Rebels and Bandits
As the Ming was founded by a peasant rebel, it was probably fitting that the dynasty was also toppled in large part by the efforts of peasant rebel armies. Unlike the Mongol threat however, peasant rebellions tended to spring from specific socio-economic triggers, including drought, famine, poor harvests and other natural disasters.[202] Additionally, many of the so-called peasant rebels of the late Ming period were in fact soldiers or members of the official Ming postal service who, through government cutbacks or simple maladministration, had fallen into destitution and felt they had no other way out.
As these people transitioned back into local society, often with considerable friction, they brought a range of martial skills and experiences with them. In the process, certain areas of the country, most notably the north-west, became increasingly militarised and violence became a part of everyday life. Virtually all the major late Ming peasant rebel leaders hailed from north-west China. Although Tong's study on collective violence in the Ming also notes the importance of ‘regime capacity' and distance from the power centres as factors in instigating peasant uprisings, Robinson has countered Tong's findings by highlighting the violent nature of Ming society in general.[203]For example, the rebellion of one Wang Jiayin, which broke out in the autumn of 1628 and spread throughout the north China plain, was attributed to widespread starvation and deprivation. In general, the policy for dealing with peasant rebels was to convince the leaders to turn themselves in, and then pardon the rank and file in the interest of maintaining stability. In some cases leaders who turned themselves or their allies in would even be rewarded with military ranks themselves. Famine or disaster relief measures would also be implemented if deemed necessary.
Military force would be applied only if less severe measures failed. But much depended upon the abilities and predilections of particular officials assigned to deal with the problem in question.Such strategies generally met with mixed results for a variety of reasons. First of all, most soldiers themselves came from lower-class backgrounds and often sympathised with the plight of the peasant rebels. Low-ranking officers who felt cheated by the government could often be lured into joining rebel groups and assuming leadership positions by virtue of their military experience. This meant that local uprisings could quickly mushroom into regional or even national threats, especially in times of widespread natural disaster.[204] [205] And, if and when government forces did come forth to engage rebels in combat, they could simply melt into the countryside along with the rest of the peasantry.
Crushing the peasant revolts proved maddening and in the end impossible for the Ming. Their mobile warfare and ability to blend in with the populace resulted in unsatisfying engagements and their decentralised leadership meant that even killing prominent leaders often had little effect. So the government resorted to a ‘body bag', or more accurately, ‘ear counting' philosophy whereby success was measured primarily in the number of enemy killed, once again resorting to the strategy of trying to overawe perceived enemies. But the practice backfired as soldiers often killed innocent commoners to inflate their numbers and receive rewards. This in turn led more locals to abscond into the wilderness, frequently joining bandit gangs and thereby militarising society even more.
The Qing were similarly bedevilled by the peasant rebel problem and eventually ended the threats by pacifying local society, restoring order and encouraging agriculture and a return to traditional occupations. Areas needed to be secured and a formal military presence in the form of the Chinese Green Standard Armies established.
These were essentially infantry units raised from the Chinese (rather than the Manchu) populace and used for maintaining internal security. When people felt safe again they were less inclined to join local bandit gangs and society was gradually demilitarised, albeit not without some massive pacification campaigns. For example, in the final military push to eradicate the so-called Thirteen Houses of Kuidong in the eastern Sichuan region in 1662-4, the Qing mobilised an army of 200,000, converging from three provinces, to crush the rebels in their mountain fortresses. The Qing relied upon the time-honoured tactic of overawing the enemy while also encouraging defections by commanders and local supporters.19Related to the problem of peasant rebellion was the existence of low-level banditry. Petty bandits were endemic to China. Banditry tended to increase during times of political and social unrest or natural disaster, but the frequency of references to bandits attests to the fact that they were a recurring problem. Bandits tended to be opportunistic, so outbreaks of banditry often followed disruptive government suppression campaigns. The ability to curtail banditry on the local level was seen as indicative of an official's ability to maintain peace and tranquillity in general and was a way for military officials to obtain combat experience. Much of what is related above concerning the suppression of peasant rebellion applied to anti-bandit measures, albeit on a more localised scale. In short, the government generally relied upon a combination of carrot- and-stick measures, and Confucian suasion would often be tried first, though if that failed, violence would be liberally applied. While one is certainly struck by the widespread occurrence of petty banditry in Ming-Qing China, it does not seem to be inherently any more violent than any other early modern society.[206]