Conclusion

The courts cannot become a forum where every single resource allocation deci­sion is fought out in detail through a long, complex and expensive litigation process. Courts also cannot venture too far into the realm of political and/ or expert-bureaucratic decision-making: as discussed previously, they lack the democratic legitimacy or the technical expertise to become social engineers.

However, this does not mean that courts cannot play a useful role in ensur­ing that resource allocation decisions meet basic needs and respect the entitle­ment of all humans to a dignified existence. At present, public authorities can make life-changing decisions to grant or deny access to social support without having to worry overmuch about judicial scrutiny of the substance of their deci­sions. However, a good case can be made that such decisions should be subject to heightened review by the courts when fundamental human interests are on the line. This would complement the functioning of the democratic process, not dis­place it. It would also be workable, on the basis that permission to apply for judi­cial review would only be available for cases whose facts disclosed the existence of a sufficiently grave situation. Finally, it would ensure some degree of protection for basic socio-economic rights which currently lack any real legal status within the UK's constitutional order.

At present, the desire to keep law free of any entanglement with social justice has limited the reach of legal accountability mechanisms. However, it is time to re-think the relationship between public law regulation and resource allocation in the social welfare context. Legal accountability has come to play an important role in regulating public administration: it is time its remit was extended to help ensure that public authorities comply with the basic requirements of social justice.