Violence in Inner Asian Politics

Nomads in an ‘imperial condition' were, in theory, less exposed to random or organised violence than ‘stateless' nomads. Internal discipline, unified leader­ship under a single family or clan endowed with a monopolistic power over the government and army, and the development of new institutions and legal regimes contributed to a large reduction of violence within the social body, and to the suppression of self-reproducing violence.

It is undoubtedly true that succession was one of the most delicate moments in the political existence of nomadic empires, although recent studies have shown that succession was similarly bloody and contested in other East Asian contexts, not affected by nomadic practices.^[40] What may be more relevant here is the weakness of emperorship as an institution, which made a model of rulership based on absolute sovereignty easier to challenge. The absence of firm rules made successions open to fissures in the political system that could lead to a coup d’etat and other forms of violent usurpation even in cases in which the heir apparent had been chosen. The discrepancy between actual authority and institutional legitimacy derived from the very rise of the charismatic power of the founding ruler, who was regarded as endowed with demigod qualities, and indeed ‘chosen by heaven'.

The rise of charismatic leaders itself is often associated with parricide and fratricide, but it was the problem of succession that created vicious political crises, whereby not just the destiny of an individual but the integrity of the newly created state was at stake. In medieval China, the Tuoba Xianbei, a northern people hailing from Manchuria that conquered northern China as the Northern Wei dynasty (386-534) introduced a peculiar system that involved the matricide of imperial consorts who had given birth to an imperial heir. Once the mother had been killed, no other potential heirs would be born, thus excluding challenges to the succession process.^[41] That particular type of violence did not take root in either the Inner Asian or the Chinese traditions, but it shows in stark terms the degree to which succession issues were critical to a raison d’etat that did not hesitate to resort to human (female) sacrifices.

Aristocratic women participated in politics as wives and mothers of rulers, and in several cases queens took the reins of the succession process, often avoiding political crises at the cost of personal sacrifice. In the Mongol empire, the roles of Toregene Qatun and Sorqaqtani Beki cannot be overestimated. The first, mother of Güyük Khan and temporary regent after the khan's death, and the second, widow of Tolui and mastermind of the Toluid takeover of the empire from the Ogodei line, resulted in the rise of her sons Mongke, Khubilai, Hülegü and Arig Boke as future leaders of the empire, except for the Golden Horde and the Chagadai ulus.

Before the Mongols, dangerous succession crises were not uncommon among Inner Asian regimes. In the Uighur empire, which took over in 744 the mantle of imperial dignity after the collapse of the second Turk empire, a coup d’etat was perpetrated by the chief minister Tun Bagha in 779, who assassi­nated the khagan Mouyu. The struggle in this case cannot be regarded as one of succession but was a violent takeover of the leadership because of political dissent regarding the khagan's policy towards China and the excessive influence of Sogdians in government. In 795 another minister ascended to the throne, because of the lack of an imperial heir.^[43]

This is not to say that every succession had to be soaked in blood and fratricidal struggles, but that, given the weakness of the succession process, political contestations could easily devolve into violence. However, it would be mistaken to believe that violence, or ‘bloody tanistry', was the default method of resolving political disputes. One case in which negotiation suc­cessfully avoided conflict was when the Jurchen Jin emperor Wuqimai, who had succeeded the state's founder Aguda, had to appoint the heir apparent. The system favoured a lateral succession (brother to brother) but the com­plex family landscape pitted various potential candidates one against the other. Eventually, it was determined that a very young grandson of Aguda be appointed as the new emperor, bypassing various uncles and cousins who had theoretical priority.^[44]

Political dexterity also managed to prevent a major state crisis in the case of the Liao succession to Abaoji.

While political skills could avoid a bloodbath, the possibility of inter­necine factional wars flared often in the history of Inner Asian regimes. Yet violent competition was not inevitable. It was, rather, a last resort within a political system that was relatively fragile, given the ample space for political manoeuvre afforded to clan members and military leaders. In theory, a weak imperial institution was meant to prevent the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the ruler, but in practice it allowed succession to be subject to complex negotiations, which could degenerate into violence. Political solutions were often sought to over­come the dangers presented by the clashes among various factions both within the imperial clan and outside, such as military commanders and aristocratic leaders.

Several Inner Asian states made concerted efforts to curb the violence inherent in court politics and the centrifugal tendencies generated by political factionalism. Such efforts were directed as an often radical remaking of the elites. Thus, in several regimes we see an internal transformation of the top political echelons aimed at employing a Chinese-like bureaucracy to com­pensate for the power of the tribal aristocracy. This balancing act was exceedingly complex, since it was easy to err on either side: an excess of reliance on foreign traditions and institutions could easily trigger nativistic responses - as we see often both in the Liao and in the Jin dynasty - and could also reduce the army's efficacy. On the other hand, retaining a nomadic tradition of rulership, based on the primacy of the hereditary aristocracy, could make leadership vulnerable to civil wars and rebellions. Only after 1500, and most significantly with the rise of the Manchus and the establishment of the Qing dynasty, was a traditional Inner Asian regime able to transform itself into a system of government that successfully resolved the contradictions that underlay so much of the political violence experienced in earlier periods.