Strategic and Tactical Theory

Von Moltke (1909) defined strategy as “the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view.” The important point is distinguishing the responsibility of the general as carrying out, but not making, policy [“the objective in view” in von Moltke’s language].

The best theories identify a few key variables that have general explanatory power. Archer Jones (1987) has done this for warfare as neatly as Galileo did it for physics, although he proposes different sets of variables for tactics and for strategy. Tactically, Jones parsimoniously distinguishes fighting forces using only two variables. Until World War I armies fought either on foot (whether they marched or rode into combat) or mounted (whether on chariots or horses). Second, they relied on missile (javelins, arrows, or bullets) or shock (maces, swords, or bayonets) weapons (Figure 14.2). Missile-wielding troops tended to be more lightly armored and more mobile than shock troops.

Horizontal, vertical, or diagonal arrows labeled either “D” for “Defensive Superiority” or O for “Offensive superiority” indicate the situation at specific places and times. For example, the arrow labeled “O” in Figure 14.2 means that French heavy cavalryon offense normally defeated English infantry in about 1250 AD. Less than a century later, the arrow would reverse and be labeled “D” because English infantry on defense armed with longbows usually prevailed against French cavalry.

The general notion of laying out the main weapons systems and their relative advantage in attacking or defending at particular points in time remains a useful concept. A commander may be able to force battle under circumstances that offset the advantage of the other.

Jones reduces strategy to three main variables. The commander can combine a defensive or offensive, a persisting or raiding, and a combat or logistic strategy depending on his and the enemy’s economic, military, and political aims and capabilities. Figure 14.3 shows examples of each from World War II.

Baron de Jomini (1971), one of Napoleon’s generals who later served Russia, wrote a less abstract book than did his more famous contemporary Clausewitz, arguing that victory depended on experience, intuition, and understanding of the “principles of war.” These applied to every type of military operation at every level of organization throughout military history (with implications for other conflicts as well). The first requirement, driving all the rest, was a clear, coherent objective correlating ends and means so that military victory achieves a worthwhile purpose. This required seizing the initiative by offensive action, captured in the saying, “the best defense is a good offense.” The offensive had to concentrate at the critical point that allowed one force to dominate the other. This critical point is not the same in every battle in every age—recognizing it is one of the points at which experience and intuition come into play. The remaining principles supported this concentration. Economy of force elsewhere permitted dominance at the critical point. Surprise and deception enabled success at minimum cost, while security and intelligence aimed to protect one’s own forces. Keeping plans simple, achieved primarily by giving each subordinate unit a single task, helped overcome the massive confusion of the battlefield, the so-called “fog of war” (Johnson, et. al. 2010).