Message Production
Theory and research indicate that people make two choices regarding how they communicate to the other person in conflict (e.g., Putnam & Wilson, 1982; Sillars & Wilmot, 1994; van de Vliert & Euwema, 1994): first, people must decide how direct or indirect to be; and second, people must decide how cooperative or competitive they will be.
That is, and given the preceding events, people typically rely on judgments of directness/indi- rectness and cooperation/competition when selecting conflict behaviors. These choices lead to the selection of various strategies (general approaches) and tactics (behaviors that institute the strategies). Sillars, Canary, and Tafoya (2004) found it easy to classify various conflict observational coding schemes into the four quadrants implied by the crossing of these two dimensions: (1) direct and cooperative, (2) direct and competitive, (3) indirect and cooperative, and (4) indirect and competitive. Using van de Vliert and Euwema’s (1994) terms, direct and cooperative behaviors are called negotiation and direct and competitive behaviors are called direct fighting; indirect and cooperative tactics are called nonconfrontation and indirect and competitive tactics are called indirect fighting. Subsequently, Sillars and Canary (in press) edited these behaviors into a more parsimonious group. Table 10.2 reports the Sillars and Canary typology of conflict codes.Table 10.2 Communication Codes
Negotiation: Direct and Cooperative
Accept responsibility (Weiss, 1993)
Statement that “I” or “we” are responsible for the problem
Analytic remarks (Sillars, 1986)
Descriptive statements, disclosive statements, qualifying statements, soliciting disclosure, soliciting criticism
Approve (Weiss, 1993)
Statement that favors couple’s or partner’s attributions, actions, or statement
Cognitive acts (Rausch, Barry, Hertel, & Swain, 1974)
Opening the issue/probe, seeking information, giving information, suggesting course of action, giving reasons, exploring consequences
Conciliatory remarks (Sillars, 1986)
Supportive remarks, concessions, acceptance of responsibility
Mindreading/positive (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Beliefs about the partner’s internal states, said with positive or neutral affect
Problem description (Weiss, 1993)
Problem-solving/information exchange (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Propose change (Weiss, 1993)
Compromise, negative solution (proposal for termination or decrease of behavior), positive solution (proposal for initiation or increase of behavior)
Reconciling acts (Raush et al., 1974)
Accepting blame or responsibility, showing concern for other’s feelings, seeking reassurance, attempting to make up, offering help or reassurance
Resolving acts (Raush et al., 1974)
Accepting the other’s plans, ideas, feelings; introducing a compromise, offering to collaborate in planning
Summarizing self/summarizing other (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Direct Fighting: Direct and Competitive
Avoiding blame or responsibility (Raush et al., 1974)
Blame (Weiss, 1993)
Criticize, mindread negative (statement assuming a negative mindset or motivation of the partner), put-down, threat, hostile or negative voice tone
Coercive acts/personal attacks (Raush et al., 1974)
Using external power, commanding, demanding compensation, inducing guilt or attacking other’s motives, disparaging the other, threatening the other
Confrontative remarks (Sillars, 1986)
Personal criticism, rejection, hostile imperatives, denial of responsibility, presumptive remarks
Denying validity of other’s arguments (Raush et al., 1974)
Excuse (Weiss, 1993)
Interrupt (Weiss, 1993)
Mindreading/negative (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Beliefs about the partner’s internal states, said with negative affect
Rejecting acts (Raush et al., 1974)
Recognizing other’s motive as a strategy or calling the other’s bluff, rejection
Table 10.2 (Continued)
Nonconfrontation: Indirect and Cooperative
Changing the subject (Raush et al., 1974)
Denial and equivocation (Sillars, 1986)
Direct or implicit denial (that a conflict exists), evasive remarks (failure to acknowledge or deny the presence of a conflict following a prompt)
Disengage (Weiss, 1993)
Expressing the desire not to talk about an issue
Off topic (Weiss, 1993)
Topic management (Sillars, 1986)
Topic shifts (terminating discussion before it has reached natural completion), topic avoidance (statements that explicitly avoid or limit discussion)
Indirect Fighting: Indirect and Competitive
Dysphoric affect (Weiss, 1993)
Affect communicating depression, sadness, self-complaint, or whiny voice
Giving up or leaving the field (Rausch et al., 1974)
Hostile jokes and questions (Sillars, 1986)
Turn off (Weiss, 1993)
Withdrawal (Weiss, 1993)
Polysemous: Variable Meanings
Agreement/disagreement (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981; Raush et al., 1974; Weiss, 1993) Appealing acts (Raush et al., 1974)
Appealing to fairness, appealing to other’s motives, offering something else to win one’s goal, appealing to other’s love, pleading or coaxing
Communication talk (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Communication about communication
Compliancehnoncompliance (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981; Weiss, 1993) Expressing feelings about a problem (Gottman, 1979; Notarius & Markman, 1981)
Facilitation (Weiss, 1993)
Assent (listener states “yeah,” nods head), humor (lighthearted, not sarcasm), metacommunication (statements that direct the flow of conversation), question, paraphrase/reflection
Friendly joking (Sillars, 1986)
Noncommittal remarks (Sillars, 1986)
Noncommittal statements, noncommittal questions, abstract remarks, procedural remarks
NOTE: Adapted from Sillars and Canary (in press).
The reader might wonder which of these behaviors are seen as optimally competent.
The answer to that question is not always obvious. We will discuss the answer in a moment; however, we first want to make a point about the multiple meanings of messages.Importantly, message codes are not behaviors in a literal sense (i.e., mere sounds readily subsumed to van de Vliert & Euwema’s, 1994, categories). The functions of some acts are always contextual (Duck, 2002), subject to negotiation (Montgomery, 1992), resting heavily on interaction and ambiguous to some degree (Sillars & Vangelisti, 2006). Although the codes vary in degree of ambiguity, all are polysemous to an extent (Sillars & Canary, in press). Polysemous references how the same code can reflect multiple contexts, functions, and meanings. For example, a single message (e.g., “That’s not going to work”) can potentially serve as criticism, stonewalling, problem solving, or even validation, depending on how the statement is positioned within the interaction and other factors. To resolve this ambiguity, the listener or observer must go beyond surface features of the message and infer speaker intent utilizing implicit cultural and contextual knowledge (Jacobs, 2002). Various biases may affect the way participants in conflict interpret speaker intent.
Certain codes in Table 10.2 appear to open more than one interpretation. So we (Sillars & Canary, in press) refined the Sillars et al. (2004) typology to include those categories that clearly qualified as “polysemous.” For example, consider how appeals to fairness or to one’s motives can reflect a very face-threatening message event or an appropriate point to be raised that implies no face threat (“This argument does not consider how many years one has been here”). Note as well how metacommunication can function for positive (“well said”) or negative (“that was stupid”) purposes. Finally, consider how noncommittal statements/ques- tions may represent a circumspect and facehonoring point of view or the opposite given the issue and context (“Let me think about it”).
The point is that certain conflict communication codes can appear more fluid, context dependent, and open to multiple meanings compared with other conflict communication codes. With the idea that some communication codes are more open to interpretation, we can now discuss the relative effects of message behavior directness and cooperation.In terms of directness, people often state a preference for being direct. However, as indicated above, some research indicates that being indirect is more functional for people with certain self-concepts, in certain kinds of relationships, and in particular kinds of cultures, as indicated previously. For example, people who have an interdependent self-construal are more likely to use directness than individuals with an interdependent self-construal (Kim & Leung, 2000; see also Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001, for a description of bioconstruals and ambivalents). Interdependent people see their own identities as tied to other people, whereas independent persons view themselves more as isolated agents. In addition, the use of indirectness can be functional in relationships that contain affection, though it is dysfunctional in relationships where avoidance is used to mask ongoing tensions and problems (Sillars et al., 2004). Finally, indirect communication appears to be more desired in cultures that value collectivistic versus individualistic tendencies (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), though the research on this point has been mixed (Cai & Fink, 2002).
In terms of c ooperation, most research indicates that cooperative conflict is positively linked to assessments of communication competence and that competitive messages are usually seen as both inappropriate and ineffective (e.g., Lakey & Canary, 2002). One major category of conflict behavior identified by van de Vliert and Euwema (1994) is negotiation, which includes tactics that are positive and direct. People choose tactics that will not offend or cause the other to respond in a hostile manner and therefore are likely to be viewed as effective and appropriate.
This approach allows people to maintain emotional regulation and to retain dignity.Some research, however, indicates that competitive communication in terms of demanding conversation and showing anger can be functional insofar as issues are dealt with and relationship quality increases as a result of such confrontations (e.g., Gottman & Krokoff, 1989). Fincham and Beach (1999) speculate that a curvilinear relationship exists between conflict competitiveness and relational quality, such that too little competitive confrontation and too much competitive confrontation lead to poorer outcomes. An alternative explanation is that people learn how to balance their negative and competitive behaviors with more positive and cooperative behaviors. As a radical example, Marshall, Weston, and Honeycutt (2000) found that the use of positivity by husbands who abused their wives verbally, physically, or sexually almost entirely filtered the effects of abuse on relational satisfaction. That is, the wives of abusive husbands who showed love, stated how proud they were of their wives, were gentle, and so forth did not experience declines in relational satisfaction as the result of being abused. Referring to nonabusive marriages, Gottman (1994) found that satisfied couples engaged in a 5:1 ratio of positive/negative conflict behaviors, whereas dissatisfied couples engaged in a 1:1 ratio of positive/negative behaviors, underscoring the salving quality of positivity.
In short, people make strategic choices that become manifest in conflict tactics and related nonverbal behaviors. Accordingly, individuals should exercise strategy control. When behaving mindfully, people have more information, more options, and, therefore, more understanding of the conflict and the partner. These characteristics of mindful behavior should help people choose tactics and nonverbal behaviors that work with the partner and provide increased possibility for compromise and cooperation. If a person had to place a bet, then cooperative behaviors (direct or indirect) are clearly seen as more competent than competitive behaviors. In addition, cooperative actions are functional in limiting the negative effects of competitive behaviors.