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What does decolonization mean?

Decolonization is a widely used concept both inside and outside aca­demic circles, but its meaning is still ambiguous and controversial. Some commentators use 'decolonization' to mean the process by which empires disintegrate and colonies achieve independence.

Scholars in developing countries now often consider decolonization as a process of struggle for ending colonial rule. From this vantage point, decoloniza­tion means liberating colonies, whereas in the West it usually means granting independence. I take the view, here and in my other publica­tions, that the substance of decolonization is the actions of the colonial power, including all the strategies, tactics and measures used in the course of a forced imperial retreat, which were taken with the intention of maintaining its own interests.16 This concept differs from that of Cain and Hopkins.

Colonial powers were never willing to 'decolonize' (give independ­ence to colonies); they only retreated from colonies because they were forced to do so by the national liberation movement and other forces that were opposed to colonialism. The end of the British Empire was not determined by the will of Britain, though Britain did command a cer­tain initiative in the course of the imperial retreat. To some extent, Britain could manage how and to whom power would be transferred. In this respect, British policymakers showed a considerable degree of flexi­bility and also achieved a great deal of success. Various efforts were made to contain 'radical' nationalists, and power was transferred, wher­ever possible, to the more 'moderate' nationalists who showed more readiness to co-operate with the colonial power.

Here is one example. In April 1953 Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party won the general election in British Guiana under a new constitution. Jagan became Prime Minister, but because he supported some socialist principles he was considered to be 'radical' by the British Government.

In October 1953, a state of emergency was declared and the constitution was suspended. Jagan and many other members of the People's Progressive Party were put into jail. In December 1956, with certain revisions of the constitution, a new election was held. Jagan's People's Progressive Party again won the majority of the elected members. But the suspension of the constitution in 1953 helped to split the nationalists. The split later became a serious problem and led to social conflict. There was another election in August 1961. Once more, the People's Progressive Party won a majority: 20 seats out of 35, with Burnham's People's National Congress getting 11 seats and D'Aguiar's United Force getting 4. But the People's Progressive Party gained only 42.6 per cent of the total vote, while the People's National Congress and the United Force gained 41 per cent and 16.4 per cent respectively. There were sharp differences between the People's Progressive Party and the other two parties. The latter requested that a new election, based on proportional representa­tion, should be held before independence. Burnham and D'Aguiar were considered to be moderate and less radical than Jagan. Thus indepen­dence was postponed. In 1964 the British government issued a new Order in Council revising British Guiana's constitution. Proportional representation was adopted and a new election took place in December 1964. The People's Progressive Party won 24 seats out of 53, while the People's National Congress and the United Force got 22 and 7 seats respectively. The People's Progressive Party did not win the majority and the other two parties refused to co-operate with it. Thus Burnham was asked by the Governor to form a government. In the end, the People's Progressive Party was 'out of power' and British Guiana became independent in May 1966 with Burnham as the first Prime Minister of Guyana.17 This story illustrates vividly that Britain did have an ability to direct the transfer of power in the course of her imperial retreat, and power was transferred preferably to the more moderate nationalists.

The core of decolonization was the transfer of power and the transi­tion of relations. In the course of the imperial retreat, Britain's strategy was to establish new relations with the emergent or newly independent countries which could maintain the old relations as far as possible and thus ensure the continuity of British interests. Part of this strategy was to bring newly independent countries into the Commonwealth. This was a long-term policy of British governments. As the Commonwealth Secretary put it in September 1954:

However uncomfortable it may be to have some of the emergent ter­ritories as full Commonwealth partners, we are quite clear that the wiser course is to admit them to a status of nominal equality, and seek from the start to ensure that, through sharing in that intimate exchange of views and information on foreign policy which marks relations between Members of the Commonwealth, they will remain within our own sphere of influence...the existence of a Commonwealth composed of like-minded, independent and freely associating Members drawn from every continent, is a source of strength and prestige for the United Kingdom.18

In this way, the British government achieved great successes and most newly independent countries became members of the Commonwealth. As a result, British interests were largely secured and established rela­tions largely maintained.

Neocolonialism, which Cain and Hopkins admit, 'can undoubtedly be found in parts of the former empire' did indeed manifest itself in the course of the imperial retreat.19 Decolonization can be considered as a transitional process from colonialism to neocolonialism. What consti­tutes neocolonialism is another topic on which my colleagues and I have recently published a book.20

For a variety of reasons, the strength of nationalism was not equal in different colonial territories. The upsurge of the national liberation movement thus arrived earlier in one territory than in another.

This is why some territories obtained independence before others. Generally speaking, wherever the national liberation movement was strong, the imperial retreat took place earlier than where it was weak. This explains why the major territories of South Asia became inde­pendent in the years immediately following the Second World War, whereas most colonies in Africa did not achieve independence until the 1960s.

The colonial empires collapsed in the three decades following the Second World War. The British Empire was no exception. The funda­mental reason for this was that, in the postwar period, there was an unprecedented upsurge of nationalism across the colonies and semi­colonies and also a high tide of the international communist move­ment, which was a strong force against colonialism. These developments led to a great change in the international power balance. All colonial powers, whether or not they had a 'gentlemanly capitalist' element which played a similar role to its British counterpart, had to 'decolonize'. They all faced the same external pressures.

In the last pages of their work, Cain and Hopkins make a brief obser­vation about the implications of their analysis for the study of rival imperialist powers, especially those in Europe. But they do not take the matter further. They admit that they could not 'decide whether the particular configuration of interests we have identified was both present and of equal importance elsewhere, or whether it was specific to the British case'. 'The reason for the difficulty is simply that the evidence currently available is insufficiently detailed to allow generalizations to be made with confidence.'21 This kind of elusive statement offers no help in understanding why all colonial empires collapsed so rapidly at the same time. Historians need to be aware that there must be some overwhelming force outside the metropolitan powers that pushed the empires to their end.

Cain and Hopkins made only a partial investigation into 'decoloniza­tion'.

Many issues concerned with the postwar imperial retreat were not even touched. If we consider all the major issues as a whole, financial problems were only a part, perhaps only a small part, of the British gov­ernment's concerns. A basic strategy of Britain's imperial retreat was to establish a new relationship with the newly independent countries, which would ensure, as far as possible, a continuation of the old rela­tions. A major aim of this strategy was to keep the newly independent countries within the Commonwealth and within the 'free world' when the Cold War was at its height. To maintain financial relations so as to secure the interests of 'gentlemanly capitalism' was only a part of this strategy.

When we look into the treaties and agreements signed between Britain and the emergent territories or newly independent countries in the course of imperial retreat, we find that most of them were not con­cerned with financial issues.22 A great number were related to military or strategic affairs; they were about the maintenance of British military bases and the status of British troops stationed in the territories con­cerned, or about British military assistance to the newly independent countries, for instance, providing military facilities and helping to train the armed forces of the countries concerned.23

The other major group of agreements signed between Britain and the emergent territories at the time of independence concerned public service. Almost all the territories signed such agreements with Britain. The first one was the British-Ceylon Public Officers Agreement. This agreement was very short, only a few hundred words, but it contained the basic elements that later agreements also had.24 These agreements usually had clear definitions about qualifications, conditions of service and retirement, and the preservation, payment and increase of pensions. There were also provisions on the release of public officers for employment elsewhere.

These agreements ensured pensions for public officers who had worked in the colonies and who would continue to work in the newly independent countries. They tended to encourage public officers to stay in these countries. The chief purpose of these agreements was to ensure a stable transition of the established relations.

There were indeed agreements of a financial nature. But they were mainly concerned with the sterling balances, signed mainly between Britain and the South Asian territories: India, Pakistan and Ceylon. These agreements set the conditions whereby sterling balances held in London would be gradually released. The first financial agreement of this kind (between India and Britain) came into force on 31 August 1947 and terminated on 31 December 1947. The agreement was extended or replaced by new ones until the 1950s, when the problem of the sterling balances was finally resolved. Afterwards, there were few similar agree­ments signed between Britain and other emergent territories.

If we look through the conclusions of postwar British Cabinet meet­ings, which are available in the Public Record Office (CAB 128), we will find that financial issues between Britain and the emergent territories were not often discussed in Cabinet meetings. Apart from the matter of the colonial sterling balances, only a few entries were directly linked with colonial financial issues. The following is one example. On 26 July 1960, in a meeting on overseas civil service:

there was general agreement in the Cabinet that in present circum­stances high priority must be given to the maintenance of an effi­cient system of administration in Colonies advancing towards independence. In recent experience in Africa and in Asia there was ample evidence that without this, the structure of society in emer­gent countries could easily collapse. This could imply, not merely a failure of our Colonial Policy, but serious damage to our investment in those countries - which would impose a much more serious strain on our balance of payments.25

The British government here showed a great concern with financial issues. Even so, this concern should not be considered to be solely in the interests of 'gentlemanly capitalism'. Rather, it represented the whole of Britain's economic interests.

British governments did take into consideration the interests of British investments in colonies that were approaching independence. Again, however, this was only a part of governmental concerns. It can be seen from British Cabinet discussions of the colonies down to the late 1960s, that there were more entries on constitutional reform, colo­nial services, and the development of colonial resources and military affairs, such as emergencies and defence. Financial issues regarding the colonies were not frequently discussed in Cabinet meetings. Of course, many financial issues were dealt with at the departmental level, but this means that what was then discussed by the Cabinet was of some importance.

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Source: Akita Shigeru. Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.,2002. — 279 p.. 2002

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