Violence within Inner Asian Societies

All successful empire-building enterprises by nomadic leaders are preceded by an escalation of violence and militarisation within the steppe society. The reasons for the escalation from what we might regard as low-level family feuds to much larger tribal conflicts are not clear, but it is possible that scarcity of resources caused by periodic climatic events may have acted as accelerators of political crises, leading to a higher frequency of conflicts in society.

The reasons for specific confrontations within a nomadic setting are typi­cally difficult to identify, and the sources in our possession can hardly be regarded as objective witness to history. In the Secret History of the Mongols - doubtless the most important single document that provides an in-depth view of steppe politics - we find several examples of violence in contexts that explain the rationale behind it. While the narrative is couched in a literary style narrating epic feats that cannot be regarded as faithful historical record, several episodes are indicative of the cultural significance of violence within medieval Mongol society. For instance, two foundational episodes of violence in the life of the young Chinggis Khan, then Temujin, illuminate a kind of violence that must have been common in the steppe. The assassination of Temujin’s father Yesugei, by another tribe’s members, and Temujin slaying of his own half­brother Bekhter are indicative of the existence of a pervasive, endemic level of violence.^[27]

The first episode refers to a feud between Yesugei’s clan and the Tatars.

The second episode refers to competition between siblings to assert claims of seniority, which could arise very early in their life. Temüjin's cold-blooded assassination of his older half-brother following a minor dispute was meant to show that violence was a means to asserting one's own primacy within the family, and thus establish a sort of political hierarchy. The reaction of Temüjin's mother, which condemned the assassination and pleaded for the unity of her children, was meant to provide a political lesson, more than a moral one. That type of pragmatism appears to be constantly present in steppe politics, and violence should be proportionate to the ends that one aims to achieve.

The kidnapping of Borte, Temüjin's wife, at the hands of the Merkits exemplifies another type of violence, exacted in retribution for a previous kidnapping by Temüjin's father. Taken as brides in an act of revenge, or as booty in war, women were the frequent victims of the culture of vendettas that pervaded Inner Asian nomadic societies. Violence was widespread because it was also regarded as legitimate, and, in fact, required by a sense of honour and self-respect that could not allow a slight to remain unpunished. Retribution had to be exacted according to an ‘eye-for-an-eye' sense ofjustice that in reality prolonged and extended violence across generations.

Two considerations emerge from these examples. The first is that feuds and vendettas constituted a low-level endemic violence. Avenging a wrong was probably the single most important cause of conflict, and, to the extent that revenge was understood to be a sacred duty of the political community, it was accepted as a legitimate casus belli.

The Liaoshi presents Abaoji, founder of the Kitan empire, as a fair ruler who ‘made the rewards and punishments equitable and abstained from wanton military campaigns'.^[28] Before him, the Orkhon inscriptions, monu­ments to the resurgence of the Turk nation's imperial ambitions, referred to the royal ancestors and founders of the early Turk empire (sixth century ce) as rulers who ‘kept in order the Turkish peoples' kingdoms and polity'.^[29] The legal provisions passed by Chinggis Khan, and often known as the Great Yasa, were meant to impose empire-wide laws and regulations. Theft, murder and other crimes were to be adjudicated according to the law, and justice was administered by authorities established by the state. Several authors have indeed noted, based on medieval sources, that ‘the way of life of Eurasian nomads created a need for social institutions that would reduce violence'.^{[30] [31] [32]} These few examples suffice to show a close association between imperial unity and the transition to an equitable government meant to keep social order by the administration of laws.

This is not to say that the imperial ‘unifier' of various steppe empires was elected simply by a vote of confidence of the various tribal chiefs who were trying to prevent the total collapse and annihilation of their people. Abaoji, in order to secure his power, ambushed and killed rival chiefs.11 The early founders of the Turk empire emerged in the sixth century from a series of wars intended to ‘pacify' the Mongolian steppes, and subsequently rebelled against their Rouran overlords.12 It is again the Secret History of the Mongols that provides the best examples of a use of violence that could only be justified teleologically, as one of many episodes leading to the ending of internecine violence. For instance, the rivalry that developed between Temujin and his erstwhile blood brother (anda) Jamuqa, and the final execu­tion of the latter, can be read as an allegory of the brutal truth that sharing of power could not be tolerated lest more violence ensued.

A different type of inter-nomadic warfare followed the dissolution of a nomadic empire, and the collapse of a central authority. This process has been read by historians as the return to a pre-imperial or pre-unification status quo, but this interpretation is difficult to maintain. Surely the social order that existed before the Turk, Uighur, Kitan or Mongol empires could not be recreated after a period in which the previous ethno-political units had been thoroughly altered through processes of assimilation, relocation, dis­bandment or, sometimes, extinction of a given nation. The disappearance of ethnic appellations among the steppes does not have to be necessarily the result of some form of ‘ethnic cleansing' but surely violence is one of the causes that can explain why certain names, and presumably a good portion of the peoples carrying them, vanished.^{[33] [34] [35]} One example of ‘dissolution' is the end of the Uighur empire, brought about in 840 by a combination of factors among which the invasion of the Kirgiz was the final and decisive coup de grace.

Intra-nomadic conflicts erupted also in the Mongol empire after the con­quest had been under way for several decades. The conflict between the Chagadaid Baraq and the Ilkhanid Abaqa that culminated in the Battle of Herat of 1270 was a clash between rival commanders, but also, in a more essential sense, between two people who saw themselves as legitimate rulers of a Chinggisid state.15 Both had their power base in conquered territories and the crux of the matter was territorial domination. A few years earlier another critical struggle emerged between the founder of the Ilkhanate Hulegu and the khan of the Golden Horde Berke. Religious as well as territorial disputes foregrounded the clash, but one episode in particular speaks to a violence that we do not often find elsewhere. According to Arabic sources, when the war broke out Hulegu killed the merchants from the Golden Horde residing in Tabriz, confiscating their property, and in retaliation Berke killed the mer­chants coming from the Golden Horde. Economic damage to the enemy was inflicted by massacring the very agents of trade.^[36]

Another example of intra-nomadic warfare worth mentioning derives from the violation of political rules meant to limit the power of the supra­tribal leader. A case in point is that of the founder of the Kitan state, Abaoji. By Kitan rules, the election of an emperor was supposed to be limited to three years, and when Abaoji refused to relinquish power opposition by various tribal leaders led to violent uprisings and assassination plots in 911, 912 and especially 913, when a rebellion was violently repressed.

In general, intra-nomadic warfare, whether it preceded or followed the formation of empires or large multi-ethnic polities, appears to have been often just as brutal as violence against sedentary peoples, insofar as the civilian population did not enjoy any special protection, and war under such circumstances could lead to the total annihilation of the losing side. Dearth of sources makes it all but impossible to ascertain the degree to which a war among nomads would lead to widespread killing, or even to some form of ‘ethnic cleansing'. Assimilation to other polities, dissipation by migration or social dissolution, and reconstitution under a different ethnonym are possible ways to explain the disappearance of a polity.

The end of the Uighur empire in 840 is indicative, on a larger scale, of a political dynamic that radically transformed the Uighurs as a people from nomads to city dwellers and farmers as some moved to agricultural areas and became sedentary, establishing their sovereignty in smaller city-based king­doms such as Qoco and other areas in what are today the Chinese provinces of Gansu and Xinjiang.^{[38] [39]}

To conclude, intra-nomadic violence persisted at an endemic level among clans as a consequence of conflicts that emerged naturally due to human rivalries and criminal behaviour. Such violence could, however, escalate with the proliferation of tribal armies, extensive and prolonged conflicts, and widespread militarisation, thus posing an existential threat to the entire social body. Violence spiralled out of control until a higher authority emerged, and a different socio-political structure (call it state or empire) managed to put an end to the violence by creating a new centra­lised political order.