Towards the Pacific War

A possible way out of its dilemma was provided by news from Europe. In May and June 1940 Germany seized control of Holland, forced France to surrender, and threatened to extinguish British resistance.

Vichy France

The regime led by Marshal Petain that surrendered to Hitler's Germany in June 1940 and subsequently controlled France until liberation in 1944.

Konoe chose as his foreign minister the controversial figure of Yosuke Matsuoka. Matsuoka acted quickly to increase Japan's influence in South-East Asia. On 1 August he announced that Japan intended to construct a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. This was rapidly followed by the sending of an economic mission to the Dutch East Indies and an agreement with the Vichy French regime in Indochina to allow the stationing of Japanese troops in Tonkin. In addition, in autumn 1940 and into early 1941 he attempted to increase Japan's influence in South-East Asia by mediating in a border dispute between Thailand and French Indochina. On the global scale he signed a Tripartite Pact with the Axis Powers on 27 September, which was designed to keep America from intervening either in Europe or in Asia by threatening it with the possibility of having to fight a two-front war.

This new assertiveness did not, however, have the intended effect on the United States and Britain, for not only did they refuse to acquiesce, they also began to take retaliatory action. The cause was not only the provocative nature of Japanese actions, but also the fact that South-East Asia's raw materials were vital for the British war effort against Germany and for American rearmament, and thus had to be protected. On 26 September Washington retaliated against the move into North Indochina by announcing a ban on the export of scrap metal and petroleum capable of conversion into aviation fuel. Britain followed suit and over the next months pressed the Americans to go further and jointly introduce a concerted policy of economic warfare against Japan. Finally, in February 1941, after rumours

that Japan was about to negotiate control over military bases in South Indochina and Thailand, the United States responded to British pressure. Over the next few months an economic noose was constructed around Japan, which involved limiting its ability to trade with not only the British Empire and the United States, but also Latin America and the Middle East. The only major commodity that remained untouched was oil. In addition, regional defence talks began between the British Empire, the Americans and the Dutch, along with collaboration over intelligence and propaganda issues.

The situation by the spring of 1941 was therefore that, although Japan had managed to strengthen its position, it had not removed the obstacles to its expansion. Two further gambits were in store. First, in March 1941 talks were begun in Washington by Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura with Secretary of State Cordell Hull in order to try to find a solution to American-Japanese differences. Second, on his way back from a visit to Europe to meet with Hitler and Mussolini, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow to sign a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, which in theory freed Japan to concentrate upon southern expansion.

As a result of the American ability to read the Japanese diplomatic code, Washington was aware of the decisions taken at the Imperial Conference. Fearing that either an advance south against British interests or an attack north on the Soviet Union would assist the German war effort, Roosevelt decided that the occupation of South Indochina should be used as a justification for the intro­duction of restrictions on oil exports to Japan. Whether Roosevelt intended to introduce a complete embargo or whether one was implemented by bureaucratic error is still a matter of debate, but what is clear is that after the Japanese move into South Indochina in late July, its oil imports dried up. Japan was now faced with a grave dilemma: before its oil supplies ran dry, it had to make a choice between trying to find an acceptable diplomatic settlement with the United States or seizing the raw materials of South-East Asia, including the oil of the Dutch East Indies, which would involve war with both America and Britain.

Typically Japan pursued both goals; it prepared for war while simultaneously attempting to find a way out through negotiations. The problem with this strategy was that the bellicosity of Japan's military movements naturally contradicted its avowed belief that a diplomatic solution could be achieved. Further undermining the diplomatic route was the fact that Western faith in Japan's sincerity was already limited, owing to the fact that the latter remained allied to Nazi Germany, and was collaborating with the Axis over intelligence, propaganda and trade issues.

while Japan became increasingly desperate to reach a settlement, American policy rested on extending the Hull-Nomura talks for as long as possible. Washington’s hope was that, while the negotiations were in progress, the United States and Britain could use their economic and military power to tip the balance of power in the Pacific against Japan and thus deter it from going to war.

The Western belief in the efficacy of this policy rested on two false assumptions derived largely from a faulty interpretation of intelligence. First, there was a conviction that the Japanese armed forces were of indifferent quality. They had, after all, failed to win the war in China and appeared to possess technologically backward weapons compared with those available in the West. The second factor was that it was held that the Japanese were aware of their relative weakness and that this heightened their innate cautiousness. Thus while Japan might threaten to take dire action, it was believed that, in all likelihood, this was bluff. Con­sequently it was held that the current Anglo-American military presence in the region, along with the promise of gradual reinforcements in the shape ofAmerican bombers and British capital ships, was a sufficient deterrent to Japanese aggression.

In these circumstances the Hull-Nomura talks stood little chance of success. The West felt that it had little reason to compromise because of its misreading of the military balance, while Japan was not prepared to make satisfactory con­cessions to the United States, particularly in regard to the conclusion of the war in China. Faced with the lack of a diplomatic escape route, the government of General Hideki Tojo, which had taken office in October 1941, felt that it had no choice but to go to war and hope that a series of rapid victories, allied with German successes in Europe, would force the democracies into a compromise peace in the Pacific. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation.