The weaknesses of the Cain-Hopkins thesis

First of all, as to the definition of imperialism, the statement of Cain and Hopkins is unsatisfactory. They point out that the 'distinguishing feature of imperialism' is that 'it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state'.⁴ There is, of course, a rational element in this statement.

The crucial nature of imperialism is that one state oppresses, exploits and enslaves another. Imperialism means war, political oppression and economic exploitation. If we are to consider the nature of imperialism, we need to look into all its major manifestations. Otherwise, it would be difficult to see the whole picture. Cain and Hopkins have examined little more than one aspect of the economic dimension of the problem. The picture of imperialism they present to the reader is certainly partial. The contradictions and conflicts caused by imperialism are rarely referred to. In their view, British imperialism is much linked with world development and the promotion of civilization and living standards. They state that: 'The empire was a superb arena for gentlemanly endeav­our, the ultimate testing ground for the idea of responsible progress, for the battle against evil, for the performance of duty, and for the achieve­ment of honour.'⁵ This is far removed from the historical facts.

Cain and Hopkins's explanations of the causes of imperialism are equally inadequate and, in a sense, one-sided. It cannot be denied that manufacturing industries were a substantial sector of the British economy for a long time, at least in the nineteenth century. The needs of these industries were important, and surely often the chief impulses behind British imperial expansion. Colonies were not only places where British manufacturers could obtain raw materials, but also places where they could find markets for their products. It is an established fact that colonies were regularly urged to produce raw materials for the needs of Britain's manufacturing industries.

British imperial expansion was pushed not merely by the interests of so-called 'gentlemanly capitalism' which, as Cain and Hopkins have described, was mainly the finance and services sector. These interests certainly played an important role in the formation of British imperial policies and in the expansion of the Empire, but so too did the interests of manufacturers and other social groups. Cain and Hopkins's views are a bit too extreme, overemphasizing the influence of 'gentlemanly cap­italism' and playing down the significance of industrial capitalism in British imperial expansion.

Britain's diplomatic and military efforts to open the door into China were no doubt intended mainly to find markets for British products. For instance, the Macartney embassy, the first British embassy to reach China, was sent to the Qing Court to promote British commercial inter­ests. As the history of this peculiar mission - a dramatic event in the history of Sino-Western relations - has been well researched both by Western and Chinese historians,⁶ it is not necessary to discuss it here in any detail. It will be sufficient to mention Macartney's requests to the Qing Court to reveal the main purpose of the mission.

Opium was smuggled into China largely because British manufac­tured goods could not find a market there large enough to reduce Britain's trade deficit with China. Subsequently, Britain launched the Opium Wars against China to open the market - chiefly for manufac­tured goods. At the time of the Macartney embassy, the interests of the financial and services sector were obviously not yet that important in the making of Britain's China policies.

Later on, when British financial interests did appear on the stage, the interests of 'gentlemanly capitalism' and industrial capitalism were not necessarily divided or in conflict with each other. For instance, British loans to China in the last years of the nineteenth century enabled Britain to take firmer control of China's tariffs. Control of customs duties helped Britain to monopolize China's imports and exports. This in turn enabled Britain to promote exports of British products to, and exports of raw materials from, China.

Doubtless, as Cain and Hopkins have argued, economic impulses are the basic cause of imperialism. But conditions for the existence of imperi­alism are based fundamentally on military power. Without military super­iority, no state can impose imperialist control or colonial rule on others. Industrial technologies strengthened British military capabilities. The advance of industries was the basis of British military superiority, just as military superiority was a precondition of British imperial expansion. It was the Industrial Revolution that provided Britain with military super­iority over China and rendered it possible for the Victorians to 'open the door' by means of the gunboat.

The fact that different parts of the world developed in an unbalanced way, with some areas being more advanced than others, undoubtedly provided a necessary condition for the emergence and continued exist­ence of imperialism. Imperialism was possible because there were weaker territories for the imperialists to invade, oppress and exploit.

At times when capitalism plays a dominant role in international affairs, the rise and fall of imperialism are decided mainly by the power balance among these three elements. At the high point of Western expansion, all the major European states were colonial powers, struggling against each other and endeavouring to establish and expand empires overseas. There was no single 'major power' in the international system to counter­balance or contain colonial expansion. Other non-Western parts of the world were in general the objects of colonialism. Without any check from the anti-colonial 'major powers', the expansionists achieved great success and did enormous mischief to the weaker peoples.

The chief condition for the emergence and expansion of the British Empire was Britain's military superiority over the 'object countries'.

Just as the emergence and expansion of imperialism were decided mainly by the power balance among the three elements, so was the end of imperialism or colonial empires. The Second World War was a land­mark in the history of the Western empires because it changed this balance of power and led to the rapid disintegration of the British Empire. The war weakened Britain both militarily and economically, at least in a relative sense. The forces of anti-colonial nationalism became much stronger during the war. On the international stage, the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower that advocated the end of colonialism and provided support to national liberation movements across the world.

The Soviet factor in the disintegration of colonial empires has long been ignored or deliberately played down by Western historians. Reading publications on the end of the British Empire, one will frequently find historians stressing American pressure for British decol­onization, while saying little about the influence of the Soviet Union. In reality, the United States was, and still is, one of the closest allies of Britain in postwar times and has enjoyed a strong strategic partnership with Britain in international affairs. It was the Soviet Union and other newly established socialist countries that were the major enemies of colonialism and imposed real pressure to end the colonial empires. The rise of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made a historic contribution to the rapid collapse of the colonial empires in the post­war era.

It can be said that the Soviet Union was the greatest international force contributing to the collapse of colonial empires. The establish­ment and development of the Soviet Union led to the spread of communism across the world. Under its influence, communist parties were founded in many colonies and semi-colonies and became a lead­ing force in national liberation movements in many territories. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower and played the key role in the formation of the postwar socialist bloc. The existence of the socialist bloc diverted the military resources of the colo­nial and imperialist powers, thus making the task of suppressing national liberation movements more difficult. The Soviet socialist model was also attractive to many colonial nationalists. Colonial powers were often forced to make concessions to colonial nationalists in order to prevent them from becoming more radical and from turning to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union strongly condemned colonialism and offered great assistance to national liberation movements in the colonies and semi­colonies. For instance, when France occupied Lebanon and Syria in May 1945, the Soviet Union condemned the action and demanded that France withdrew her troops. The Soviet Union consistently supported the colonial and semi-colonial national struggle against colonialism and imperialism in the United Nations and through other diplomatic chan­nels. For instance, in May 1948, the Soviet Union established diplo­matic relations with the young Indonesian Republic. This was a great support for the Indonesian people in their struggle against Dutch colo­nial rule. The Soviet Union also directly provided vast amounts of military and economic assistance to many newly independent countries and helped them to maintain their independence.

Thus, the Soviet factor in the disintegration of colonial empires can­not be ignored. It is an indisputable historical fact. The Soviet Union itself collapsed later on, but without the presence of the first socialist country in human history, independence for colonies and semi-colonies would certainly have been delayed; some of them might never have achieved their freedom. Admittedly, the Soviet Union made mistakes in its policy towards developing countries and also pursued its own hege­monic ambitions. Nonetheless, the Soviet contribution to the world national liberation movement cannot be denied and should not be played down. The rapid change in the balance of power after 1945 led Britain to conduct a wholesale imperial retreat. Britain, like other colonial powers, was primarily forced into action by the international situation, and was not willing to confer independence to the colonies, as Cain and Hopkins and many other historians have suggested.

Cain and Hopkins are not very consistent in explaining the causes of the end of the British empire. On the one hand, they admit that Britain retreated from the colonies because 'nationalist aspirations could not be contained at a price that was worth paying, or perhaps at any price'.¹¹ On the other hand, they claim that 'the empire became progressively less important to Britain's needs and it became easier, even for Conservative policy-makers, to envisage and then to speed the process of decolonization'.¹² This suggests that Britain did not intend to control the colonies and was willing to end the empire. In effect, the whole argument of the theory of 'gentlemanly capitalism' assumes that the Empire ended because it became unnecessary for the gentlemanly capit­alists to continue to control the colonies. Either the colonies had become less useful, or it was unnecessary to maintain formal colonial rule to secure Britain's interests.

This inconsistency can be clearly seen in their explanation of the causes of Britain's retreat from India. They note that India had become 'ungovernable' at the point when Britain conceded independence. At the same time, they assert that:

in 1947 the case for 'staying on' was no longer compelling. By then, India had ceased to be one of Britain's largest debtors and had joined the ranks of her creditors instead, while Britain's newer interest in joint ventures in manufacturing and other economic activities pointed to the wisdom of working with the nationalists rather than against them.¹³

The bare truth, however, is that Britain had to leave India irrespective of her interests and no matter how important or how unimportant the interests of 'gentlemanly capitalism' in India were. This was simply because the forces of Indian nationalism had become too strong for the British to contain. The military force available was unable to deal with the power of nationalism. The British had no choice but to go.

The British Cabinet reached this conclusion when considering India's constitutional position on 10 December 1946:

The strength of the British Forces in India was not great. And the India Army, though the Commander-in-Chief had great personal influence with it, could not fairly be expected to prove a reliable instrument for maintaining public order in conditions tantamount to civil war. One thing was quite certain viz., that we could not put back the clock and introduce a period of firm British rule. Neither the military nor the administrative machine in India was any longer capable of this.¹⁴

There was no controversy here: Britain could not continue to rule India. The problem was how to retreat so as to maintain British interests as far as possible. For this reason, the British government had to 'work with the nationalists'; it was forced by circumstances to do so, whether it was willing or not.

Britain's retreat from Burma can be explained in the same way. The British Cabinet was aware that it was imperative to leave the territory:

All the advice from Burma was that the A.F.P.F.L (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) commanded great influence throughout the coun­try and that if their leaders left the Executive Council the adminis­tration of the country would be paralyzed, there would be a police strike, and it would be impossible to maintain Government without the use of force. Indian troops could not be used for this purpose, and British troops could not be made available without serious con­sequences elsewhere. One brigade could be brought from Malaya. A second brigade could be made available at the cost of weakening our Forces in India or delaying the demobilization scheme. But even so, the administrative troops required to support these brigades would be lacking if, as must be assumed, we were unable to use the Indian administrative troops now in Burma. Finally, even if these could have been provided, it would not be possible with this strength to do more than hold Rangoon and a few other key points; and the countryside generally would be outside our control.¹⁵

This conclusion clearly reveals the reason for Britain's retreat from Burma. Whether the gentlemanly capitalists were willing or not, colonial rule in Burma could not continue. That colonial rule could no longer be maintained by force was the basic reason for the so-called 'decolonization'.