Writing in 1085, Censor Wang Yansou urged the rapid end of the militia policies instituted under the previous emperor.

Not only were the policies disruptive of rural life, but the training was brutal, bred resentment, and created the potential for trained bandits. While there were significant political reasons behind his concerns, the very fact that he would argue that training farmers to function as soldiers undermined society demonstrated a sea change in attitudes about military skills and Chinese farmers, a change Wang acknowledged.¹ Formally trained skills in the use of violence lie at the centre of the cultural, political and social relationship between imperial governments and their subjects.

Chinese governments often struggled to balance their own need for trained soldiers with their desire to limit the means for effective violence within their societies. Ideally, a dynasty's farmers served as soldiers and its officials as officers when needed for war, with everyone returning to their peacetime occupations afterward. This was both cheaper and more politically safe for the government, since it allowed it to keep a minimal military establishment that would not threaten the government. Over the course of the Tang (618-907) and the Song (960-1279) dynasties this ideal setup col­lapsed and was replaced by a very different structure. The Mongol Yuan (1279-1368) prohibited weapon ownership for its Chinese subjects, and the Ming (1368-1644) limited training to a hereditary military class.^{[432] [433]}

The Tang dynasty initially maintained a military based upon farmer­soldiers, the fubing system.^[434] Over the course of the dynasty the system was displaced by professional standing armies, often built on non-Han steppe cavalry, guarding the border, as well as some other formations.

The Song dynasty was founded by and maintained a professional army for its entire history. While the dynasty did an effective job of keeping the military from threatening the regime, statesmen lamented the expense and moral decline of a professional military. Attempts to return to the days of farmer-soldiers failed to produce effective armies. Farmers were not inter­ested in learning martial arts, nor very good at being soldiers. State violence was the responsibility of the army, not the people. The only individuals who took up violence did so to become bandits or otherwise oppose state authority.

The rise of the Mongols, following in the footsteps of the Kitan and Jurchen peoples, provided another model for state-directed violence. These steppe groups drew their soldiers from the ranks of commoners, but they were primarily itinerant herdsmen who were all skilled in mounted archery.^[435] When these steppe peoples took control over parts of China, or in the case of the Mongols all of it, they ruled as an occupying force. The Mongols prohibited Chinese people from owning weapons for the safety of the state. Chinese people in this system were not supposed to practise violence.

The Ming dynasty shifted course, establishing hereditary military house­holds who were liable to provide soldiers to the army while farming land given to them by the state. This had the attraction of restricting the means of state violence to a limited and presumably loyal group, but keeping costs down by providing that group with a peacetime livelihood. Unfortunately, it failed to provide effective soldiers, forcing the state to recruit and pay for replacements. Some hereditary officers continued to serve, but much of the Ming military became once again a professional force.