The Basis of Moral Difference

The observation that human communities differ in how they see the world is a truism bordering on the trite, but the consequence of this state of affairs can be profound as moral orders come to clash.

We take the term incommensurate from Thomas Kuhn (1970), who applied the term to competing scientific paradigms, the logics of which cannot be mapped onto each other. The vocabulary, categories, and logical rela­tions of one paradigm do not permit direct translation to those of the other. The two systems of thought cannot be compared point by point. Richard Bernstein (1985) applied the term to philosophy and social theory, noting that incommensurate systems can be compared, but only by moving to larger, tran­scendent categories that require understand­ing each moral order on a deeper level. For example, most divorces are strictly interest based. In other words, the husband and wife differ on custody, real estate, money, personal property, and so forth. In such cases, you can actually compare the demands and interests of the parties right down the line issue by issue.

There seems to be a reflexive relationship between culture and moral order, though neither can be reduced to the other. Because cultures are determined in part by underly­ing belief systems, moral differences among cultures are often salient and can lead to conflict. Where cultural groups come to clash, moral differences may be part of the picture, particularly when incommensurate cultural views are involved.

In a survey of 15 cultural groups world­wide, Shailor (1988) found significant dif­ferences in conflict management practices. Specifically, he found that forms of conflict resolution native to a particular cultural group are deeply connected to the group’s assumptions about personhood, preferred forms of communication, and power. In par­ticular, local conflict resolution forms aim to manage face, shift responsibility from the individual to the community, and may either reconstruct authoritarian views of power or egalitarian ones, depending on the nature of the culture.

Determining whether a conflict arises from cultural or moral differences can be dif­ficult, since cultural forms and styles may enter the picture. Orbe, Everett, and Putman (this volume) correctly claim that interethnic and interracial conflict stems from many sources that are hard to sort out, including inequalities, existing tensions, perceptual dif­ferences, and stereotypes. For example, differ­ences in communication styles among African Americans, European Americans, and Asian Americans are widely known and experienced (e.g., Fine, 1995; see the chapters in Section 4, this volume). To what extent do these style differences connect to moral differences?

Space does not permit a full exploration of this issue here, but clearly, some moral differ­ences are present among these cultural groups. Ting-Toomey’s (1985) distinctions between high and low cultural demand and constraint can help us identify situations in which con­flicting moral orders may become relevant in intercultural conflict. A situation, particularly an organization, which is high in cultural demand promotes a single set of values or ways of understanding human experience. Such organizations do not tolerate difference very well. Low-demand organizations (and presumably other situations) actually encour­age multiple ideologies. Conversely, cultural constraints are factors that suppress cognitive, emotional, and behavioral differences. Thus, we might expect that moral conflict would be more likely in organizations high in cultural demand and in situations that contain a large level of cultural constraint (Littlejohn, 1995).