LESSONS FROM UN EXPERIENCE FOR THE PRE-MEDIATION PROCESS

This chapter will now explore the use of negotiation and mediation by the Secretary­General and his Representatives to assist warring parties in finding (and subsequently implementing) comprehensive settlements to their conflicts and the lessons which can be learned from this experience for conflict resolution practice.

Although different RSGs take different approaches to their third party role, some of the practical advice from their experience is presented below. Since many of the concepts referred to by RSGs come from the wider conflict resolution literature, the scholars who developed these concepts are also cited in the notes and the references.

Helping to ripen a situation

Some Representatives argue that UN involve­ment can help to ‘ripen' a situation⁵ and, therefore, that peacemaking assistance should be offered more proactively. ‘When the UN becomes involved, it brings hope,' observes Vendrell (2002).

In Guatemala, the UN helped to ripen the situation by bringing civil society into the process (for example, trade unions, peasant groups, indigenous groups and human rights groups). This brought a greater element of balance into a situation where the guerrillas were very weak and also allowed more space for NGOs to develop. As well, it brought about a discussion in the media about how to end the conflict. Finally, the kind of proposals that the Secretary-General's Representative was putting forward ‘created a dynamic within Guatemalan ruling circles, particularly within the army, that brought about power struggles and purges and, on the whole, resulted in the more moderate elements in the army, who were keener on negotiations, coming to the fore' (Vendrell, 2002).

Dealing with pre-conditions

One common problem that RSGs face occurs when one or both parties demand that certain requirements must be met before negotiations can begin. Such pre-conditions are often set by hard-line leaders or in response to hard-line constituents to block negotiations.

In internal conflicts, the most common pre­condition is a demand by the government for the guerrillas to disarm or sign a cease­fire agreement before negotiations. Guerrilla groups, however, frequently believe that only armed pressure will force concessions from the government, so they are usually unwilling to comply. ‘In most cases, such a demand is a non-starter,' comments de Soto. ‘War-time negotiations can actually be easier than peace­time negotiations, mostly because of the external pressure that can be brought to bear' (2001). Indeed, de Soto's mediation efforts in El Salvador offer a successful example of this.

Third parties can also make it clear to the parties that substantive pre-conditions are not acceptable. In the negotiations in Burundi, Dinka explained to guerrilla groups the distinction between substantive pre­conditions which had to be the subject of negotiation versus confidence-building pre­conditions which could be agreed to in order to build confidence. ‘If the rebels say to me: “We don't want the president to call us rebels; we are an armed group, but we're not rebels!” I can go to the president and say, “When you speak on the radio, please don't call them rebels” - because that is not going to change anything.' By contrast, Dinka makes it clear that substantive issues are what have to be negotiated and no party should be asked to make a concession on such issues before the negotiations begin (2001).

Confidence-building measures

Egeland (2001) points out that, ‘Parties often don't know which tools are available to them. They know how to fight, but they don't know how to make peace. They need to be educated in what confidence-building measures they can undertake and what tools the international community can provide.' In some cases, it may be useful to go through a pre-negotiation phase, where the objective is not agreement but merely low-key facilitation of dialogue and confidence-building.

To facilitate confidence-building in Colombia, Egeland organized a joint tour by the two negotiating teams - the FARC and the government - to Stockholm and Oslo where seminars were held on human rights, international humanitarian law, experiences from other peace processes, democratic governance, rule of law and transparent governance. As well, the teams were taken on a joint European tour ‘to expose them to something different than the vicious cycle they were living in their own country.' This helped to develop relationships between the parties and also established a positive relationship between the parties and the Secretary-General's Representative (2001).

In an attempt to make progress in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, a series of con­ferences were organized to discuss concrete confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of refugees and displaced persons; information sharing among law enforcement organs to prevent crime; cooperation in the field of mass media; economic exchanges in areas such as wineries and joint meetings between parliamentarians, journalists, NGOs, and directors of libraries. In the latter case, for example, the Director of the Georgian National Library agreed to search for books and materials among Georgian holdings to replace the loss of the Abkhaz archives destroyed during the war (Boden, 2001).

An interesting variation on confidence­building measures was used by de Soto at the beginning of the negotiations in El Salvador, when President Christiani was criticized by his constituents for offering a dialogue process with the guerrillas, who had refused to renounce hostilities. Knowing the guerrillas did not want to make a gesture to the government, de Soto took the unusual step of suggesting to the FMLN that it make confidence-building gestures to the Secretary-General (who was intervening for the first time in a good offices role in Latin America).

The UN can also build confidence through its own actions. In both Guatemala and El Salvador, UN human rights monitors were deployed during the peacemaking process. Arnault comments that the deployment of the human rights verification mission created, within the URNG constituency, the sense that the peace process was bringing something tangible. ‘Yesterday an army colonel could do anything and now there was an office of MINUGUA in the area, staffed with five police observers and five human rights monitors' (2001).

The need for a single mediator

RSGs were unanimous in agreeing that, for peacemaking to be effective, it must be led by a single mediator. Ould-Abdallah recalls that at one point in the Great Lakes Region there were twelve Representatives from regional organizations, member states, NGOs and the UN. ‘Such a proliferation of intermediaries can, of course, engender considerable confusion regarding the role of the international community and create numerous opportunities for extremists to play one intermediary off against another.' In such cases, he advises that a ‘lead actor' must be established (2000: 131). In Cyprus, where the UN has a mandate from the Security Council, de Soto (2004) met the other envoys and told them that the Secretary-General viewed them as his friends in the process and sources of advice and support. However, he also explained the importance of maintaining the unity and integrity of the UN's efforts and asked them to consult with him before coming to the island or having contact with the parties.

Deciding who to include in the process

Another issue which can be contentious is who to include in the process. Most RSGs urge that all major parties who are stakeholders in the situation should be included and warn that those left outside the talks will have a greater motivation to act as spoilers.⁶ ‘Leaving a warring party out of a negotiation is a recipe for failure,' comments de Soto.

Tubman describes why the peace process for Somalia, organized by Djibouti in 2000 and dubbed the Arta process, didn't succeed:

Arta was based on the premise that the warlords had been a problem and that although they were welcome there, the idea was that you would deal with civil society, with the clans, and they would get together and hold the answer to what was needed in Somalia. The warlords would be left out. When the government was formed, those who were left out were free to be co-opted into other arrangements. Ethiopia, which was also largely left out of the Arta process, wasn't happy with the results of Arta, and they reached out to those unhappy warlords and formed them into a group that began to offer a parallel political dispensation to the Transitional National Government. As a result, the people who initiated the next process - IGAD - felt that all stakeholders should be invited into the next peace process. (2003)

Ould-Abdallah (2001), however, warns against including extremists, since they can disrupt an already shaky political environment. By contrast, Vendrell (2002) argues that including an extremist group usually depends on the power of that group. ‘The question,' he maintains, ‘is not so much whether you have extremist groups at the table, but whether you accede to their demands which are contrary to the objectives and principles of the UN Charter.'

One means for overcoming the problem of extremists is to include a broader-based group of positive, influential actors, such as religious leaders, elders or scholars. Sahnoun (2003) proposes that these individuals should be given visibility, especially when the negotiations meet with success.

Another issue is the involvement of women. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) calls for ‘an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes.' The UNIFEM book, Women at the Peace Table, argues that:

It is predominately male leaders of the fighting parties who are negotiating an end to war and laying the foundation for peace. The justification often given is that the peace table must bring together those who have taken up arms because it is up to them to stop the conflict... The process of reconstructing a society emerging from war requires the equal contribution of men and women. Ensuring women's participation in such negotiations enhances the legitimacy of the process by making it more democratic and responsive to the priorities of all sectors of the affected population. In this sense, the peace table becomes a platform for transforming institutions and structures, and opening the door to greater social justice. (Anderlini, 2000: 5)

Other RSGs argue, however, that including too many parties makes agreement less likely. ‘Most mediators,’ comments Vendrell (2002) ‘would look askance at the idea of having civil society (for example, the exile groups or the refugees) represented at the table, because it makes the negotiations totally unmanageable. But civil society will argue, “Why should only those with the guns be negotiating?”.’

To overcome this problem in Guatemala, the UN mediation process established an Assembly of Civil Society in 1994, with representatives from a range of civil society groups. While the Assembly did not partici­pate directly in the negotiations between the government and the guerrillas, it was able to input views and, even more importantly, it had the right to review and pass judgement on all agreements reached in the bilateral talks. Its judgement was not binding, but it did exert pressure on the main parties to take into consideration a broader range of interests (Arnault, 2001).

Dealing with decision-makers

Dealing directly with the decision-makers is vital to any peacemaking process. ‘It is often a mistake,’ advises Egeland, ‘to seek contact with those who share your opinions because it’s easier to deal with them. If you do that, you end up with a deal that can’t be realized, because those you dealt with have no clout on their respective sides.’ He proposes that mediators should try to have the leaders at the table or at least those who can make decisions (2001).

In the 1990-91 El Salvador talks, the government’s Dialogue Commission did not have full capacity to make decisions, so de Soto often found himself flying on an urgent basis to San Salvador to deal directly with President Christiani or phoning him from wherever the negotiations were being held. De Soto also travelled to Cuba, Nicaragua and Mexico to meet directly with the commanders of the FMLN (2001).

Agreeing on a venue

Settling on a venue for peace talks may also create problems, since the location can have symbolic meaning for the parties. Typically, governments want to hold talks inside the country, but opposition groups may fear for their security or be concerned about listening devices. In cases where a Group of Friends of the Secretary-General exists (which will be discussed later), the talks can take place in the country of one or more of the friends. More generally, Vendrell (2002) proposes that one should not choose a venue that is identified with either side or too distant. Good communication facilities are important, as is the consent of the host country, since it is usually asked to pay for the local costs. Finally, he recommends that one doesn’t want a place ‘where the government will try to poke its nose into the negotiations.’ His modus operandi is to prepare a list of countries that he believes would be suitable and to individually ask the parties where they would not be willing to go. By the time he proposes a venue, he has discussed this thoroughly with all sides.

In Tajikistan, Merrem and his staff found themselves carrying out framework talks in December, 1996 in freezing temperatures at the mountain fortress of Commander Masood in order to overcome the fact that the President wanted talks in Dushanbe and Nuri wanted them at his own base in northern Afghanistan (Merrem, 2002). In 1997 in the DRC, when Kabila's forces were marching on Kinshasa, Sahnoun and Mandela negotiated with Mobutu and Kabila on a ship provided by SouthAfrica, anchored off the coast ofAngola in order to avoid bloodshed (Sahnoun, 2003).

Establishing a framework for negotiations

Most UN mediators stress the importance of trying to obtain a framework agreement as a first step in the negotiation process. Such an agreement commits the parties to a process of negotiation and sets out how the process will be structured and what procedural rules will guide the talks. Framework agreements usually outline: who the parties will be; who the mediator will be; what format the talks will take and the need for high-level representatives from the parties who have the capacity to take decisions. A framework agreement also usually contains a commit­ment by the parties not to abandon the process unilaterally, as well as rules about who can talk to the media under what conditions. Even when it is not possible to negotiate a framework agreement, the mediator can ‘frame' the talks by providing an opening statement which sets out procedural rules for the negotiation and seeks informal agreement on these.