Theoretical and Methodological Influences
Since the first studies of moral conflict (Freeman, Littlejohn, & Pearce, 1992; W. B. Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997), our inquiry has developed and moved in directions we could not have anticipated in those early years.
Consistently over the years, however, this work has been guided by a set of four related academic traditions: (1) systemic theory, (2) social constructionism, (3) practical theory, and (4) action research.Systemic Theory. This broad tradition draws attention from individual attributes to relationships and connections, in which communication processes are emphasized over personality and individual behavior. Note in the Pornotopia case, for example, that we are not interested in the personalities, styles, or traits of individual players but emphasize interaction patterns within and between the parties in the dispute. The moral conflict in this case stems not from personal characteristics but from interaction patterns. This is why we emphasize the use of language and mutual response. From system theory, we learn that the “whole” is created through interaction among parts and that processes of interaction produce outcomes (Littlejohn & Domenici, 2001; Littlejohn & Foss, 2011). Systems are organized sets of components that act on one another to create something more than a mere accumulation of characteristics. When you take a systems approach, you look at the dynamic forces among parts in terms of some kind of energy or information (e.g., Coleman, 2011). Control and self-regulation are also important as the system forces lead to homeostasis as well as adaptation and change. In addition, systems cannot be understood apart from their environments, because the system itself always interacts within a network of shifting relationships.
Our work has been especially influenced by a line of systems inquiry known as second order cybernetics, primarily attributable to thinkers such as Gregory Bateson (1972) and Heinz von Foerster (1981); observing always means interacting with the system itself.
Automatically, the system widens to include the observer, who both influences and is influenced by the system. The implication of this point is that one can never observe a system purely and objectively but must take his or her own role into account. Observation, then, is intervention. We become part of the system we observe.In all our work, then, we want to concentrate on what happens between parties in conflict, how they communicate with one another, and how this communication affects and is affected by larger systems. Much of our work is interventionist in nature. In other words, we become involved with actual communities and learn from this experience. Our “knowledge” about moral conflict and transcendent discourse develops over time as a result of this engaged practice. Our key learning from system theory is that moral conflict is a dynamic relational state arising in certain forms of interaction.
Social Constructionism. The second influence on our work hails originally from two movements in sociology: (1) symbolic interaction- ism (Lal, 1995) and the “social construction of reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and (2) the philosophy of language (e.g., Schutz, 1967; Wittgenstein, 1953). This work expanded to a movement throughout the social sciences that Kenneth Gergen (1985, 1999) aptly named constructionism (Galanes & Leeds-Hurwitz, 2009; W. B. Pearce, 2007). In the communication field, this school of thought forms an important part of what has been called the social approach (e.g., Leeds-Hurwitz, 1995; Littlejohn & Foss, 2011), which is based on the ideas that human beings always make their realities socially, through interaction, and that language and other symbolic forms shape what we experience. The focus of attention in constructionist research is what gets made in a social situation and how social worlds come into being through communication (W. B. Pearce, 1995). In other words, humans “make” or “construct” social worlds through the forms of communication they employ.
Though the process of social construction is not normally conscious, we have learned that it can become deliberate if participants think about the consequences of their interactional patterns within the situations they face. Although we did not intervene in the Pornotopia case, we do imagine better forms of communication that might have been employed, namely, forms of dialogue, which are explored in greater detail later in this chapter.In the realm of moral conflict and transcendent discourse, then, we can look at (a) how moral conflict involves certain patterns of interaction, the use of certain kinds of language and action; (b) what is created in moral conflict situations; and (c) what could get made if the language and process of communication were to change. O ur key learning from constructionism is that moral conflicts are made in human interaction, and they can be transcended when communicators shift their patterns of talk.
Practical Theory. This view establishes a set of principles by which an actor can make difficult situational decisions (Barge & Craig, 2009; Cronen, 2001; Littlejohn & Foss, 2011). Instead of predicting outcomes from causal models, practical theory provides a basis for achieving goals in complex situations where many solutions and outcomes may be possible. Following this tradition, our work is designed to provide practical guides for action. According to Craig and Tracy (1995), practical theories “construct a tentative, revisable, but still rationally warranted normative model that is relevant to a broad range of practical situations” (p. 252). Cronen (2001) wrote that practical theory “offers principles informed by engagement in the details of lived experience that facilitate joining with others to produce change” (p. 14). According to Cronen, practical theories provide a basis for understanding the uniqueness of situations to learn from experience and to weigh alternative courses of action for achieving positive outcomes.
Our emerging theory of transcendent communication (Littlejohn, 2004; Lowry & Littlejohn, 2006), summarized later in this chapter, is itself an example of practical theory.An example—indeed, an exemplar—of practical theory is the c oordinated management of meaning, or CMM (W. B. Pearce & Cronen, 1980; Pearce & Kearney, 2004). Especially influential in our work, CMM looks at the ways in which action, particularly interaction, is embedded in socially constructed contexts of meaning. CMM provides a basis for understanding how people connect their actions with meaning, the logics that drive interaction, and the ways in which shifting contexts can bring about changes in meaning and action (Littlejohn & Domenici, 2001; Littlejohn & Foss, 2011). The Pornotopia case illustrates the power of contextual logic very well. Each side in this clash operates from a “logic” that makes the case seem compelling to the point of total rejection of other points of view. We will see this phenomenon again in the case studies summarized in the following section.
In reflecting on CMM, W. B. Pearce (2004) mentions several themes he believes important in the theory. These include (a) multiple contextuality, or the idea that all experience is understood in a web or dynamic contexts that give meaning to action; (b) connected stories, or the relationship between the interactions that people live and the stories they tell; (c) coordination, or the challenges of organizing and understanding actions within a system; (d) mystery, or openness where firm answers cannot be found; and (e) continuing creation, or the dynamic, constantly created nature of our social worlds. Our key learning from practical theory and CMM is that responses to moral difference are coordinated practices by which communicators manage actual situations in their lives.
Action Research. As a final influence on our work, action research involves inquiry accomplished through engagement in actual communities (e.g., Stringer, 1996).
Action research is learning by doing. We work in communities with real people facing normal conditions of life, experience and learn from this work, codify and write our observations, and continually refine our ideas about how to work in communities. Spano (2001) outlined three characteristics of action research. First, it is participative, working collaboratively with members of actual communities. Rather than treating people as “subjects” to be “observed,” action research relies on partnerships and relationships in real situations. Second, researchers take the role of facilitators and invite participants into new forms of communication that will help them reflect on the system and make decisions about how to orient and respond to the situations they face. These processes are never invented out of context and imported into the situation but are tested and developed collaboratively over time so that they become “owned by” and “meaningful to” the participants themselves. Third, action research produces practical knowledge that allows participants and facilitators to gain insight into the situation, the desired changes, and the new forms of action that can lead to salutary outcomes. For the researcher/facilita- tors, these insights grow over time to enable the development of evolving practical theories that provide frameworks for (a) understanding important dynamics of situations, (b) identifying potential community visions, and (c) making decisions about how to act in complex and potentially problematic situations. Thus, our key learning from action research is that understanding grows as we engage actual communities facing real situations.Our inquiry into moral conflict began with a series of case studies. From these, we began to conceptualize patterns of communication in moral conflict situations, and we explored new forms of interaction that can transcend moral differences. In the following sections, we outline these dimensions of our work: (a) early case studies, (b) conceptualizing the discourse of conflict, and (c) exploring transcendent communication.