 1937 made it a republic in all but name. Its declaration of neutrality in 1939 effectively took it out of the Commonwealth, an action formally acknowledged by all parties ten years later.

5. Cited in Yapp, Making of the Modem Middle East, 1792-1923,293.

6. Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East; Darwin, Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East... 1918-1922. As Monroe notes (65) of Great Britain’s policies toward its Palestinian mandate, “The speculation and confusion of mind into which the indeterminate and multiple promis­ing of Palestine had thrown everyone cannot be overstressed.”

7. Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 72. For the background to Britain’s unilateral grant of independence, see Darwin, Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East.

8. The context for the Montagu statement is laid out in Robb, “The British Cabinet and Indian Reform, 1917-1919,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, and Robb, The Govern­ment of India and Reform... 1916-1921. See also Ellinwood and Pradhan, eds., India and World War I.

9. Draper, The Amritsar Massacre.

10. For interwar relations between Congress and British authorities in New Delhi and London, see Low, ed., Congress and the Raj... 1917-47; Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940; and Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947. For Gandhi as thinker and political activist, see Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922, and Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34. Hutchins, India’s Revolu­tion: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement, discusses the events of 1942 and their broader significance.

11. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China; Susa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. An observation effect was at work in these cases. Susa notes (x) that a Chinese envoy visited Ankara, the new Turkish capital, in the 1920s to study abolition of the capitulatory regime. His aim was clearly to apply lessons from Turkish experience to China.

12. British Empire figures from Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, 73. Wartime contributions of France’s colonies are summarized in Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francises, 40-51.

13. Tomlinson, Political Economy, 109; Spear, A History of India 2:183.

14. Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur, 86 (translation supplied). Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. Sarraut was governor-general of Indochina before the war and from 1920 to 1924 was France’s minister for the colonies. Lugard was the first governor-general of Nigeria and a key figure in formulating and articulating British colonial policy in the interwar years. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa, chaps. 2,3, discusses a theme linked to the new emphasis on colonial development: reconceptualization of colonial subjects as units of labor not substantially different from the metropole’s working classes. On the “development of development” as a rationale for British rule in the interwar period, see Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940, and vol. 1 of Morgan’s five-volume Official History of Colonial Development.

15. An overview of private and public investment in European, American, and Japanese overseas empires in the mid-i93os is Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Colonial Problem, 275- 85. See also Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, and Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas: The Anatomy of a Multinational, 1895-1965.

16. Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, chap. 9. Pirn, Colonial Agricultural Production.

17. World trade data are not classified in terms of colonized vs. noncolonized areas. However, the three most colonized regions in phase 4—Oceania, Africa, and Asia—together accounted for 24 percent of global exports of primary products in 1913,29 percent in 1928, and 34 percent in 1938. Figures from Yates, Forty Years of Foreign Trade, table 19,47. See also Royal Institute, The Colonial Problem, 288-93.

18. Figures calculated from appendix 11,196-200, in Latham, The Depression and the Developing World, 1914-1939.

19. Plantation data from von Albertini, European Colonial Rule, 1880-1940,175. For Burma, see Adas, The Burma Delta... 1852-1941. For Southeast Asia generally, see Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant.

20. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century, 8.

21. Pacification campaigns were by no means easy or quick. Not until 1934 was all of Morocco brought under French control (Wesseling, Divide and Rule, 355). For other examples of pacif­ication campaigns, attempts to apply regulations throughout a territory, and difficulties Euro­peans encountered in implementing these projects, see Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956, and Fuglestad, A History of Niger, 1850-1960.

22. See, for example, Crowder, “The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa,” in Gann and Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 2:320-50.

23. Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 174-75, discusses the role of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, the eminent British anthropologist, in the administration of the Sudan. An example of officially sponsored anthropological research prompted by an unexpected popular revolt—the Aba Women’s War of 1929 in southeastern Nigeria—is Green, Ibo Village Affairs.

24. Stocking, ed., Colonial Situations.

25. Latourette, Advance through Storm: a.d. 1914 and After (a volume in his History of the Expan­sion of Christianity), 282, 240, 277, 326. Figures for French Indochina are for Catholics only; Protestant activity there was minimal. For English, Scottish, Dutch, and other Protestant mission agencies, see Parker, Directory of World Missions. Among those founded in phase 4 were the Congo Evangelistic Mission, Friends Service Council, Methodist Missionary Society, and United Society for Christian Literature.

26. An insightful description of the impact of mission schooling in rural Africa is Murray, The School in the Bush.

27. Federation des Anciens Coloniaux, Le Livre d’Or de I’Exposition Coloniale de Paris 1931.

28. Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Problem of International Investment, 130-31.

29. Clough and Rapp, European Economic History, 419. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, documents the post-1914 ascent of Japan (298-303) and the United States (327-32).

30. Quoted in von Albertini, Decolonization, 11-12.

31. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, 291,296. Though published in 1948, this book was based on observation of prewar trends, and its conclusions echoed those of other European analysts in the interwar years. Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs noted in its 1937 survey, The Colonial Problem (2), that “an­thropological studies on the effects of the impact of Western civilization on more primitive ways of living have aroused serious anxiety among those interested in colonial administration.”

32. Concern about the alleged detribalization of African mine workers is expressed in Davis,

Modem Industry and the African. Scathing attacks by European officials on Western-educated politicians are cited in Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, 145-59, and Draper, Amritsar Massacre.

33. Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition.

34. Ibid., 249-50.

35. Royal Institute, The Colonial Problem, 2,264. See also Furnivall’s comments in Colonial Policy and Practice, 290-303, on trends in southeast Asian colonies. “The desire for gain tends to subordinate all social relations to individual economic interest, and, unless kept under con­trol, leads... to general impoverishment.... It seems... to be generally true in tropical dependencies that western law encourages litigation, crime, and corruption.” Ibid., 291,296.

36. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, makes similar observa­tions. The multiple transformations subsumed under social mobilization occur, of course, in all kinds of societies. Their effects are shaped by the political situation in which people find themselves. In a colonial situation social mobilization has typically generated a mass base of support for independence movements.

37. Figures from Misra, The Bureaucracy in India, 232, 235, 291. Included are holders of listed as well as regular ics posts. The Indian proportion of provincial administrations and centrally administered agencies like the Agricultural Service, Educational Service, and Society of Engi­neers was considerably higher than in the ics.

38. Latourette, Advance through Storm, 304. Data from chaps. 9,11,12.

39. Ibid. 411.

40. See Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, chaps. 2, 3, for the rise of labor unions in British and French Africa and efforts of colonial officials to understand and confront chal­lenges the unions posed.

41. An overview of Indian as well as British industrial investments is Bagchi, Private Investment in India, 1900-1939. See also Markovitz, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-1939, and Leadbeater, The Politics of Textiles. Appendix D in Harris, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata, 319-27, details the twentieth-century diversification of the House of Tata into locomotive and truck production, chemicals, cement, tinplate, air travel, insurance, and the like.

42. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion, 82-102.

43. Marr, Vietnamese Traditions on Trial, 1920-1945,5-6.

44. The Pan-African Congress was a transcontinental gathering, with twenty-one delegates from the West Indies, sixteen from the United States, and twelve from nine African countries. For Du Bois’s assessment of the Congress and its attempt to influence postwar colonial policy, see “The Pan-African Movement,” in Kedourie, ed., Nationalism in Asia and Africa, 372-77.

45. M. Rollin, cited in Royal Institute, The Colonial Problem, 311.

46. Lamming, In the Castle of My Skin, 91.

47. The phrase is from Anderson’s brilliant book, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.

Chapter?. Phase 5: Contraction, 1940-80

1. Zanzibar gained independence from Britain in 1963 and merged the next year with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. I classify independence for Malaya and Malaysia as two separate events because Malaysia included the previously dependent territories of Sin­gapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. Britain’s figure would be higher if one included British Somali­land, merged with Italian Somaliland in i960 as Somalia. Libya is considered an Italian colony, as Italy ruled it at the start of World War II and played a minor role along with Britain and France in its postwar administration under U.N. auspices.

2. The principal examples were Portuguese Goa and French Pondicherry (to India); Dutch West New Guinea and Portuguese East Timor (to Indonesia); Eritrea, an Italian colony governed after World War II by Britain (to Ethiopia); and Spanish Western Sahara (to Morocco). In 1993 Eritrea gained independence after a thirty-year war against the Ethiopian government. Whether the Western Sahara should be independent or absorbed into Morocco remains a matter of dispute. The people of East Timor won independence from Indonesia in 1999.

3. When French troops entered Hanoi in late 1945 they found the statue of the colonial admin­istrator Paul Bert lying in pieces on the ground. The statue’s fate symbolized what the war had done to France’s power in Vietnam. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions, 189.

4. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe; Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: Interna­tional Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980.

5. The shift from formal rule to informal influence is discussed by Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft, and in Bull and Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society. For contrasts between European colonialism and the more informal mechanisms of post-1945 superpowers, see Abernethy, “Dominant-Subordinate Relationships,” in Triska, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States, esp. 108-23.

6. Lebra, Japanese-trained Armies in Southeast Asia. Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960,11.

7. For tensions between British and American perspectives on empire as the two allies began thinking about the postwar world, see Louis, Imperialism at Bay.

8. Quoted in Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, 239. Nigeria’s leading nationalist, Nnamdi Azikiwe, referred to the charter in his influential pamphlet, Political Blueprint of Nigeria (1943).

9. Coupland, The Cripps Mission, 22. Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 37,39.

10. Quoted in Hutchins, India’s Revolution, 197.

11. Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 14.

12. See, for example, Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War: Indochina 1954, and Bender, “Ameri­can Policy Toward Angola: A History of Linkage,” in Bender, Coleman, and Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, 110-28. In 1947 and 1948 the United States was uncertain whether to support the Dutch or the Indonesian republican government headed by the nationalist Mohammad Hatta. Hatta’s suppression of the communist-led Madiun rebellion in 1948 was decisive in tilting the United States toward the nationalists. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 243-44.

13. Kent, The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939-1956.

14. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, esp. 219-47; Davidson, The People’s Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa; Birmingham, Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozam­bique. A detailed study of Angola prior to independence is Marcum, The Angolan Revolution.

15. There is a vast literature on decolonization in British India. Sources include Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan; Hutchins, India’s Revolution; Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947; Menon, The Transfer of Power in India; Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography 1:1889-1947; Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem; and the twelve-volume compilation of primary sources in Mansergh and Lumby (later Moon), eds., Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power.

16. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 145-60. India’s decision in 1949 to adopt a republi­can form of government might have led to withdrawal, since the Commonwealth’s formal head was an unelected monarch. But Prime Minister Nehru made clear India’s desire to remain within the Commonwealth if constitutionally possible. Adroit diplomacy produced a mutually acceptable description of the British monarch as “the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.” This wording enabled India and other republics to affirm their complete sovereignty while par­ticipating in Commonwealth affairs.

17. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51; Louis and Stookey, eds., The End of the Palestine Mandate; Hurewitz, The Struggle for PalestinefWasserstein, The British in Palestine... 1917-1929.

18. Quoted in von Albertini, Decolonization, 493.

19. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War; Rick- lefs, A History of Modem Indonesia, 187-221.

20. Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France; Smith, The French Stake in Algeria.

21. For the siege of Dien Bien Phu, see Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. For the national and international context, see Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War: Indochina, 1954.

22. Naroun, Ferhat Abbas ou les Chemins de la Souverainete, 93-94. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors.

23. Khenouf and Brett, “Algerian Nationalism and the Allied Military Strategy and Propaganda during the Second World War: The Background to Setif,” in Killingray and Rathbone, eds., Africa and the Second World War, 267.

24. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 23-28.

25. Reforms included ending the citizen-subject distinction in France’s colonies, abolition of forced labor, extension of the franchise, and equal pay for equal work regardless of race. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, chap. 3.

26. Ibid., chap. 6; Berg, “The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa,” American Political Science Review.

27. Of these, Cameroon and Togo were administered as United Nations trust territories.

28. White, Black Africa and de Gaulle. For policy continuities between colonial and postcolonial eras, see Corbett, The French Presence in Black Africa, and Chipman, French Power in Africa.

29. Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence; Centre de Recherche et d’lnfor- mation Socio-Politiques, Congo 1959; Gerard-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo i960; Gerard- Libois, Katanga Secession.

30. The principal non-British case was Rwanda, where Belgian indirect rule policies favoring the Tutsi minority were challenged by politicians from the 85 percent majority Hutu population. Several hundred people were killed and some 220,000 internally displaced in the ethnically charged run-up to Rwanda’s first local elections in i960. Vassall-Adams, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action, 9. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 48-49. Belgium transferred power to Hutu leaders when it departed in 1962.

31. For descriptions of the communal violence and refugee crisis by persons involved in negotia­tions among the British, inc, and the Muslim League, see Menon, Transfer of Power, 417-36 and Hodson, Great Divide, chaps. 16,18, 22. A powerful journalistic account is Collins and Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight.

32. Among the best-known nationalists who came to power were, by year of independence, Jawa­harlal Nehru (India), M. A. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan (Pakistan), Sukarno (Indonesia), David Ben-Gurion (Israel), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef (Morocco), Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaya), Sekou Tour6 (Guinea), Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu (Congo-Leopoldville), Arch­bishop Makarios (Cyprus), Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Modibo Keita (Mali), Nnamdi Azikiwe and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria), Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia (Senegal), Sylvanus Olympic (Togo), Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika/Tanzania), Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria), Norman Manley (Jamaica), Eric Williams (Trinidad & Tobago), Milton Obote (Uganda), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Seretse Khama (Botswana), Forbes Burnham (Guyana), Francisco Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea), Amilcar Cabral (Guinea Bissau), Samora Machel (Mozambique), and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). Three prominent nationalists killed shortly before their countries attained inde­pendence were Aung San (Burma), David Dacko (Central African Republic), and Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique).

33. A classic expression of this view is Lord Lugard’s pronouncement in 1920: “It is a cardinal principle of British Colonial policy that the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will... of a small minority of educated and Europeanized natives who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed to theirs.” Quoted in Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, 156.

34. When this did occur, in revolts led by Fathers Hidalgo and Morelos, it pushed creoles fearful of social revolution to seize independence so as to prevent a repeat performance. An exception to this generalization is the recruitment of mixed-blood llaneros into Bolivar’s army.

35. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Develop­ment, 71-134.

36. Figures from Bairoch, “The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Indus­trial Revolution,” in Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer, eds., Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution, 7,8,12,14. Asia includes China and other areas not incorporated into European empires.

37. Nehru, Nehru, the First Sixty Years, 210.

38. Nigeria, Western Region, Proposals for an Education Policy, 6.

39. Smith, We Must Run While They Walk: A Portrait of Africa’s Julius Nyerere.

40. Achebe, A Man of the People, 34.

41. Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography ofKwame Nkrumah, 111-12. On Kaunda, see Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, 164.

42. See, for example, L’Afrique Revoltee, by the Dahomean intellectual Albert Tevoedjre.

43. Press release of July 28,1947, quoted in Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, Septem­ber 1946 to April 1961,159.

44. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics. Kahin, The Asian-African Con­ference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955.

45. For the impact of the Accra conference on Roberto’s thinking and subsequent activities, see Marcum, Angolan Revolution 1:64-70. Among leaders Roberto met were Nkrumah (Ghana), George Padmore (THnidad; Nkrumah’s adviser on pan-African affairs), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Kenneth Kaunda (Northern Rhodesia), Tom Mboya (Kenya), and Frantz Fanon (Martinique and Algeria).

46. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 179-85; Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations. George, Krishna Menon: A Biography, 177-79.

47. Hovet, Africa in the United Nations; El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization.

48. From Article 76b of the United Nations Charter.

49. Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, 239-51.

50. Morgenthau, Political Parties, 64, notes the impact of political advances in Togo in the mid- 1950s on the thinking of French West African leaders.

Chapter 8. Western Europe as a Region

1. This is a classic problem for causal theorizing in the social sciences. In Arend Lijphart’s words, “The principal problems facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as: many variables, small number of cases.” Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review, 685. One response is to increase the number of cases. This is the methodological advantage of treating European imperialism as two distinct expansionist phases rather than a single half-millennial episode. Even then, so many plausible independent (causal) variables remain that imperialism remains overdetermined, i.e. ex­plained several times over. Here the challenge is as much to eliminate contenders from serious consideration as it is to identify those remaining after passing a series of plausibility tests.

2. On multiple conjunctural causation, see Ragin, The Comparative Method, chaps. 1-3.

3. Polynesians were the world’s premier long-distance sailors in the premodern era, their ships covering enormous distances throughout the Pacific. I do not list them here because it is not clear their vessels would have been able consistently to return to home port had this been the goal.

4. “In the four and a half centuries from the consolidation of the Sung empire to the great period of expansion of the Ming empire China was the greatest maritime power in the world.” Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 326. See also Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West, 109.

5. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires, 137 and passim.

6. Ibid., 138-40.

7. Parker, The Military Revolution.

8. Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 112.

9. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, discusses gains to Great Britain from the transatlantic slave trade and the slave-based plantation economies of the Americas.

10. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 468; Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 36.

11. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean, esp. chaps. 5, 6. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 251—59. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago.

12. Al-Hassan and Hill, Islamic Technology: An Illustrated History, chap. 5.

13. Hourani, Arab Seafaring. Boorstin, The Discoverers, chap. 24 discusses Arab seafaring priorities.

14. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, 1-3 and passim.

15. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China.

16. Jones, The European Miracle, xix.

17. Columbus took a heavily annotated copy of Marco Polo’s Voyages on his first transatlantic voyage. Following landfall he kept looking for the Great Khan as he sailed from one unpromis­ing island to the next. The great mariner was off target by about twelve thousand miles, half the earth’s circumference.

18. Jones, European Miracle. Jones argues that the concentration of wealth in many Asian courts resulted from the conquest of agrarian societies by traditionally pastoral groups. Alien dynas­ties had opportunities and incentives to extract economic surplus from the agarian base. In the process they enriched the court while keeping the base in essentially unchanged conditions of poverty. Jones contends that Europe’s failure to experience nomadic invasions permitted evolution of a more equitable distribution of resources than in the great Asian polities. Europe’s image of Asian affluence in early phase 1 was in reality the image of wealth concen­trated in the hands of Asian rulers.

19. Columbus, The Log of Christopher Columbus, 51.

20. Quoted in Leon-Portilla, ed., The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico, 26.

21. Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, 28 (entry for October 14,1492).

22. Raleigh, The Discoverie of the Large and Bewtiful Empire of Guiana, 73. The sexual reference here is clear: imperialism is analogized to rape.

23. Dening, Islands and Beaches... Marquesas, 1774-1880,206.

24. Zurara, Conquests and Discoveries of Henry the Navigator, 14.

25. As quoted in (and translated from) Girardet, L’Idee Coloniale en France de 1871 d 1962,63.

26. Quoted from Millin, Rhodes, 138; cited in Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 124.

27. Quoted in Axtell, The Invasion Within, 137. See also Pearce, The Savages of America, 3-24.

28. Eliot, The East Africa Protectorate, 104.

29. See capsule biographies in Waldman and Wexler, Who Was Who in World Exploration.

30. Dunn, The Adventures oflbn Battuta, 7.

31. See Collingwood, I7ie Idea of Nature. The author asserts (n) that this view of Nature became prominent during the Renaissance—i.e., early in phase 1.

32. Arciniegas, America in Europe: A History of the New World in Reverse, chap. 4.

33. MacLeod and Rehbock, eds., Nature in its Greatest Extent: Western Science in the Pacific; Mackay, In the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science, and Empire, 1780-1801.

34. Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens; Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress, chap. 7.

35. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men.

36. On European state formation from phase 1 onward, see Poggi, Development of the Modem State; Tilly, ed., Formation of National States in Western Europe; Hall, Powers and Liberties: Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West; Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship; Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State; and Barker, Development of Public Services in West­ern Europe, 1660-1930. My debt to Max Weber is obvious.

37. Tilly, ed., Formation of National States, 15.

38. On the fiscal crisis, see Gabriel Ardant’s essay in ibid. North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World, part 3, discuss how early modern European governments tried to resolve the crisis. A rational-choice perspective on the recurring extractive and distributive dilemmas confronting rulers is Levi, Of Rule and Revenue.

39. The impressive exploratory activities of Norse/Viking sailors in the North Atlantic did not produce colonies, in the sense in which I employ the word, because there was no significant metropole to administer the scattered settlements settlers founded.

40. Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 184.

41. Camoens, The Lusiads, 64.

42. Symonds, Oxford and Empire, 33-34,161,162. See also Betts, “The Allusion to Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Victorian Studies.

43. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, a.d. 900-1992, 47. For the economic role of European cities in the late Middle Ages, see Braudel, The Perspective of the World, chaps. 2,3; Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, chaps. 2-4; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, chaps. 6,7; and Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States.

44. Hohenberg and Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1994,131.

45. Poggi, Development of the Modem State, 36-42.

46. North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, 113.

47. By focusing on urban-based institutions and values favoring productive recycling of profit, I associate capitalism with European history from the late Middle Ages onward. This approach differs from Marx in stressing the bourgeoisie’s insulation from state control in the crucial initial phases of capitalist development, rather than bourgeois control of the state. It differs from Weber in not identifying capitalism so closely with Protestant northern Europe. The problem with Weber’s analysis is that key procedures for recording, generating, and recycling commercial gain were developed in Catholic, pre-Renaissance Italian cities, long before Calvin elaborated the predestinarian ideas Weber considers so important. My approach differs from Immanuel Wallerstein in not defining capitalism in terms of relations of trade. Wallerstein is clearly on the mark, however, in emphasizing the profitable role played by intraregional and global trade. See stimulating discussions of the emergence of European capitalism in Rosen­berg and Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich, chaps. 1-4; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, parts 2,3; and Baechler et al., Europe and the Rise of Capitalism.

48. For examples, see Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement, and Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1/40.

49. See the insightful discussion in Mann, Sources of Social Power 1, chap. 10. Jews inhabiting various urban centers of western Europe comprised a visible and often prominent commu­nity. But their small numbers and strong pressures from Christians to isolate and discriminate against them limited the pluralizing effect of their presence on European religious life.

50. Hennessy, The Frontier in Latin American History, 54-60; Clarke, West Africa and Christianity, chaps. 1-3; Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841-1891.

51. Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, 25.

52. Ibid., 83-87.

53. For a survey of Christian-Muslim relations from the seventh through the sixteenth centuries, see vols. 2 and 3 of Kenneth Latourette’s monumental History of the Expansion of Christianity: The Thousand Years of Uncertainty: a.d. 500-A.D.1500, esp. chaps. 6,7; and Three Centuries of Advance: a.d. 1500-A.D. 1800, esp. chap. 1. Also Malouf, Crusades Through Arab Eyes.

54. Camoens, The Lusiads, 70,78-80.

55. This discussion benefits from the stimulating comparisons of European, Arab/Islamic, and Chinese civilizations in Hall, Powers and Liberties, chaps. 2,4,5; and Levenson, ed., European Expansion and the Counter-Example of Asia.

56. Abun-Nasr makes this point with respect to North Africa west of Egypt in A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 12. In the Muqadimma, the great historian Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1406) advanced a theory of the rise and fall of Islamic dynasties based on the sharp contrast in lifestyles between urban dwellers and pastoralists.

57. Levenson, European Expansion, 45.

Chapter 9. Western Europe as a System of Competing States

1. In this discussion “state” refers to a central government, in particular to civilian and military agencies charged with formulating and implementing policies toward governments of other countries. More generally, “state” denotes a territorially bounded unit recognized by others as having sovereignty, and the people living within that unit.

2. Mann, The Sources of Social Power 1:511. “Preparation for war,” writes Charles Tilly, “has been the great state-building activity. The process has been going on more or less continuously for at least five hundred years.” Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 74.

3. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since a.d. woo; Parker, The Military Revolution.

4. This process is copiously illustrated in Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires. See also Parker, The Military Revolution, esp. chap. i. For diffusion of military technology among major European powers during phase 3, see Headrick, The Tools of Empire, chaps. 4,5.

5. Nash, Red, White, and Black, 45.

6. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 159.

7. Maylam, Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British... 1885-1899.

8. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902,95.

9. An example is the Liverpool merchant John Holt, who traded along the West African coast for years prior to the 1880s. In a letter to British foreign secretary Lord Granville in 1882, Holt warned of growing French and Portuguese political interest in Africa and urged that Britain “not allow the trade at present possessed by her to be confiscated for the benefit of protection­ist competitors; but that the influence due to her by virtue of her great colonial and trading interests in Western Africa... will be maintained, and, if necessary, her territory extended, in order to prevent the encroachments of those foreign powers whose interests are antagonistic to those of Great Britain.” Cited in Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 121.

10. Quoted in Girardet, L’Idee Coloniale en France de 1871 a 1962,85-86 (translation supplied).

11. Quoted in Ibid., 85.

12. Robinson and Gallagher, with Denny, Africa and the Victorians, illustrate this kind of thinking among British officials at the time of the scramble. Defense of India, so the reasoning went, entails control of South Africa and Egypt. Defense of Egypt entails control of the source of the Nile—that is, Uganda. Access to Uganda entails control of Kenya, and so forth. In the authors’ felicitous phrase, the British government advanced along “new frontiers of insecurity.”

13. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 68.

14. Quoted in Betts, Tricouleur: The French Overseas Empire, 43.

15. Ratios derived from estimates in Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History, table 10,296.

16. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement; Earle, The Sack of Panama; Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas. Writing in 1629, a year before setting out to found “a plantation in New England,” John Winthrop asserted that “it will be a service to the church of great consequence, to carry the gospell to those parts of the world, and to raise a bulwarke against the kingdom of Antichrist which the Jesuits labour to rear up in all places of the world.” Massachusetts Historical Society, Winthrop Papers 2:117.

17. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, 1-14 and passim.

18. Hemming, The Search for El Dorado, chap. 10, describes Raleigh’s futile attempts to find what he called “that great and golden city which the Spaniards call El Dorado and the naturals Manoa.”

19. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 166-74; Latourette, Three Centuries of Ad­vance: a.d. 1500-A.D. 1800, chaps. 3,12. See also de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581- 1768, and Duviols, La Lutte Centre les Religions Autochtones dans le Perou Coloniale.

20. This helps explain the limited number of settlers from France as compared to those from Spain (in phase i) and England/Britain (in phases i and 3). The largest concentration was in Algeria, a territory sufficiently close at hand that settlers could readily be mobilized to fight on French soil should this become necessary—as it was in World War I.

21. Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation, 38. See also Girardet, L’Idee Coloniale en France, 25.

22. Israel, Dutch Primacy, 6. See also Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II, chap. 2, “Dutch Hegemony in the World-Economy.”

23. Holland’s pioneering role in west European economic modernization is stressed in North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, chap. 11.

24. Quoted in Day, Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java, 45.

25. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, chap. 9.

26. See the comparative studies of phase 1 chartered companies in Blusse and Gaastra, eds., Companies and Trade; and two works edited by Tracy, The Rise of Merchant Empires and The Political Economy of Merchant Empires.

27. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, chaps. 1-7. Whereas Spain’s phase 1 heroes were conquistadors whose exploits took place on land, most of Britain’s early heroes were seafarers. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, Henry Morgan, Sir John Hawkins, Capt. James Cook, and (in phase 2) Admirals George Rodney and Horatio Nelson come to mind.

28. Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies, 3-16 and ff. The case studies here show that British settlers were more inclined to insist on self-government than settler fragments from Spain, Portugal, and France.

29. Hynes, The Economics of Empire: Britain, Africa, and the New Imperialism 1870-95; Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies, chap. 1.

30. Winthrop Papers 2:120. See Nash, Red, Black, and White, chaps. 3,4; and Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675.

31. Axtell, The Invasion Within, contrasts the missionary work of English-speaking Protestants in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century bna with the far more extensive—and considerably more successful—efforts of Jesuit contemporaries in French Canada. For a New World over­view see Latourette, Three Centuries of Advance, 186.

32. Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810, chaps. 5,7-9.

33. The ambitious agendas and self-assured moralism of British Protestant missionaries are con­veyed in such works as Johnston, Missionary Landscapes in the Dark Continent; Lovett, History of the London Missionary Society, 1795-1895, 2 vols.; Pitman, Central Africa, Japan, and Fiji: A Story of Missionary Enterprise, Trials and Triumphs; and Stock, History of the Church Mission­ary Society. See Morris, Heaven’s Command, chaps. 2, 16, for the religious dimensions of Victorian Britain’s “improving instinct.” Studies of phase 3 missionary activity dealing pri­marily or exclusively with British-based Protestant agencies include Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841-1891; Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Reason and Revelation... in South Africa, vol. 1; Goodall, A History of the London Missionary Society, 1895-1945; Gow, Madagascar and the Protestant Impact; Kalu, ed., History of Christianity in West Africa; Kent, Company of Heaven: Early Missionaries in the South Seas; Langmore, Missionary Lives: Papua, 1874-1914; Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa; Ross, John Philip (1775-1851); Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924; Sanderson and Sanderson, Education, Religion, and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899-1964; and Temu, British Protestant Missions.

34. This phrase summed up the arguments of Thomas Powell Buxton’s widely read tract, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy (1840). Buxton’s ideas were elaborated and put into practice by Henry Venn, the influential secretary of the (Anglican) Church Missionary Society from 1841 to 1872. See Webster, “The Bible and the Plough,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.

35. A biographer calls him “one of [nineteenth-century] imperialism’s earliest proponents and advocates.” Jeal, Livingstone, 188.

36. See works by Ajayi, Oliver, and Ross cited in n. 33.

37. Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914, 29. See· also Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost; Ascherson, The King Incorporated: Leopold II in the Age of Trusts.

Chapter 10. The Institutional Basis for the Triple Assault

1. On this last point, see Schwaller, Origins of Church Wealth in Mexico... 1523-1600. Alden, The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus... 1540-1750, part 4, discusses the Jesuits’ wide- ranging economic activities.

2. Porch described Tangier’s European population as falling “broadly into two categories: the celestial and the criminal.” Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 14.

3. For a discussion of principal-agent relations, see Milgrom and Roberts, Economics, Organiza­tion, and Management, esp. chap. 6, “Moral Hazard and Performance Incentives,” 166-98. Moral hazard is “the consequence of postcontractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may choose to pursue his or her private interests at others’ expense.” Ibid., 167. Moral hazard is most likely to occur under conditions of long-distance institutional stretching analyzed here.

4. Referring to the early seventeenth century, Winius observes, “While official India drifted in military and financial crisis, the bureaucracy went shamelessly about its private business. Shielded by the distance from Portugal, the deliberate weakness of the viceregal office, and the restricted personnel policy, its members connived to pursue their private fortunes in as many ways as individual, traditional, or collective ingenuity could devise.” Winius, The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon, 99.

5. Cortis, Five Letters of Cortes to the Emperor, 243. Cortes was not, strictly speaking, an agent of royal power, as his expedition left Cuba for the mainland in defiance of orders from the island’s governor. He is better described as a self-designated agent. This makes even more striking his insistence on conquering on behalf of a distant ruler who could not possibly have known what was happening in the field.

6. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire, 92-93.

7. European governments frequently sponsored overseas settlement of people they least wanted to have living at home. Convicted criminals, sentenced in British courts to “transportation,” formed the core of settler society in Georgia and Australia. Other territories serving as penal colonies were Angola, New Caledonia, and French Guyana. Opponents of Napoleon Ill’s rule were consigned to political exile in Algeria. For the Australian case, see Hughes, The Fatal Shore, chaps. 2,4-6,13. For degredados (exiled criminals) in Angola, see Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, chap. 3.

8. An early instance of metropolitan intervention against settler interests was the Spanish Crown’s edict of 1542, elaborated in 1549, restricting encomenderos’ power to exploit Amer­indian labor. This triggered settler revolts in Peru and Nicaragua. But opposition was quickly quelled and metropolitan authority reasserted.

9. The voc’s structure acknowledged the urban base of mercantile activity by permitting several cities to select representatives to the company’s ruling Council of 17. But the very feet that these municipalities were willing to subordinate commercial rivalries and form a single company demonstrates the growing appeal of the Dutch nation relative to the smaller units—Amster­dam, Middelburg, Delft, Hoorn, etc.—in which merchants conducted business.

10. “From the beginning [the popes] realized that an apostolic mission in America could be organized only by the Spanish Crown.” Parry, Spanish Seaborne Empire, 153. See also Shiels, King and Church: The Rise and Fall of the Patronato Real. Beginning in 1508, a series of papal bulls conceded the Crown’s right to select missionaries, name all bishops, heads of religious houses, and parish priests, and create new dioceses. The Jesuits were perhaps most successful among Catholic orders at retaining control over what they did and who did it.

11. Shiels, King and Church, 78. See pages 72-81 for the text and interpretation of the papal proclamation, Inter caetera divinae.

12. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 90. See also Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, chap. 3.

13. Merton, Cardinal Ximenes and the Making of Spain. An interesting commentary on the Church’s role in European imperialism is the fact that Ximenes organized, with financial aid from church funds, and personally accompanied a military expedition to Oran (Algeria) in 1509. The city was captured and remained in Spanish hands until destroyed by an earthquake in 1790. Ibid., chap. 9.

14. Lockhart and Schwartz, Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil, 66-67. Shops and the homes of prominent citizens occupied the square’s remaining side. In effect, two sides of the square were allotted to the public sector, one side each to the private profit and religious sectors.

15. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, i67ff.

16. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 272-314; Ganiage, Les Origines du Protectorat Francais en Tunisie, 1861-1881, chaps. 4-7; Miege, Le Maroc et I’Europe (1830-1894), vol. 3. On international financiers in Egypt before the British occupation, see Landes, Bankers and Pashas.

17. Axtell, The Invasion Within, and Moore in his carefully researched novel Black Robe describe interactions among seventeenth-century French colonial officials, fur traders, missionaries, and Amerindians in what is now eastern Canada.

18. Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914,102-11; Persell, The French Colonial Lobby, 1889- 1938; Betts, Tricouleur, chaps. 1,3.

19. Miege, Expansion Europeenne et Decolonisation de 1870 a nos Jours, 174. See also Cohen, The French Encounter with Africans... 1530-1880,275-79.

20. Dening, Islands and Beaches... Marquesas, 1774-1880,192.

21. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914,363-64.

22. Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal; Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan; Roberts, Warriors, Merchants, and Slaves: The State and the Economy in the Middle Niger Valley, 1700-1914.

23. A similar situation obtained in south-central Africa from the 1820s onward—though the portion of South Africa under British rule was by then far larger than a coastal enclave. The Cape Colony was a secure base from which Robert Moffat, David Livingstone, and others launched missionary initiatives into the interior further north. The European penetration of China in phase 3 also fits this pattern. China’s coastal and riverine treaty ports, where citizens of Britain, France, and other states enjoyed extraterritorial legal rights, were staging areas from which their merchants and missionaries left for the interior. In this case, however, informal influence foreigners exercised outside the treaty ports was never translated into formal rule.

24. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, 5 and passim.

25. Quoted in Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, 128.

26. Metcalf, Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870,47-48,92-110,129-30. Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India.

27. For Nigeria, see Buell, The Native Problem in Africa 1:728-37; and Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-1914, chaps. 3,4. For the Sudan, see Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934, 240-59. Growing anticlerical sentiment in France to­ward the end of the nineteenth century reinforced official suspicion of missionary work. French West African authorities were more willing to countenance Islamic religious educa­tion, provided it contained pro-French instruction, than to support Catholic schools. Har­rison, France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960,18,63-65.

28. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825,83.

29. Quoted in Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution 1:253.

30. Nehru, The Discovery of India, 274.

31. On the Treaty of Waitangi, see Sahlins, Islands of History, 67-71. Deception over consumer goods was another feature of this treaty. As one Maori participant in the negotiations put it, “We had less tobacco and fewer trinkets and other European goods than formerly and we saw that the first Governor had not spoken the truth, for he told us that we should have a great deal more” (quoted in ibid., 70). On negotiations between Lobengula and the British, see Sam- kange’s Origins of Rhodesia and his novel On Trial for My Country. Samkange describes Reverend Helm, who knew the Ndebele language and served as translator in the negotiations, as “a Rhodes man in missionary clothing” (Origins, 67).

32. Quoted in Martin, Keepers of the Game, 61.

33. For examples, see Axtell, Invasion Within, 64-68; Ayandele, Missionary Impact, chap. 10; and Moorehead, The Fatal Impact, 118,124. Alcoholism, it should be noted, was more often the consequence than the cause of demoralization. As Gary Nash noted of North American native peoples, “When tribes lost their land, their autonomy, and their confidence in their traditional belief system, drinking could change from a form of social relaxation to a solvent for inter­nalized aggressive impulses against whites.” Nash, Red, White, and Black, 244.

34. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, 41-42.

35. Moorehead, Fatal Impact, 108-09.

36. The following discussion relies heavily on the account of Malaccan history in the Sixth Book of Tome Pires’s monumental Suma Oriental of Tomi Pires. Pires was sent from Goa to Malacca shortly after the Portuguese captured the city in 1511. He was accountant for the trade factory the new rulers established, later serving as the first Portuguese ambassador to the Chinese imperial court. A description of the city’s capture, written in the 1570s by the son of the soldier/administrator directing the assault, is found in Albuquerque, Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, Second Viceroy of India 3:66-146. Other sources consulted include Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony; Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire; Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean; Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization; Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies; Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence; Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance; and Reid, ed., Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era, chap. 3.

37. Quoted from Viceroy Afonso d’Albuquerque’s son in Commentaries 3:88.

38. The apparent exception to this generalization is Vietnam, which experienced centuries of Chinese rule. Ming armies occupied Vietnam in 1406, coincident with Admiral Ho’s early voyages, holding it until 1427. But governing a neighbor was essentially an overland operation. Vietnam is not an instance of overseas empire.

39. On the separate, essentially competitive character of official and private trade, see Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast... 1842-1854, 57. Meilink-Roelofsz notes another source of tension between the two sectors in the fifteenth century: “the government’s tendency to prevent precious metals from leaving China, as these were being exported by the merchants on a large scale.” Asian Trade and European Influence, 74.

40. Boxer notes that as of the early sixteenth century Chinese merchants and mariners from the coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwantung were trading in the Philippines, the Indonesian islands, and Malacca. But “their activities were either ignored or disowned by the Imperial government” Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 44.

41. Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, cited in Levenson, European Expansion and the Counter-Example of Asia, 68.

42. If there was a dominant polity in the Near East early in phase 1 it was the Ottoman Empire, whose rulers were not Arab. After conquering Lower Egypt and the Arabian holy places in 1516-17, the Ottomans controlled shipping in the Red Sea. But even with Egyptian ships at their disposal Ottoman rulers were unable to block Portugal’s entry to the Indian Ocean.

43. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation, and Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony.

44. Tome Pires, Suma Oriental 2:240. The author’s use of the term “Moorish” to refer to Muslims reflects, of course, his Iberian background. It also reinforces the point about the cosmopolitan character of Islam. Adherents of the faith included Moroccans (the vast majority of whom were not descended from Arabs) and Sumatrans living more than seven thousand miles east of Morocco.

45. “The importance of Malacca had been recognized in King Manuel’s instructions to the com­manders of the fleets which left Lisbon in 1509 and 1510, though it fell to Albuquerque to achieve the actual conquest” Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 47.

46. Albuquerque, Commentaries 3:119. This, at least, is a paraphrase of the viceroy’s words by his admiring son, writing years later.

47. Ibid. 3:118.

48. Ibid. 3:116.

49. Ibid. 3:127.

50. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 80.

51. Betts, Tricouleur, 20-21.

52. Escape from Europe’s alienating confines was evidently a motivator for Hubert Lyautey, who according to Douglas Porch was an open homosexual. This status “condemned him to be a perpetual outcast, a man on the margins of many worlds but belonging to none.... Moving from the minutiae and the parochial concerns of garrison life in France to the giant tasks of empire-building was like stepping from a small room into the open air.” Porch, Conquest of Morocco, 86,87. Christopher Columbus seemed driven less by desire to escape home than by the allure of the unknown. The journal entry for December 26,1492, expresses his perpetual restlessness: “For it was always with the intention of discovering that he voyaged and not delaying more than a day in any place, save for lack of wind.” Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, 128.

Chapter 11. Non-European Initiatives and Perceptions

1. Rare exceptions were isolated chains of tiny islands—the Azores, Malvinas/Falklands, Sey­chelles—and Antarctica.

2. Examples include Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the Euro­pean Colonial Order; Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts; Campbell, Rasta and Resistance from Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney; Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies; Crowder, ed., West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation; Drechsler, ’’Let Us Die Fighting”: The Struggle of the Hereto and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915); Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique; Jones, Maya Resistance to Spanish Rule; Josephy, The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of Indian Resistance; Nonini, British Colonial Rule and the Resistance of the Malay Peasantry, 1900-1957; Ohadike, The Ekumeku Movement: Western Igbo Resistance to the British Conquest of Nigeria, 1883-1914; Ranger, “Connexions between ‘Primary Resistance’ Movements and Modem Mass National­ism in East and Central Africa; Part I,” Journal of African History, and Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7; Rotberg and Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa; Sariola, Power and Resistance: The Colonial Heritage in Latin America; Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, and Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance; Stern, ed., Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries; Welch, Anatomy of Rebellion; and Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century.

3. Ronald Robinson makes this point persuasively in “Non-European Foundations for European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” in Owen and Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, 117-42.

4. Perrin, Giving up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879,35.

5. Quoted in Cooper, ed., They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543- 1640,41.

6. Ibid., 402. See also Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 163-65,331-33.

7. From the rescript of 1640 as reprinted in Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, 331-32. This policy may be attributed less to foresight than to careful observation of what was happening on other islands further south. Japan’s rulers were acutely aware of the triple assault Spain had successfully launched on the Philippines.

8. For this contrast, see Schirokauer, Modern China and Japan: A Brief History, chaps. 3-7.

9. Oliver and Atmore, The African Middle Ages, 1400-1800,181.

10. Describing Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, a local historian of that era noted that residents of the great port of Alexandria were surprised by the arrival of French ships. Jabarti, Napoleon in Egypt, 20-22. This observation is itself surprising, considering that Alexandrians had ships of their own and centuries of experience with European vessels and crews.

11. Leon-Portilla, ed., The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico, 13.

12. Axtell, The Invasion Within, 9.

13. Writes Bernal Diaz of the founding of Vera Cruz, from which he set off with Cortis to Tenochtitlan: “We planned a church, a market-place, arsenals, and all the other features of a town, and built a fort. From the moment of laying the foundations till the walls were high enough to receive the woodwork, loopholes, watchtowers, and barbicans we worked very fast.” Bernal Diaz, The Conquest of New Spain, 114.

14. The Ottoman Empire and Japan do not qualify as hinterland polities, especially after their capitals were moved to the ports of Istanbul and Edo, respectively. However, in important respects both were oriented to the land rather than the sea. The Ottomans’ sixteenth-century preoccupation with expansion into southeastern Europe, the Arab Middle East, and Persia weakened their maritime capacities just when European ships were entering the Indian Ocean. Had Ottoman navies successfully retaliated for the Egyptian-Gujarati loss to the Portuguese in the Battle of Diu (1509) or won the Battle of Lepanto (1571) in the Mediterranean, western Europe’s rise to Old World dominance might have been thwarted. Tokugawa centralizers concentrated on strengthening Japan’s army while neglecting naval forces. This made it im­possible for Hideyoshi even to begin to achieve his grandiose goal of conquering India, China, Mongolia, Korea, southeast Asia, and the Philippines. The Japanese historian Yoshi Kuno states that “in his continental [Asian mainland] campaign Hideyoshi had not entirely dis­regarded the need of a naval force, yet it is undeniable that he did not consider the navy an essential factor in his military organization. In so thinking he was only following what had long been a military tradition in Japan. Throughout the seven hundred years of the feudal military period, all national difficulties were settled by land batdes.” Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 152. This is a classic case of the will to create empire not being matched by capacity. For Hideyoshi’s plan and its outcome—his armies wreaked havoc on Korea but never got beyond Korea’s borders—see ibid., 143-77.

15. The Aztec case is an exception. Moctezuma was deeply concerned about the news that strange beings (men? gods?) had landed on the coast, some two hundred miles away. The striking fact remains that the Aztec ruler did not mobilize his troops to fight the Spaniards at Vera Cruz or at any point along the lengthy route between the coast and Tenochtitlan.

16. Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City Planning in Early Modem Europe.

17. Ledn-Portilla, ed., The Broken Spears, 61,91-92. Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 28-29.

18. For examples, see Kupperman, Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580-1640.

19. Quoted in Ledn-Portilla, The Broken Spears, 51-52.

20. Ibid., 35,36.

21. Many economic historians argue that a precondition for economic development is legally secure private property rights. See, for example, North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, and Rosenberg and Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich. This point is valid for European empires if one adopts the perspective of colonizers, who routinely assigned themselves land rights, enforced them through the colonial legal system, and proceeded to develop what they owned. The same economic historians seem less willing to grant the corollary proposition that in the course of securing European property rights an indigenous system of property rights was systematically destroyed. Colonial development occurred at the expense of an established set of rules and understandings about land. It is not secure property rights per se that matter for economic development. Rather it is the assignment of such rights to people committed to raising the commercial value of property by realizing its potential to produce items for sale in the market.

22.1 use “societies” to encompass the enormous variety of organized units Europeans encoun­tered. These ranged from stateless societies to states with stable, specialized public sector institutions; from nomadic societies to polities with sedentary populations and stable bound­aries; and from small-scale units with hundreds of members to empires whose bureaucracies exerted influence over tens or even hundreds of millions of people. One of the most profound adjustments overseas Europeans had to make was to realize that the state, whose structure and legitimating rationale were so familiar to them, was but one of many devices people have invented to satisfy collective needs. Organizational models that seemed natural and civilized to Europeans struck many people elsewhere as deviant, and vice versa.

23. Scammell, The First Imperial Age... c.1400-1715,79.

24. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 473.

25. Day, Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java, 48.

26. For these and other examples, see Nash, Red, White, and Black, chaps. 3-6. Sometimes more complex alliance patterns emerged. Thus competition for trade in the second quarter of the seventeenth century pitted the Dutch and Iroquois (based in the Hudson River region) against the French and Hurons (based in the St. Lawrence River region). Ibid., 90-91. Indigenous groups could retain autonomy longer if their leaders played off European powers contending for dominance.

27. Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa 2:10-11, cited in Doyle, Empires, 355.

28. “Without martial Sikh assistance the British might not have recaptured their proudest jewel to set in Victoria’s Imperial Crown.” Wolpert, India, 109.

29. Chirenje, Chief Kgama and His Times, c.1835-1923,28.

30. Isaacman, Tradition of Resistance, 38.

31. A recurring theme in the literature on subaltern and postcolonial studies is the pernicious tendency of Europeans to regard indigenous people as Others, not entitled to receive the rudiments of respect because of their differences from the civilized European Self. See, for example, Said, Orientalism, and Guha and Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies. The point is well made. But it is also incomplete and therefore misleading. The larger truth is that groups on both sides of a racial/cultural divide regard those on the opposite side as Others. Indige­nous peoples perceived Europeans as different from them in significant ways and often consid­ered European behavior barbaric. Alterity should be seen as a shared feature of cross-cultural interaction, not as a characteristic confined to the interaction’s dominant party.

32. Samkange, Origin of African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, 46-47.

33. Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 140.

34. On the Sokoto Caliphate, see Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest, chap. 5 and episodes 10-12. The Nigerian historian concludes (189), “Common loyalty to Sokoto did not exclude hostility between those who gave this loyalty. We have to realize that relations between the various Hausa states of the period before the jihad [in the early nineteenth century] were carried over to the period after the jihad. So there were enmities which a common loyalty to Sokoto did not necessarily remove.”

35. Klein, “Colonial Rule and Structural Change: The Case of Sine-Saloum,” in Cruise O’Brien, ed., The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal, 70.

36. Marsot, A Short History of Modem Egypt, 74.

37. More than twenty thousand Chinese residents of Manila were killed by the beleaguered Spanish community following an uprising in 1603. Yet the Chinese court took no measures to protect them and did not even protest what happened. The court again took no notice when thousands were slaughtered in 1629. Beijing officials could not have been unaware of events in a thriving center of Chinese-European trade less than eight hundred miles off the mainland (Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 89,93). It is inconceivable that a European government would have been so indifferent to a massacre of its people overseas. On the vulnerability of Chinese overseas communities, see Wang Gunwu, “Merchants without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourn­ing Communities,” in Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant Empires, 400-21.

38. On Francis Xavier’s successfill work among India’s low-caste fishing communities, see La- tourette, Three Centuries of Advance, 253-54. In the nineteenth century Wesleyan Methodists in Hyderabad concentrated upon Maias (outcaste agricultural laborers) and Madigas (out- caste scavengers and leather workers). Latourette, The Great Century, 153-54. The Holy Ghost Society began its work in Africa by buying slaves; see P. B. Clarke, “The Methods and Ideology of the Holy Ghost Fathers in Eastern Nigeria, 1885-1905,” in Kalu, ed., The History of Chris­tianity in West Africa, 36-37.

39. Harris, Repatriates and Refugees in a Colonial Society: The Case of Kenya, gives examples from late phase 3.

40. Disintegration of old socioeconomic structures is stressed as a pull factor in Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires.

41. Burkholder and Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 112.

42. In Nigeria Sir Frederick Lugard attempted to apply indirect rule principles developed among Muslim emirates of the far north to the stateless peoples of the southeast. For the failure of this effort, see Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929.

43. See Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, and Abu-Lughod, Before European Hege­mony, for long-distance trade networks.

44. Axtell, The Invasion Within, 11.

45. Ibid., 11-12.

46. Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuseand the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7.

47. An individual’s role can, of course, change as time passes and circumstances shift. An example is Chief Maherero, who initially collaborated with the British and Germans in what became Southwest Africa (Namibia) but later led a revolt against them. I classify individuals according to what I consider to be their most significant historical contribution.

Chapter 12. Sectoral Institutions and Techniques of Control

1. A classic early study is Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. Later works include Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires; Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914; Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas; Lang, Portuguese Brazil; Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule; Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France C1500-1800; and Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective.

2. Exceptions should be noted. Governors in bna colonies were frequently American born. To a degree unique in Europe’s overseas experience, bna governors and judges were beholden to elected colonial assemblies, which voted on their salaries. Ambrosio O’Higgins (ca. 1720-1801) left his native Ireland for South America at an early age. O’Higgins rose to become governor of Chile and viceroy of Peru. Felix Eboue, a black man from French Guiana, was appointed governor of Guadeloupe (1936) and Tchad (1939), then was governor-general of French Equa­torial Africa from 1940 until his death in 1944. For Eboue’s career, see Brian Weinstein, Eboue.

3. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 24.

4. Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief, viii. The Dejerat lay beyond the Indus River, more than a thousand miles from “the country north of Calcutta” where its men fought.

5. For the genocidal attack on the Hereros, see Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting.

6. See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 445-49, for recruitment of so-called martial races or martial classes into colonial police forces and armies. For India, see Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men, esp. 341—61; and Farwell, Armies of the Raj: From the Mutiny to Independence, 1858-1947,179-90.

7. McCully, English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism, and Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India, discuss competition among India’s Hindus and Muslims in the educational arena. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education, does the same for Yorubas and Igbos in Nigeria.

8. A growing literature documents this observation. See Etienne and Leacock, eds., Women and Colonization: Anthropological Perspectives; Knibiehler, La Femme au Temps des Colonies; Ollen- burger and Moore, A Sociology of Women: The Intersection of Patriarchy, Capitalism, and Colonization; and Devens, Countering Colonization: Native American Women and Great Lakes Missions, 1630-1900.

9. Over time some firms transformed themselves by expanding territorial coverage or increasing their scope of activities. For an enterprise that grew prodigiously as it diversified from trade into plantation management and low-level manufacturing, see Fieldhouse, Unilever Over­seas... 1895-1965. Profitable activities of foreign investors in a settler-dominated territory are examined in Swainson, Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918-77. Frankel, Capi­tal Investment in Africa, gives an overview of foreign capital in the region as of late phase 4.

10. See, for example, Duviols, La Lutte Contre les Religions Autochtones dans le Perou Colonial... entre 1532 et 1660.

11. An effective fund-raising mechanism for Catholic parishes in Spanish American colonies was the cofradia, a lay brotherhood. Settlers, Amerindians, and blacks organized their own broth­erhoods to raise funds for church construction, pay the priest’s fee on Sunday and holy days, support impoverished congregants, and organize street celebrations on saints’ days. See Far- riss, Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico, 1759-1821, for judicial mechanisms created by the Catholic Church to discipline its personnel. This system operated essentially on its own, parallel to the colonial state’s laws and courts, until challenged by the Bourbon centralizer, King Charles III, in the mid-eighteenth century.

12. Burkholder and Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 137-38.

13. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, shows how leading Spanish families in the Philippines, acting purely in a private capacity, facilitated trade between China and the Americas.

14. On Bishop de las Casas (1474-1566), see Wagner, The Life and Writings of Bartolome de las Casas. On Father Vieira (1608-97), see Lippy et al., Christianity Comes to the Americas, 1492- 1776,103-06.

15. For examples from nineteenth- and twentieth-century British India, see the introduction in Ray, ed., Entrepreneurship and Industry in India, 1800-1947,1-69.

16. Responding to settler pressures, twentieth-century colonial regimes passed regulations to prevent Africans from growing coffee (Angola and Kenya), sisal (Tanganyika), and tobacco (Southern Rhodesia).

17. Gosner, Soldiers of the Virgin: The Moral Economy of a Colonial Maya Rebellion, 83. In Amer­indian communities the posts of fiscal, maestro de coco, and sacristan were held by indigenous Catholics. Appointed by the parish priest, these persons were important intermediaries be­tween the local community and Europeans atop the religious hierarchy.

18. Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart graphically depicts these aspects of the missionary impact on Igbos in Nigeria.

19. Jack, Daybreak in Livingstonia: The Story of the Livingstonia Mission in British Central Africa; Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924, chap. 3.

20. This dual identity is stressed in Subaltern Studies, an Indian journal founded in 1982 to critique European colonialism and its postcolonial legacies. Said makes a similar point in Orientalism and other works.

21. Quoted in Stocking, “Maclay, Kubary, Malinowski,” in Stocking, ed„ Colonial Situations, 38.

22. English-Swahili Phrase Book, 9.

23. Tevoedjre, L’Afrique Revoltee, 72. After independence Dahomey was renamed the Republic of Benin.

Chapter 13. Sources of Colonial Weakness

1. Crow, The Epic of Latin America, 407-08.

2. Kane, Ambiguous Adventure, 37. Emphasis added.

3. Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest, 135,137.

4. Hemming, Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500-1760, discusses the escape option Indians took as they sought, often successfully, to avoid enslavement and slaughter. The journal Cultural Survival describes a similar pattern today as the settler frontier presses deeper into the Amazonian forest.

5. Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, chaps. 16,25.

6. Price, ed., Maroon Societies: Slave Communities in the Americas; Price, The Guiana Maroons; Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655-1796.

7. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 329-30.

8. Peires, The Dead Will Arise. Shepperson, “Nyasaland and the Millennium,” in Thrupp, ed., Millennial Dreams in Action, 144-59.

9. Campbell, Rasta and Resistance, links slave revolts and maroon activity to subsequent move­ments for black emancipation. He argues (39) that in the twentieth century, as blacks returned to their Caribbean homelands from education and work abroad, “the legacy of Tacky, Cudjoe, Nanny, Paul Bogle and Sam Sharpe was linked [in people’s minds] to the struggles of Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, King Ja Ja, Chaka Zulu and King Menelik of Ethiopia.”

10. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. I apply Scott’s ideas to colonized peoples while recognizing that the tactics he discussed were used in all sorts of noncolonial situations as well.

n. In the 1760s a Delaware Indian prophet named Neolin urged Indians to revitalize their culture by abandoning material objects associated with whites and forswearing rum. Nash, Red, White, and Black, 262. In Kenya in the late 1920s, members of the Watu wa Mngu (People of God) sect among the Kikuyu threw away all utensils of foreign origin. According to Jomo Kenyatta, sect leaders “say emphatically that foreign goods are full of defilements.” Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, 265.

12. The colonizer’s message could produce both reactions within the same person. In a brilliant essay, “The Fact of Blackness,” in Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon describes the devastating effect the white person’s negative image of blacks has on him, even as he resolutely rejects that image as false and immoral.

13. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 87-88.

14. Quoted in Penders, ed., Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830- 1942,230.

15.1 classify mestizos as non-Europeans, especially since they fought alongside indigenous peo­ples in the two rebellions in which they were most active: those led by Hidalgo and Morelos. Morelos and Tupac Amaru II were mestizo; the latter had a Spanish wife. People of European descent played a part in some cases. A few creoles assumed local leadership roles in Tupac Amaru’s rebellion. The creole priest Miguel Hidalgo was acknowledged leader of the rebellion in New Spain’s Bajfo region. The vast bulk of the army assembled under his banner, however, was Amerindian and mestizo.

16. The longest-lasting was the campaign led by Sayyid Muhammad ’Abdille Hassan to oust foreigners from Somalia. The man the British exasperatedly called the Mad Mullah kept British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces on the defensive from 1900 until 1920. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, chap. 4.

17. Wolpert, India, 53-54.

18. Nehru, The Discovery of India, 325.

19. Leon Campbell, “Ideology and Factionalism During the Great Rebellion, 1780-82,” in Stern, ed., Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 110-39; and Stern, “Introduction to Part I,” 32.

20. There is a vast literature on anticolonial nationalism within the even larger corpus on na­tionalism. Works I found helpful include Anderson, Imagined Communities; Breuilly, Na­tionalism and the State; Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication; Emerson, From Empire to Nation; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa; Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism; Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination; Seton-Watson, Nations and States; Smith, Theories of Nationalism; Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism; and Ward, Five Ideas that Change the World.

21. Some nationalists supplemented the claim to statehood by a sweeping, usually vaguer, claim about the rights of larger categories of people. The prime examples are pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. I see these as supranationalist doctrines because they served primarily to give significance to the struggle for statehood in specific territories.

22. Studies of nationalist social movements and parties in British colonies include Sisson and Wol­pert, eds., Congress and Indian Nationalism; Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942; Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties; Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development; and Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964.

23. Hoffer, The True Believer, 27.

24. See Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism, and Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, for analyses and examples of changes in group identity when people compete for centrally dis­tributed resources in modernizing Third World states. Case studies of identities that appear traditional but are not include Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India; Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community; Mitchell, The Kalela Dance; Ranger, The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe; and Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa.

25. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, chaps. 5,6.

26. Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, 84.

27. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, 347; chaps. 15-18.

28. In phase 4 it seems inappropriate to describe as setders people whose ancestors may have migrated from the British Isles a century or more earlier. But the same problem arises when one uses the term to describe late phase 1 Spanish American creoles. Despite its obvious limitations, “settlers” captures the dual identity of persons permanently ensconced in one territory yet able (and often eager) to trace genealogical and cultural descent to the metropole.

29. Phelan, The People and the King: The Communero Revolution in Colombia, 1781, xvii.

30. See Morris’s evocative description of her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 as “an imperial fulfillment” in Heaven’s Command, chap. 27.

31. For text and background, see Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 233-36.

Chapter 14. Colonialism as a Self-Defeating Enterprise

1. By “new states” I mean polities that declared independence from a European metropole and were internationally recognized as possessing sovereignty. I do not refer to states formed under other circumstances, such as the collapse and fragmentation of large land-based polities like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A comparative study of state formation in these situations is Barkey and von Hagen, eds. After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building.

2. From “If Only I Were a Netherlander,” quoted in Penders, ed., Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1942,233.

3. Morison, Oxford History of the American People, 222. Hartz emphasizes the close correspon­dence between Lockean thinking and bna settler worldviews in The Liberal Tradition in America. On eighteenth-century settler pamphlets, which echoed contemporary complaints in England about an arbitrary and unrepresentative Parliament, see Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.

4. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 46.

5. Quoted in Crow, The Epic of Latin America, 416-17.

6. Ibid., 526.

7. Quoted in Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography, 35.

8. To simplify matters I discuss only settler-led movements in phase 2, leaving the Haitian exception aside, and only non-European-led movements in phase 5, leaving the Rhodesian exception aside.

9. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, 173. See the title of Wolf’s book: Europe and the People without History.

10. Comments here are more applicable to Old World than New World phase 5 states. Non­European populations in the Caribbean basin were exposed to Western education, Chris­tianity, and European lifestyles much earlier and more intensively than people in Asia, Africa,

and Oceania. Hence the rapid growth of secondary- and university-level enrollment in phases 4 and 5 probably had a less revolutionary impact—politically as well as culturally—in the Caribbean than in the Old World.

n. Baum and Gagliano, Chief Executives in Black Africa and Southeast Asia, appendix B, tables 5, 6. Considering the prominent role Christian missions played in colonial education, it is significant that twenty-eight of the forty-eight African leaders stating a religious affiliation fisted Christianity. Comparable figures for Southeast Asia were five of twenty-seven—a lower proportion but still far higher than the percentage of Christians in the region. Ibid., table 4.

12. If one broadens the criteria to include prominent nationalists trained in Europe or the United States who did not become chief executives at independence, the list includes Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria), Ba Maw (Burma), Subhas Chandra Bose (India), J. B. Danquah (Ghana), Mamadou Dia (Senegal), M. K. Gandhi (India), Cheddi Jagan (Guyana), V. K. Krishna Menon (India), Tom Mboya (Kenya), Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique), and Soetan Sjahrir (Indo­nesia). One could add a long list of politically active intellectuals as well, such as Caribbean- born pan-Africanists Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, C. L. R. James, and George Padmore.

13. Ho Van Tao, quoted in Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, 21.

14. Ibid., 35.

15. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 19.

16. Olusanya, The West African Students’ Union and the Politics of Decolonisation, 1925-1958.

17. Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, 44,45.

18. This incident is recounted in the essay on Prime Minister Rahman in Current Biography Yearbook, 1957,444.

19. Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 52-54.

20. Hodson, The Great Divide, 81. “Pakistan” is a linguistic amalgam of the northern Indian provinces of Punjab, Afghan or Northwest Frontier, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan.

21. Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, 35. Ho Chi Minh’s perspective was based not only on his years in France but also on experiences from 1911 to 1913 as a laborer on French ships. Lacouture notes (18) that he went ashore “at all the principal ports of Africa and the Mediterranean; Oran, Dakar, Diego-Suarez, Port Said, Alexandria, where he observed conditions closely akin to those in Vietnam, and these findings were to constitute the factual basis” of his book.

22. Jawaharlal Nehru studied in England from 1905 to 1912, enrolling at Harrow, the elite second­ary school, then at Cambridge University, and reading law and economics in London. He gave few public speeches in the early years after returning to India, in large part because “I felt that public speeches should not be in English, and I doubted my capacity to speak at any length in Hindustani.” Nehru, Toward Freedom, 42-43. Because of schooling given M. A. Jinnah, the Muslim League leader and founder of Pakistan, by an early point in his life “English had become his chief language, and it remained so, for he never mastered Urdu; even when he was leading the Muslims into freedom, he had to define the terms of their emancipation in an alien tongue.” Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, 14.

23. Nehru, Toward Freedom, 353. Nehru wrote the original edition of his autobiography in 1934 and 1935 while in prison.

24. Jahoda, White Man.

25. See, for example, Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa; Shepperson and Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and... the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915; and Rosberg and Not­tingham, The Myth of “Mau Mau”: Nationalism in Kenya, chap. 4.

26. Sithole, African Nationalism, 85,86.

27. Ibid., 86.

28. I treat British India as the phase 5 leader even though Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon preceded its independence by a year. I do so because of the prominence of India’s nationalist movement in phase 4, the enormous publicity attending its run-up to independence and partition, and the great impact Indian independence had elsewhere. Independence for the three Middle East mandate territories was little noticed by the world at large.

29. Quoted in Cochrane, Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America, 54. Perkins estimates that by the 1770s the typical bna family maintained a material standard of living about a fifth higher than its counterpart in England. Perkins, Economy of Colonial America, 145.

30. Markovitz, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-1939· Leadbeater, The Politics of Textiles.

Chapter 15. The International Dimension: War as the Catalyst for Independence

1. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, table 2:1,30. Debt rose by £58 million between 1756 and 1763. In the two principal previous wars it rose by £29 million (1739-48) and £22 million (1702-13).

2. Quoted in Lapping, End of Empire, 156.

3. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 35.

4. Spear, A History of India 2:182. Spear writes (246) that Nehru “had a deep suspicion of the designs of European powers in Asia and Africa. His ideas in this sphere may be said to have been influenced by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.”

5. Quoted in Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 77.

6. Leith-Ross, Stepping-Stones: Memoirs of Colonial Nigeria, 119. The author notes (119) that newspaper reports of Sir Stafford Cripps’s mission to India in early 1942, holding out the prospect of postwar Indian political advance to leading politicians, “sent as it were an electric shock throughout Lagos.... India was going to have complete independence. Then why not Nigeria?”

7. “Overseas possessions” includes territories with different constitutional statuses: (a) associated territories, i.e., those initially established as protectorates: Tunisia, Morocco, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (minus Cochinchina); (b) overseas departments considered parts of France itself: Caribbean possessions like Martinique and Guadeloupe, and Algeria; (c) overseas territories, i.e., dependent possessions of metropolitan France in sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar. The rightward shift in French politics affected overseas territories most directly. But leaders in other possessions followed this trend closely and with growing dismay.

8. Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, 48. See 41-54 for a comparison of the two constituent assemblies’ proposals regarding African colonies.

9. Yves Person, “French West Africa and Decolonization,” in Gifford and Louis, eds., The Transfer of Power in Africa... 1940-1960,146.

10. Greene, “The Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution,” Journal of Imperial and Com­monwealth History, 101.

n. See postwar identity changes as reported in Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735- 1775,74,76,215.

12. See the tide of his British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the Ameri­can Revolution, 1763-1767. Thomas emphasizes “the almost universal consensus of opinion in Britain on the question of Parliamentary supremacy over America” (364) during these years. Thus, despite repeal of the Stamp Act, “the lesson of the Stamp Act crisis was that there would be very few ‘friends of America’ in Britain in any future clash with the colo­nies” (371).

13. Tucker and Hendrickson, Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the American War of Independence, 3.

14. Quoted in Humphreys and Lynch, eds., Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 262.

15. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922,159.

16. Ibid., 185.

17. Quoted in ibid., 164. Word underlined by Gandhi.

18. Marsot, A Short History of Modem Egypt, 80.

19. David Strang, “From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decoloniza­tion, 1870-1987,” American Sociological Review, 858.

20. Ibid.

Chapter 16. Legacies

1. Wide-ranging discussions of the West’s global impact include Toynbee, The World and the West; Dawson, The Movement of World Revolution; von Laue, The World Revolution of Western­ization; and works on modernization by the social scientists C. E. Black, Karl Deutsch, S. N. Eisenstadt, Alex Inkeles, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, and Dankwart Rustow. In the humanities, scholars in the rapidly growing field of postcolonial studies, while suspicious of social scien­tific approaches, share with modernization theorists an extremely broad conception of the West and its impacts. See, for example, Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, and Prakash, ed., After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements. One reason it is difficult to know what to make of claims by postcolonial theorists is that colonialism is a vast, catchall category with virtually no conceptual boundaries because it is not clearly defined. Understanding cannot advance if writers fail to specify what their key terms mean.

2. Tetlock and Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, 3,4.

3. Stateless peoples like Palestinians and Kurds lack a polity they control. But their problem is not that they are not subject to state authority. On the contrary, they have been incorporated into states—Israel, Iraq, Iran, Turkey—whose governments oppress them. Marginalized peoples commonly respond to oppression by demanding statehood for themselves. If their demands were granted the world would become even more politically homogenous.

4. These issues are insightfully analyzed by the Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh in “Colonialism and the Two Publics: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History.

5. Akintoye, Emergent African States, 9-10. The authoritarian dimension of colonialism is em­phasized in Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective.

6. See my “Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Commins, ed., Africa’s Development Challenges and the World Bank, 179-214.1 estimate (189) that em­ployment in regular-line agencies of central and local government grew from 1.9 to 6.5 million between i960 and 1980. If one adds nonfinancial parastatal organizations, public sector em­ployment rose from roughly 3.8 to 10 million during this period. By 1980 the public sector, including parastatals, probably accounted for half the people formally employed outside agriculture.

7. Data calculated from Gunnemark, Countries, Peoples, and Their Languages.

8. Calculated from ibid. Russia is the only noncolonized country in which more than one hundred languages are spoken.

9. Information on Sudan, Mauretania, and Togo from Morrison et al., Black Africa: A Compara­tive Handbook, 631,560,660-61.

10. About 5 million Indians in a population of more than 850 million are said to know English well. This tiny pool presumably supplies the bulk of the central government’s bureaucrats, scientists, and diplomats. (Estimates from Gunnemark, Countries, Peoples, and their Lan­guages, 88-90.) As of 1985 only a quarter of those school-age and older in Africa’s officially francophone countries was literate in French. Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1985,168.

11. Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Com­munity; Davenport et al., Europe’s Preferred Partners? The Lome Countries in World Trade.

12. Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, x.

13. Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism.

14. Stephen Jay Gould, lecture at the College of Wooster in 1987, quoted in Tom Wicker, “The Greatest Tragedy,” New York Times, Jan. 21,1988.

15. For international extractive capability, see Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A De­velopmental Approach, 195-205.

16. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700,292.

17. For the large number of posts at the gubernatorial level, see Henige, Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present. This study provides data on almost four hundred Euro­pean possessions.

18. From the introduction to Tilly, ed., Formation of National States in Western Europe, 42.

19. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, 60.

20. Ageron, Modem Algeria, 30. See Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 67, for recruitment of social undesirables in France’s African Light Infantry, which played a key role in the invasion of Algeria in 1830 and subsequent pacification campaigns.

21. “The expedition... was a make-shift expedient for internal political consumption, carried out by a government in difficulty seeking the prestige of a military victory.... As the minister of war had written as long before as 1827, ‘it would be a useful distraction from political troubles at home’ and would allow the government ‘to go to the country at the next election with the keys of Algiers in its hand.’ ” Ageron, Modern Algeria, 5.

22. Of these, Bismarck was the least favorably disposed to overseas expansion. But there is evi­dence that he thought an assertion of German claims in Africa would help him in the Reichstag elections of 1884. Stoecker, ed., German Imperialism in Africa, 33.

23. The Duchy of Kurland (in present-day Latvia) and the Electorate of Brandenburg (after 1701 the Kingdom of Prussia). Henige, Colonial Governors, appendix, 361. Venetian sailors made trade contact with islands off the North African Atlantic coast early in phase 1. Venice and Genoa, of course, controlled extensive networks of trading enclaves in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

24. Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francises, 37-38 (translation supplied).

25. For the influence of West Indian sugar planters and merchants on Britain’s Parliament in the eighteenth century, see Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 92-93. Persell describes the political influence of French business interests in The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938.

26. Advocates of the high-gain position include Wallerstein, in The Modern World-System II; Frank, in World Accumulation, 1492-1789; and Williams, in Capitalism and Slavery. Advocates of the low- or minimal-gain position include Rosenberg and Birdzell, in How the West Grew Rich, esp. 16-20; North and Thomas, in Rise of the Western World; and Bairoch, Economics and World History, part 2.

27. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 102; see chap. 5, “British Industry and the Triangular Trade.”

28. Cameron, A Concise Economic History of the World, 160; Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 82-83.

29. Said, Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. See also Mudimbe, The Idea of Africa; Mitchell, Colonising Egypt; and Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. Discussing Victorian England in Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context, McClintock argues that the perceived exoticism of the colonial Other enabled some Europeans to indulge in a highly racialized and sexualized fantasy life.

30. For a critique of Western intellectuals’ unwillingness to apply to non-Europeans behavioral standards routinely applied to their own societies, see P. T. Bauer, “Western Guilt and Third World Poverty,” in Bauer, Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion, 66-85.

31. This point applies with particular force to territories in Africa and islands in the Caribbean and Oceania that became independent in phase 5. See Jackson, Quasi-States, and Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics.

32. Sjahrir, Out of Exile, 144-45.

Chapter 17. The Moral Evaluation of Colonialism

1. Works by critics include Alavi and Shanin, eds., Introduction to the Sociology of ’’Developing Societies”; Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism; Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Nkrumah, Ghana and I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology; Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America and World Accumulation, 1492-1789; and Murdoch, The Poverty of Nations. For defenders, see Bauer (“The Economics of Resentment” and “Western Guilt and Third World Poverty,” in Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion; Bums, In Defence of Colonies; Perham, The Colonial Reckoning: The End of Imperial Rule in Africa in the Light of British Experience; Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire; Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy; Ryckmans, Dominer Pour Servir; Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Franfais; and Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. Though many of these works focus on the colonial experience in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Africa, the basic arguments can be readily extended to other times and places. Not surprisingly, many of the critics are non-Europeans who grew up in the colonies, while most of the defenders are Europeans who grew up in metropoles. As the adage goes, where one stands is strongly influenced by where one sits.

2. These authors include Nehru, Toward Freedom, chap. 41; Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, chap. 3; Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India,” and other selections in Avineri, ed., Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization; Isichei, The Ibo Peoples and the Europeans; and Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. For a carefully reasoned discussion by an eminent philosopher, see Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government.

3. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 27.

4. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 22.

5. C&aire, Discourse, 23. See also Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, chap. 2. Rodney cites (40) the Gold Coast nationalist J. E. Casely-Hayford, who wrote in 1922, “Before even the British came into relations with our people, we were a developed people, having our own institutions, having our own ideas of government.”

6. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 57-83; quotation on 81.

7. Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 617.

8. Cited in Lewis, ed., The British in India: Imperialism or Trusteeship? 8. See the French poem cited earlier, contrasting cruel Dahomean rulers who sold their subjects into slavery with the French, “who delivered us and made us into men.”

9. In several situations European rulers took advantage of and further refined exploitative labor recruitment practices dating from precolonial times. Examples are the Inca Empire’s mita system and the compulsory labor policies of Vietnamese emperors. In such situations, de­fenders would insist that if Europeans are to be judged harshly the same judgment should apply to their predecessors as well. Defenders would not deny that Europeans violated the moral norm of nonexploitation. But they would argue that this did not, in and of itself, make colonial rule any worse for the subject population than the practices of noncolonial regimes.

10. Marx, “The Future Results of the British Rule in India,” in Avineri, ed., Karl Marx on Colonial­ism, 132. The issue is not whether Marx’s historical assessment was correct but whether, if one believed that it was, one would be less inclined to criticize any specific foreign elite in India, the British included, on grounds that it was foreign.

11. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 535. It should be noted, however, that Smith attributes these benefits to the initiatives of settlers, not to the policies of colonial regimes. Indeed, his chapter “On Colonies” is an attack on the mercantilist policies and practices of the leading metropoles. Smith thus occupies an ambivalent if not contradic- tory position: he welcomes the economic activities of European private profit actors overseas yet criticizes public sector rule that was often a precondition for these very activities.

12. Though Gandhi and Cesaire (in the latter’s early poems) question the high priority westerners place on material possessions and technological progress. The argument is that material­ism undermines other desirable values such as social solidarity, happiness, and spiritual enlightenment.

13. Cesaire, Discourse, 24.

14. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 365-67.

15. Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, 216, See similar statements about late nineteenth-century African rulers and Western-educated intellectuals in Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonial­ism, 1-27.

16. Masefield, A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service, 102.

17. See, for example, Bauer on the growth of production, trade, and school enrollment in the Gold Coast from the 1890s to the mid-1950s. Bauer, “The Economics of Resentment,” Journal of Contemporary History, 53-54.

18. Cesaire, Discourse, 21,22.

19. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 182. Cesaire, Discourse, 21-22, speaks of “thou­sands of men sacrificed” in the construction of this railroad line.

20. Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire, 241.

21. Nehru, Toward Freedom, 277.

22. Cited in Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, 428.

23. Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa, 50.

24. Lumumba, Congo, My Country, 12,13.

25. Presence Africaine, La Pensee Politique de Patrice Lumumba, 198,199 (translation supplied). King Baudoin described the Congo’s independence as “the crowning achievement of the mission conceived by the genius of King Leopold II, undertaken by him with a tenacious courage... not as a conqueror, but as a civilizer.” Quoted in Young, Politics in the Congo, 50-51.

26. Marx, “The British Rule in India,” (New York Daily Tribune, June 25,1853), in Avineri, ed., Karl Marx on Colonialism, 93-94.

27. Nehru, Toward Freedom, 278.

28. Marx, “The Future Results of British Rule in India,” in Avineri, Karl Marx on Colonialism, 132- 33. «6.

29. Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, esp. chaps. 1-5.

30. Thomas Munro to Warren Hastings, quoted in Moon, British Conquest and Dominion of India, yil.