Traders and Labourers
If there was a concentration of focus in mid-twentieth- century professional histories of the Indian Ocean it lay in debates about how to characterise the trading world of this sea.
The rival traditions are best illustrated in the differing emphases of two India-focussed historians: Kirti Chaudhuri and Ashin Das Gupta. Chaudhuri turned to the Indian Ocean after writing on the East India Company as an economically logical institution.[114] He repeatedly paid homage to Fernand Braudel. Das Gupta, however, began not with the European expansion but with a focus on Asian maritime merchants based on the Malabar coast as they encountered the Portuguese and the Dutch.For Das Gupta, the impact of Europe was said at first to be minimal. Rather the resurgence of ports and communities was tied to the restructuring of inter-Asian trade with the rise of newly centralised polities - such as Travancore. Accordingly, ‘the maritime empire of Portugal gradually became a part of the structure of medieval Asian trade’ and the Dutch who followed, ‘carried on trade much as any Asian merchant with a substantial capital to invest would have done’.[115] For Das Gupta, though the British played a role in explaining the end of this story, he was as keen to trace, for instance in his work on Surat, the breakdown of Indian polities, the changing profitability of trade and the impoverishment of merchant communities. In locating local agency, in contrast to Chaudhuri’s quantification and systematisation, Das Gupta turned to the human face of trade. In the case of Surat, Mulla Abdul Ghafur stood as a gauge of the whole: a ship-owner, merchant and Bhora, who might be compared in worth to a European company and who turned against the Dutch in the late seventeenth century by declaring a crusade against the firangis for the piracy and plunder of Indian ships, including his own and pilgrim ships too.[116]
As he stretched back in time and filled out his schema, Chaudhuri took up the impact of Vasco da Gama and wrote of the Portuguese desire for systematic control of the spice trade, connected to the cartaz system of passes issued to Indian ships and ‘redistributive enterprise’, which was then followed by the Dutch who were drawn to South Asia for its cottons and also indigo, saltpetre, silk, cinnamon and pepper.
The innovation brought about by the Dutch and the English rested in a common structural form. This was the world-spanning joint-stock company, and in India it was manifest in ‘a head settlement or factory situated at or near some major Indian port with subordinate stations in the interior where many of the export goods were produced’. Some Dutch bases lay at Surat, Cochin, Pulicut, Negapatam, Musilipatam and Hugli and the English of course set up what became their key bases, in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, as part of a ‘general plan to make the Company’s trade independent of the political power of the indigenous rulers’. If there was a resurgence of trade, in Chaudhuri’s view this came about not because of indigenous political changes but because of the participation of Europeans in the eighteenth century, lubricated by Latin American silver. The emphasis on control of quality and regular delivery marked this moment off as novel. All of this led to the crescendo of the Battle of Plassey in 1757, which Chaudhuri saw as a ‘revolution’.[117]Despite their differences over the dynamic oftransition to European rule and the reasons for a resurgence in trade at the advent of the Europeans, both these scholars shared a commitment to the Indian Ocean world as a unit. Drawing on world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, and allegedly going beyond Braudel to a purer kind of structuralism, Chaudhuri wrote of a ‘life cycle’ in the capitalist world economy from the ‘rise of Islam to 1750’ linking ‘Indian ocean civilisations’. The equation here pivoted on the spread of Islam from Alexandria to Canton, but also the migration of ‘nomads from Central Asia’ who founded Eurasian empires and the extending reach of China to the Indian Ocean.[118] It was summarised as the combination of ‘Islam, Sanskritic India, the societies of southeast Asia, and finally Confucian China’.[119] Meanwhile, Das Gupta wrote of a ‘high medieval’ Indian Ocean. Picking up the resilient role played by merchants, he cast the period from 1500 to 1800 as an ‘age of partnership’.[120] Relatedly, Southeast Asian historiography has presented the region as experiencing an ‘age of commerce’ from 1400 to 1650 followed by de-commercialisation, while others have looked to 1400 to 1800 as an ‘Asian age’, where global trade pivoted on the Indian ocean.[121]
If the classification of the Indian Ocean as a terrain of globalisation, grew out of work on India, recent approaches seek to break it down into granular detail, moving away from the ‘system’ of the Indian Ocean.
One way to do this is to stretch the chronology into the twentieth century, bypassing the question of the impact of European empires: ‘from about 1800 to 1930 pre-existing interregional networks were utilized, moulded, reordered, and rendered subservient by Western capital and the more powerful colonial states, but never torn apart’.[122] To argue this is to trace the world of migrant merchants, moneylenders, soldiers and labourers, working beneath and beyond the radar of formal empires. In one well- worked recent case study, from the middle of the eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth century, Gujarati merchants expanded their connection to Mozambique, finding African consumers for their woven cloths and ably predicting changes in taste for styles and patterns and thus overtaking European traders. In return for cloth these merchants traded in ivory, but also in slaves.[123]Yet stretching chronology is not the only route. Another related method comes from shifting to new geographies and smaller seas. In the Bay of Bengal, for instance, prior connections were transformed but not in a singular fashion in the period after the ‘age of commerce’. For the second half of the seventeenth century saw an intensification of commercial relations with China, arising out of agricultural expansion in Southeast Asia.[124] This intensification went together with a disconnection of the Malay courts from northern Indian Mughal ports as a result of the encroachment of European corporations. But Muslims from Southern India, such as the Maraikkayar, or indeed Afghans, connected the subcontinent to southeast Asia. At the northern end of the Bay of Bengal, Arakan and Pegu ceased to be points of transit between India and Southeast Asia turning to their hinterlands. The Dutch made inroads by taking Makassar or Banten, at the end of the seventeenth century, but further to the west their control continued to be less pronounced. Eric Tagliacozzo takes the story forward: ‘Well into the seventeenth century Southeast Asian rulers on the whole had to be much more concerned with their own internecine struggles than with European rivalry, but by the 1760s Anglo-Dutch competition in the region (punctuated by British demands for free trade) launched a new spectre of territorial conquest.’[125]
A similarly layered story is now emerging out of the Persian Gulf.
Here, longstanding connections between Arab and Indian commerce, tied to the need for timber, cotton and rice, for instance in the Gulf, and horses, silk and dates in India, were reconfigured, but not without leaving space for new successor regimes, perhaps most notably the Omani sultanate, which rode the waves of European commerce into the nineteenth century. The surge in commerce in the Persian Gulf came about at the crossroads of two declining empires - the Safavids, who gave way to the Qajars, and the Ottomans. By the end of the eighteenth century this surge included such sea-based trades as pearls, wool and opium. It relied on increasing numbers of Indian merchant communities and moneylenders in Muscat and Mutrah in Oman.[126] This trade required labour - which also came via the ocean - primarily slaves from East Africa. The slave trade benefitted from the growing political alliance between Oman and Zanzibar.[127] Slavery itself was reconstituted as a result of the rise of these maritime trades in the Gulf: it shifted from being primarily domestic and agricultural to being connected for example, with pearling, with loading and unloading at port and with work aboard dhows or other ocean-goingcraft.Slaving in the Gulf takes us neatly to a related theme of debate in Indian Ocean studies. If Chaudhuri and Das Gupta were operating in the shadow of Mediterranean historiography, the push and pull of the Atlantic is evident in the contest over characterisations of labour in the Indian Ocean. The field began with an insistence that Indian Ocean slavery was distinct in form and character to the Atlantic. Accordingly, the difference between freedom and unfreedom was blurred in the Indian Ocean, and most labourers entered slavery through indebtedness. The range of work undertaken by slaves was said to be wider than in the Atlantic and often non-agricultural: ‘porters in Imperial Madagascar could sometimes earn an income that made them the envy of ordinary non-slaves’.[128] This meant that major rebellions were exceptions and sought to reform rather than overthrow bondage.
In this framework, slavery in the Indian Ocean could not be ‘understood fully in terms of “open” and “closed” systems, characterised respectively by slave assimilation into the dominant society and exclusion from it’. Indeed women slaves could have exalted status in the Indian Ocean world as concubines and wives, superior to female peasants. The chronology and geography of Indian Ocean slavery was different. It linked maritime and overland routes and ran from ‘before the Common Era’ into the twentieth century and even to the present. It expanded in numerical terms in the nineteenth century at a time of colonial abolitionism, because of the expansion of the Omani, Merina, Ethiopian and Egyptian states.[129] Even though the intent of this argument was to release the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic model and to attend to plurality - in practice it also flattened the differences within the Indian Ocean in generalisations such as this: ‘for most IOA [Indian Ocean Africa] and Asian populations, security, food and shelter rather than an abstract concept of liberty, were the primary aims’.[130] In other words, it borrowed from the structuralism of the likes of Chaudhuri.[131]Different work seeks to multiply the kinds of slavery in particular locales. Take for instance the Cape Colony. In the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cape, the rise of a capitalist order under the Dutch East India Company depended on large numbers of slaves brought from across the Indian Ocean, from Madagascar and Mozambique, Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Africa. Yet in popular memory this diversity was often lost, with the application of unitary labels such as ‘coloured’ or the essentialisation of ‘Cape Malay’, effacing the variety of people that lay beneath such categories. Contrary to the view of those who wish to qualify the extent of coercion experienced by slaves in the Indian Ocean: ‘the isolation of many farmsteads in a society in which male slaves greatly outnumbered male colonists led to a level of control and coercion which at local levels could be violent and extreme’.
This generated resistance, sometimes drawing on Islam and often including escape. In turn the culture of slavery was expanded in rural contexts to include Khoisan labourers and took on a politics of race.[132] Dutch Cape Town saw an especial concentration of slaves, which was in line with the demography of Dutch ports like Batavia or Colombo. In the eighteenth century, intrigu- ingly, slaves from South and later Southeast Asia outnumbered those from Madagascar in Cape Town.[133] Further new work on the history of the slave trade at Cape Town at the end of the eighteenth century places it within a network stretching from the southwest Indian Ocean to Brazil and Europe. Portuguese traders, as well as French and Spanish operatives, supplied slaves to Cape settlers, and this trade operated beyond the control of British colonial surveillance and abolitionist ideology into the nineteenth century. Strikingly, given earlier anti-Atlanticism in this field, Patrick Harries uses an Atlantic concept to describe it: a ‘trans-Atlantic Middle Passage’.[134]Thinking with the 1830s, allows another lineage for debates about slavery in the Indian Ocean and one which precedes the push and pull of Mediterranean and Atlantic historiography. In this period, humanitarians questioned whether Indian indentured labour constituted a new kind of slavery. More than one million Indian indentured labourers serviced plantations such as sugar, coffee, cocoa, rubber and tea in the period between 1826 and 1920. The comparison with slavery echoed in historiographical terms down into the 1970s, most notably in Hugh Tinker’s A new system of slavery (1974), generating ‘a degree of conceptual complacency’.[135] In this framework labourers were victimised like slaves and they filled the gap left by slavery in the Caribbean, and a further revision urged that the model of their contracts paralleled the use of European indentured servants in the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and saw rather the exercise of some consent.[136] Yet it is now clear that the test case for indentured labour was not in the Atlantic, but Mauritius, the colony that received the largest number of indentured labourers through the entire period: Mauritius has seen a concentration of historical scholarship on indenture.[137] Here South Asian models of slavery, caste and agricultural bondage fed into indenture. In addition, emerging work shows how the East India Company had experimented with the use of Chinese labour in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, via Penang and Canton and stretching to St Helena and Trinidad, establishing a template for South Asian indenture. This once again stretches the history of labour practice in the Indian Ocean further east rather than into the Atlantic.
Instead of comparing and contrasting Atlantic slavery and indenture, newer work brings to light the intermediate spaces between types of labour: recovering freed slaves and apprentices, the migratory patterns, ship-board journeys, gendered lives and ‘subaltern voices’ of indentured labourers and lascars and convicts.[138] The turn away from discussions of consent, rights and victimhood towards discourse, governance, experience and culture has allowed the intriguing argument that convicthood and indenture operated in a shared mental world for Indians: the ocean journey was kala pani or black water, denoting caste pollution, through the necessity for shared eating and living on ships. The use of this term to describe indentured journeys out of India came via its currency as a descriptor of Indian convict transportation.[139] From a different perspective, seeking not to blur categories but to work beyond the slavery/ indenture dichotomy, Megan Vaughan’s history of labour in eighteenthcentury Mauritius ends with a recovery of apprenticeship, where slaves were tied to their masters after abolition in 1834 for six years and then became small-holders of land, before becoming a marginalised or ‘cre- olised’ community, in the midst of the surge of numbers of Indian indentured labourers and the forgetting of African and Malagasy pasts. Just as with work on the Cape, this is an attempt then to pluralise the cultural spaces of labour - in a landscape where indentured historiography can easily cover too much ground or be taken to stand for everything.[140]
In place of a concern with quantification, and reminiscent of how Das Gupta focussed on individuals in the history of trade, these approaches recover what has recently been termed ‘subaltern biography’ critically set in maritime context. The ability of workers to move between categories and to exercise creative agency, shifting from docks to ships and from farms to ports is now of interest.[141] Spatial and cultural geography is being turned inside out. Historians are both breaking away from or moving towards the Atlantic or shifting histories of connection by swapping nodal points in the network, replacing India with China, or emphasising South Asia instead of Southeast Asia, or re-centring Africa instead of South Asia as a cultural resource for labourers’ memory. The plantation is seen less as a singular complex, while the sea is coming into closer view as a scape of labour. Across the Indian Ocean and elsewhere lascar sea-men manned ships, ranging from Pacific whalers to convict transportation ships to Bengkulu, Penang and the Andaman islands or ships of war in the Napoleonic wars. In the age of sail, this included vessels which were East Indiamen and ‘country’ or India-built ships. In the age of steam and into the world wars, the Indian maritime worker, recently described as ‘India’s earliest global workers’ travelled across the world, navigating and defining race, nation and empire and interrogating the terms of globalisation.[142] It is their political voice and protest which is proving to be of recent interest: between the 1780s and the Indian Rebellion there were about thirty serious disturbances aboard merchant vessels which could be classed as lascar mutinies.[143] More spectacular in turn was the sight of ships burning in Indian ports as the reported result of lascar action in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1847, in a list of burnt ships appeared this entry:
The ship Bombay Castle, Capt. Frazer, burnt off Sangor Island, 27th May 1846, burnt till daylight, captain, passengers, and most of the crew saved by vessels in company. - Bound to China; cargo cotton, fire discovered about midnight; every reason to believe the loss of this fine ship was owing to the diabolical conduct of some the crew. Several lives lost - Lascars took a raft.[144]
To summarise, those who write the economic history of commodities such as Indian cloth or Persian Gulf pearls or labourers on the move, have sought at times to unite the Indian Ocean as a system, or to unify the trades and labourers of this ocean, but others have pulled the ocean apart, dividing it and its peoples, insisting on the need to decentre particular networks, to return to a focus on violence and rebellion, or in turn to look out from the Indian Ocean to newer routes. The excitement of interpreting a source like that above could stand for the broader questions in Indian Ocean histories of trade or labour: colonial vision and impact or plural geographies, agencies and times? There is in accounts of trade and labour, a characteristic restlessness, evident elsewhere too in Indian ocean histories.
More on the topic Traders and Labourers:
- IS SMALL BEAUTIFUL?65
- The British in the Coral Sea: Fiji
- The Danish colonial project on the Gold Coast
- Index
- Solomon Islands