Claiming Versus Creating Value

Lax and Sebenius (1986) proposed that negotiators need to master and jointly apply two basic negotiation moves: value claiming and value creating. Similar to the distribu­tive processes of Walton and McKersie, value claiming is a set of competitive behaviors that aims to gain individual advantage.

According to Lax and Sebenius (1986), value creating and value claiming are separate but interlinked elements of a negotiation. When value is created, it also needs to be distributed; when value is not created, fixed value still needs to be distributed. From this situation, Lax and Sebenius derive the “negotiator’s dilemma”: Even though value creation creates resources beneficial to both parties, it is individually rational for negotiators to resort to value claim­ing. However, value claiming tends to discour­age value creating, as the former tends to obscure joint gain opportunities. To manage this dilemma, to avoid competitive deadlock, and to overcome the trap of excessive value claiming without value creation, Lax and Sebenius (1986) suggested applying a “conditionally open” strat­egy. This strategy aims to foster communication and cooperation, while protecting against exces­sive claiming by the other side.