The colonialism of ‘economic exploitation'

What justified this display of power and political administration? The question is more pressing because few colonies turned a profit. Prospects of gold, even as unfounded speculations, often became a justification for pursuit of colonies.

Rumours of future wealth spread rapidly, and, while wildly exaggerated, had some historical basis. Australia and California had seen gold rushes in the mid-nineteenth century that rapidly and permanently transformed their societies. Might not another gold rush in North or East Africa enrich empires in the late nineteenth century? Even though the answer would be negative, the investment risk of colonial adventure appeared justified by past returns on undiscovered minerals and untapped natural resources and raw materials. (And indeed there were later gold rushes in South Africa and in Alaska, an American colony bought from Russia.) The competitive instincts of neo-mercantilism helped to divide up the continent, as the empires did not want to lose the possibility of any future incremental advantage.

Books of imperial theory made colonialism appear rational and predictable. In 1874, the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu began a classic tome, De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes (Colonisation by Modern Peoples), by arguing that

emigration, the taking possession of a new land, of a virgin country, is not sufficient to constitute colonisation in the true sense of the word. This is something greater and contains a different element. Emigration is an instinctual act that belongs to societies of all epochs; colonisation is a deliberate act, following rules and principles, and can only come from very advanced societies.⁹

For Leroy-Beaulieu, the crux of the matter lay in who did the colonising: only ‘very advanced societies’ colonised less advanced societies, making colonialism inherently prestigious.

Leroy-Beaulieu strengthened his Eurocentric argument by positing that the success of colonisation depended upon the emigration of either humans or capital from the metropole to the colonies. Europe could now colonise territories without populating them, sending investment capital instead of excess population abroad. In Leroy-Beaulieu’s categorical worldview, lands were either ‘population colonies’ for white settlement (such as Australia), ‘exploitation colonies’ for capitalist investment (for example, Vietnam or French West Africa), or ‘mixed colonies’ (Algeria).¹⁰ Economics were paramount in the foundation and success of all three types. By the time of the sixth edition of his book in 1908, Leroy- Beaulieu nevertheless conceded the problems that such models created on the ground, as settler populations and native populations would inevitably clash.¹¹ But Leroy-Beaulieu’s theories would remain unusually influential for states formulating their colonial plans.

Many questions faced prospective colonialists, including, where would the profits of economic exploitation flow, and who assumed the risk and rewards? Joint-stock colonial ventures had established early and successful European colonies, but the Dutch East Indies Company did not survive the Napoleonic era, and even the British East India Company lost control of India after its scandalous, violent repression of the 1857 revolt. King Leopold’s personal investments in the vast Congo had paid handsomely as a notorious example of economic success. The company met and enforced rubber production quotas, but at a tremendous human cost of millions of deaths. With the growing reach of mass media, even faraway depredations eventually became public. After years of international scandal, the Belgian parliament took over the royal management of the Congo in 1908. Statist, rather than private, colonial exploitation became the rule in the ‘new’ imperialism.

Trading colonies, like those of the Portuguese, Dutch and British colonies established in the early modern era, would seem to have been the most manageable and most profitable kind of colony.

The expansive logic of prestige and paranoia, however, could turn even a simple harbour into a huge colonial commitment. After the United States Navy destroyed Spain’s Pacific fleet in Manila Bay, Washington faced an unforeseen decision about the future of the Philippines. The American government did not want any other power to control the port, but not only did the harbour need defending, but so too its flanks and hinterland. After the United States seized control of Manila, the American army fought a Filipino independence movement in a long and destructive war, and then held onto the entire archipelago of the Philippines until granting it independence in 1946.

Similar machinations dominated the changing map of the trade entrepots of China. As Britain and France approached war over the Sudan in the Fashoda Crisis of September 1898, the Great Powers rushed toward new conquests in China, following its recent defeat by Japan in 1894—1895. It appeared that the Chinese coast might be entirely partitioned, as Russia took a lease on Port Arthur (Dalian), Germany took Qingdao, France acquired Guangzhouwan and Britain claimed Weihaiwei, in addition to Hong Kong and its ‘New Territories’. Not to be left behind, Italy mobilised an expedition to occupy San-Mun Bay (Wangpan Yang), south of Shanghai. Supported by Britain, on 2 March 1899, Italy requested a lease and sphere of influence over most of Zhejiang province. The Chinese government, however, had decided against further European concessions and refused Italy’s request. The Italian government recalled its minister and grumbled about an ultimatum, but dropped its demands in late 1899, and settled for a small sliver of the port of Tianjin in 1901.¹²

Even before it collapsed, Italy’s adventure in China attracted broad opposition at home. Anti-colonialists called for careful studies to see if San-Mun Bay could actually attract commerce, ‘that is, doing for China what was not done for Eritrea’.¹³ Italy had no established trade with China and would face entrenched commercial competition from Shanghai and British Hong Kong. Most importantly, China was unsuitable for Italian colonialism because there was no room for Italian emigration: ‘Unfortunately the only capital that Italy can export—its large emigration—is useless in China, where the population is overabundant and wages are extremely low!’¹⁴ Despite the promise of Leroy-Beaulieu’s ‘colonies of exploitation’, for Italy, colonialism meant settlement; where emigration was impossible, so was a colony.

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Source: Aldrich Robert, McKenzie Kirsten (eds.). The Routledge History of Western Empires. Routledge,2014. — 542 p.. 2014

The colonialism of ‘economic exploitation'

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