What Causes Negotiators to Change Strategy?
The challenge raised by the phases and stages research is to identify the causes of strategic change. To address this question, researchers have studied smaller units of behavior called “strategic sequences.” A strategic sequence is an “interact” (Weick, 1979) between two negotiators, comprising one’s behavior and the other’s response.
Some sequences confirm a strategic direction by matching, mimicking, or generally reinforcing behavior (Putnam & Jones, 1982). For example, reciprocal sequences (one party mimics the other) and complementary sequences (one party enacts the same general strategy) tend to confirm a strategic direction (Olekalns & Smith, 2003). In contrast, some sequences tend to change that direction. Structural (i.e., transformational) sequences, for example, redirect strategy by introducing a “mismatched” behavior. Sequences are shorter than phases. Whereas sequences consist of one interact (i.e., I speak and you speak), phases contain at least two (i.e., I speak, you speak, and I speak), and often many more. Several studies indicate that the best predictor of a negotiator’s next strategic statement is this two-interact phase (Olekalns, & Smith 2003; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999).The empirical research on sequences indicates that reciprocal and complementary sequences reinforce strategic orientation. These sequences tend to foster long phases that often indicate an emergent social structure of cooperation or competition between negotiators (Brett et al., 2004). In contrast, structural sequences change strategic orientation and can redirect distributive strategy to integrative strategy or vice versa (Donohue, 1981).
For example, Brett et al. (1998) analyzed the data set of Lytle et al. (1995), examining two-interact phases that began with a rights or power statement (distributive strategy).
They found several interesting patterns that successfully turned distributive to integrative strategy. Two were simple, structural sequences and the third, a complex structural sequence. One simple, structural approach was to avoid reciprocating distributive strategy by responding with a question or by sharing interest-based information. Another simple, structural approach was to respond to a distributive strategy with a process intervention, like labeling the process as ineffective (e.g., “This discussion is getting us nowhere, let’s move on”) or suggesting a break. The complex, structural approach not only involved reciprocating (e.g., countering a threat with a threat) but also pairing the counterthreat with a question about interests (e.g., a suggestion that the negotiators refocus on interests).Other studies describing transitions (McGinn, Lingo, & Ciano, 2004) and interruptions (Kolb, 2004) are consistent with the structural sequences identified by Brett and colleagues (1998). Kolb (2004) listed five moves that may restore equity or engage the other party more deeply in the negotiation: interrupt the action (take a break), name a challenge, question the move, correct impressions, and divert to the problem. McGinn and colleagues (2004) identified seven transitions that they saw as abrupt (emotional outbursts, personalized value statements, and cutting off a conflict spiral) or gradual (trust testing, addressing assumptions, clarifying process, and discussing feedback). However, the authors portrayed the general effectiveness of these interruptions and transitions for changing strategic direction as uncertain. They cautioned that context is important—a transition may successfully turn a negotiation in one context but not another.
Variability in the effectiveness of interruptions and transitions may stem from negotiators’ perceptions. Perceptions of interruptions and transitions may depend on the relationship between the negotiators (good, bad; trusting, distrusting), the compatibility of their goals (individualistic, cooperative, and mixed), and the nature of the interruption or transition (crisis/negative or breakthrough/posi- tive; Druckman, Olekalns, & Smith, 2009).
Variation in effectiveness may also stem from the source: whether the interruption or transition was motivated by external events beyond the parties’ control (e.g., new information, new parties such as a mediator) or by internal events (e.g., the structural sequences described above).Case study research considers particular contexts, suggesting that transitions precipitated by external events can lead to progress on security issues, while transitions precipitated by internal events can propel trade and political negotiations (Druckman, 2001). Experimental research on external events is limited and not fully consistent with the case studies. In one study, a crisis message in a low-trust climate motivated negotiators to reconsider their strategies but not to progress toward an agreement. In contrast, when trust was high, the crisis message did not lead negotiators to reconsider their strategies, but it did encourage them to progress toward agreement (Druckman et al., 2009). The researchers concluded that the context (trusting or not) into which external events intercede affects their ability to move the negotiators toward or away from agreement. When negotiators trust, their strategies seem robust to external events. When negotiators do not trust, external events only exacerbate their mutual suspicion. Thus, trust appears to determine strategy on both a static basis (as described above) and a dynamic basis by determining whether negotiators change strategy or carry on in the face of external events.