Conclusion

Unamendability may be a useful constitutional preservative mechanism. It might also be desirable from a paternalistic perspective with its expressive effects,^[259] or as means for reducing wasteful spending in rent-seeking.^[260] Nevertheless, as this chapter demonstrated, unamendability raises many theoretical and practical objec­tions.

Indeed, unamendability is a ‘complex and potentially controversial constitutional instrument, which should be applied with care, and reserved only for the basic principles of the democratic order’.^[262] Nevertheless, if the theory of unamendability is correctly construed in light of the theoretical distinction between the primary and secondary constituent powers, many of the objections to unamendability are relaxed. Most importantly, unamendability and its judicial enforcement should be regarded not as completely preventing democratic deliberation on a given ‘una­mendable’ matter, but as making sure that certain changes take place via the proper participatory channel of higher level democratic deliberations. Understood in this way, the doctrine of constitutional unamendability can be seen as a safeguard of the people’s primary constituent power. Unamendability is therefore not an expression of necrocracy—a government whereby the people are governed by the dead, but rather as the ultimate expression of democracy.