An overseas empire gained is not necessarily an empire retained.

If anything, geo­graphic and demographic realities would lead one to expect a brief life for such an improbable, manifestly contrived arrangement. In the vast majority of cases metro­poles were separated from colonies by thousands of miles of ocean.

Yet that oligarchy prevailed for a long time. The duration of metropolitan rule in the 125 member states of the United Nations (as of 2000) that at one time were governed by European countries is shown in the appendix. I estimate, on the basis of criteria spelled out there, that overseas rule lasted more than 500 years in two countries (Cape Verde; Sao Tome and Principe); more than 300 years in 18 countries;

more than 200 years in 37;

more than 100 years in 60; and

more than 60 years in 105.

Only two states—Egypt and Ethiopia—were colonies for fewer than 10 years.

How did a handful of states manage to defy the odds and govern so many dis­tant territories for so long? Part IV addresses this question. Chapter 12 continues the sectoral theme developed earlier, showing how institutions that figured in imperial expansion were critical in colonial consolidation as well. European-led institutions transformed initially inflated political claims into effective control. They made con­trol durable by recruiting and training new cadres to replace older ones. They used positive and negative incentives to get individual employees to work toward sectoral goals and comply with terms of employment. Even if institutions from one or two sectors took an early lead in an area, it was not long before the remaining sector(s) also became active.

Chapter 13 complements the top-down approach of this chapter by examining what colonial subjects did and thought. Attention is focused on non-Europeans though settlers are also discussed. Colonial subjects were not utterly powerless and passive. They continually took initiatives to which rulers had to respond. But some­times initiatives driven by opposition to some aspect of foreign dominance had the unintended effect of reinforcing dominance. Colonial residents also disagreed among themselves over identities, goals, and appropriate tactics for organizing them­selves and confronting rulers. Recurring debates over these matters undercut serious challenges to the status quo from below.

In many respects governing a colony is like governing other collections of human beings. I focus here on features specific to the colonial situation, notably the physical distance between metropole and colony and the racial/cultural distance between rulers and non-European subjects. What did metropolitan governments do to ensure that administrators dispatched to far-off lands complied with their direc­tives? What did top administrators in a colony do to ensure that non-Europeans complied with their directives? How did institutions imported from a metropole become domesticated and begin to shape colonial society? How was the public sector reinforced by European-led private profit and religious sectors?

The character of sectoral institutions varied from one metropole to another, from one region to another, and from one expansionist phase to another. The vari­ations were noted in previous chapters and will be discussed in passing here. They have been studied in a number of insightful works.¹ It would be a mistake, however, to emphasize obvious differences while ignoring features that cut across the dividing lines of geography, culture, and time. In what follows I employ an abstract, ideal-type analysis to identify frequently recurring institutional patterns. The claim is not that every pattern appears in every colony but that the frequency with which they appear in diverse settings helps explain the surprising durability of the colonial project.