The Cuban Revolution
In the late 1950s few expected Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba to survive into the twenty-first century. The island’s location alone, 150 kilometres or 90 miles south of Florida, made it a special case for American foreign policy.
As Theodore Roosevelt had made clear in the early twentieth century, the United States would never willingly allow Cuba to be dominated by a hostile (or in fact any other) foreign Power. Moreover, the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala had been a reminder of the American determination to maintain its grip on countries immediately south of its border.Castro was eager to avoid the fate of Arbenz, but he was equally aware that his domestic popularity was heavily based on the anti-Americanism of the ‘Fidelista’ revolution. Moreover, a truly independent Cuba could hardly emerge if he did not take active measures to minimize the stranglehold that American financiers and corporations had on the country’s economic and political life. Initially therefore Castro followed a cautious line, implementing only partial nationalization of foreign interests while at the same time making overtures to Washington. However, when the Eisenhower administration ignored these overtures, Castro began to gravitate towards Moscow, where the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, eager to build upon his self-proclaimed image as a promoter of wars of national liberation, offered Cuba economic assistance. Castro responded by deciding to purchase oil from the USSR. Furthermore, when American companies refused to refine this oil, he retaliated by nationalizing their refineries and then proceeded to take similar action against other American interests.
Fidelistas
The name used for the Cuban revolutionaries under Fidel Castro’s leadership. After a long guerrilla campaign the Fidelistas eventually toppled the Batista regime on 1 January 1959.
The combination of Soviet support, nationalization of American business interests and domestic pressure to remove the ‘cancer’ of communism so near to the shores of Florida prompted both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to initiate — ultimately unsuccessful — actions to remove Castro’s regime. As early as November 1959 the Eisenhower administration had effectively decided that Castro had to be overthrown. In March 1960 Eisenhower signed an executive order authorizing the CIA to train Cuban exiles; meanwhile, Washington instituted a complete trade embargo against Cuba.
Bay of Pigs
The site on 17 April 1961 of an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles opposed to the Castro regime. It had the support of the American government and the CIA was heavily involved in its planning. By 20 April most exiles were either killed or captured. The failed invasion was the first major foreign policy act of the Kennedy administration and provoked anti-American demonstrations in Latin America and Europe and further embittered American-Cuban relations.
In April 1961 the growing Cuban-American antipathy climaxed in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Following the model that had proved to be such a success in Guatemala seven years earlier, the operation was based on the idea that the CIA would train a force of Cuban exiles to invade their homeland and overthrow Castro’s regime. This plan was put together during the last months of the Eisenhower administration and was inherited by the new president, John F. Kennedy, who, having used tough language about Cuba during the presidential campaign, felt that he had to agree to the invasion plan. Accordingly, on 16 April 1961 the CIA-trained force of 1,500 guerrillas landed at the Bay of Pigs, 125 miles (200 kilometres) south of Havana. However, faced with international criticism for allowing American planes to engage in bombing attacks to assist the invaders, Kennedy on the second day of the operation cancelled any further air support with the result that the small Cuban air force quickly destroyed the ships that were carrying vital ammunition supplies for the invaders.
Stranded without adequate supplies, and unable to garner any significant indigenous support, the invaders were either captured or killed by 19 April.see Chapter 11
Although Castro successfully defeated the invasion force, the Bay of Pigs was a clear reminder of the strength of the new American government’s antipathy towards Cuba. Indeed, the failure of the invasion did not keep the Kennedy administration from considering other ways in which to overthrow Castro. The CIA, which lost much of its credibility in the eyes of Kennedy as a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, tried to assassinate the Cuban leader (Operation Mongoose). In the meantime Castro looked towards the USSR for further support. In return, Nikita Khrushchev offered to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, setting the stage for the October 1962 Missile Crisis.
Although it is discussed in more detail above, it is necessary to stress here that, from the Cuban perspective, the crisis yielded both positive and negative results. On the positive side, in return for the Soviet withdrawal of missiles, the Kennedy administration pledged not to try and overthrow the Castro regime by force. Castro could therefore breathe a sigh of relief. However, the negative sideeffects of the crisis were manifold. In particular, the United States continued to pressurize Cuba economically and politically, resulting in the island’s virtual isolation from the rest of the Western Hemisphere. This became increasingly clear as the United States put into practice an ambitious economic aid programme for Latin America.