CONCLUSION

It should be remembered that the reform of federalism seemed severely wounded, if not dead, in December 2004, when it was announced that the Federalism Commission had failed to reach consensus.

Given the current high and even alarming levels of indebtedness in most of the American states, an American observer might express approval of the provisions of the German finance reform of 2009. On the other hand, much of the debt incurred by American states has been the result not only of rising costs, such as Medicaid, or of alleged profligate spending but also of resistance by states to raising sufficient revenues. Given the legal inability of states to borrow money to balance their budgets, drastic cuts, including cuts in core services such as education, have been made since the current recession began in 2008. It is unlikely that Germans would accept such cuts. In his review of the finance reform of 2009, Joachim Wieland notes the effects of the recession and costs of unification on German finances, but he adds that bankruptcy is not appropriate or feasible for the social welfare state provided by the Basic Law (constitution).

Assessments of the reform of 2006 have been made since it was enacted, and they are continuing. However, they are still preliminary and must await developments in the coming years before they can be seen as definitive. Assessments of the reform of 2009 are even more preliminary, since some provisions affecting the federation will go into effect only in the next few years, and others concerning the Länder will not be applicable for as long as a decade from now. The public debt crises and resulting drastic cuts in the budgets of Greece and Ireland and the cuts imposed by other EU governments, especially the government of British Prime Minister David Cameron, occurred in the spring and fall of 2010, after the 2009 finance reform was passed, but they may represent a challenge to the assertion that such cuts could not occur in Germany.

1 For analyses of the 2005 federal elections, see “Special Issue: The German Election of 2005,” German Politics 15, no. 4 (December 2006); “Special Issue: The 2005 Bundestag Election, ” German Politics and Society 24, no. 1 (spring 2006), and the “Wahlanalyse 2005” in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ) 51–52/2005 (19 December 2005).

2 For an analysis of the failed federalism reform of 2004, see Arthur B. Gunlicks, “German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts, ” German Law Journal, no. 10 (1 October 2005) http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=634.

3 Cf. Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s (Kingston: Queen’s Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1996), 1–2 and by the same author, “Comparative Conclusions, ” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, edited by Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and Douglas M. Brown (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2006): 322. See also Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (London and New York: Routledge 2006).

4 For a brief overview of the Holy Roman Empire, the German Confederation, the North German Federation, and the unification of the Germany under Bismarck, see Arthur B. Gunlicks, The Länder and German Federalism (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 2004), chap. 1: 7–26.

5 For a review of the changes in regime over the past two centuries, see ibid.: 26–42.

6 Ibid., 43–4 and Uwe Leonardy, “Territorial Reform of the Länder: A Demand of the Basic Law, ” in Arthur B. Gunlicks (ed.), German Public Policy and Federalism: Current Debates on Political, Legal, and Social Issues (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books 2003), chap. 3.

7 Arthur B. Gunlicks, “The Land Constitutions, ” in The Länder and German Federalism, chap. 4; “State (Land) Constitutions in Germany, ” Rutgers Law Journal 31, no. 4 (summer 2000): 971–98; and “The Land Constitutions in Germany, ” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 28, no. 4 (autumn 1998): 105–25.

8 The originators of this term are Fritz W. Scharpf, Bernd Reissert, and Fritz Schnabel, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Foderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag 1976).

9 Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland: Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel, ” in Foderalismus: Analysen in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher und vergleichender Perspektive, edited by Arthur Benz and Gerhard Lehmbruch (Westdeutscher Verlag 2002): 53–110, especially 71.

10 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.”

11 Fritz Scharpf, “Kann es in Europa eine stabile foderale Balance geben?” in Fritz Scharpf, Optionen des Foderalismus in Deutschland und Europa (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag 1994): 125.

12 This section is based on Gunlicks, The Länder, 55–60.

13 And certainly not “equal living conditions, ” the official English translation of the Basic Law.

14 This section is based on Gunlicks, The Länder, 60–4.

15 Konrad Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller 1962).

16 Heidrun Abromeit, Der verkappte Einheitsstaat (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 1992).

17 See Gunlicks, The Länder, 173–90; Gunlicks, “Financing the German Federal System: Problems and Prospects, ” German Studies Review 23, no. 3 (October 2000): 533–55.

18 Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb und Bundesstaat. Regelsysteme und Spannungslagen im Institutionsgefüge für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3d ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 2000).

19 For a brief overview of Solidarity Pacts I and II, see Gunlicks, “The Impact of Unification on German Federalism, ” in The Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes, edited by Winand Gellner and John D. Robertson (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2003): 140–2.

20 Bundesministerium des Innern, Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets (Ernst-Commission) (Bonn 1976).

21 Joanna McKay, “Berlin-Brandenburg? Nein danke! The Referendum on the Proposed Länderfusion, ” German Politics 5, no. 3 (December 1996): 485–502. A new attempt at a referendum was originally planned for 2006, but it has now been deferred to 2013. See “Wir werden arm sein, aber glücklich, ” Das Parlament (24 January 2005): 9.

22 Gunlicks, “German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts.”

23 Gunlicks, “German Federalism Reform: Part One, ” German Law Journal 8, no. 1 (1 January 2007): www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=792.

24 Much of the discussion below is based on ibid.

25 “Equivalent living conditions” do not exist “when the living conditions in the Länder have developed apart from and affected negatively the federal social order or such a development appears concretely to be occurring.” BVerfGE 112, 226/244. For a critical view of the concept of “uniform” or “equivalent” living conditions and what the author sees as unjustifiably broad and generous interpretations usually applied to both terms, see Timo Hebeler, “Die Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhältnisse im Grundgesetz, ” Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 21 (2006): 301–20.

26 BVerfGE 106, 62; BVerfGE 110, 141; and BVerfGE 111, 10. These decisions from 2002 and 2004 rejected the federal government’s contention that it was “essential” to pass certain laws regulating, respectively, nursing homes, dangerous dogs, and store closing hours. Some legal commentators have suggested in their analyses that the above decisions and others had raised questions even before the federalism reform of 2006 about the federation’s continued exercise of concurrent powers. See Christoph Degenhart, “Die Neuordnung der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen durch die Foderalismusreform, ” Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 25, Heft 11 (15 November 2006): 1210.

27 For a criticism of these changes, see Lothar Knopp, “Foderalismusreform–zurück zur Kleinstaaterei?” Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 25, Heft 11 (15 November 2006): 1219–20.

28 For analyses of the changes in concurrent powers, see Thomas Mayen, “Neuordnung der Gesetzgebugskompetenzen von Bund und Ländern, ” Deutsche Richter Zeitung 85 (February 2007): 51–2; Walter Franz, “Gesetzgebungskompetenzen nach der Foderalismusreform, ” Jura 29, Heft 3 (2007): 165–7; Peter Selmer, “Die Foderalismusreform – Eine Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung, ” Juristische Schulung 46, Heft 12 (Dezember 2006): 1056–7.

29 BverfGE 111, 226, and BVerfGE 112, 226. These decisions in 2004 and 2005 questioned, respectively, the authority of the federal government to regulate the details of junior professor positions in German universities and to regulate university tuition fees.

30 For a critical assessment of the repeal of Article 75, see Knopp, “Foderalismusreform–zurück zur Kleinstaaterei?” 1216–20.

31 For a moderately critical view: Michael Kotulla, “Umweltschutzgesetzgebungskompetenzen und ‘Foderalismusreform, ’” Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 26, Heft 5 (15 May 2007): 489–95; more positive: Michael Kloepfer, “Die neue Abweichungsgesetzgebung der Länder und ihre Auswirkungen auf den Umseltbereich, ” in Wege gelebter Verfassung in Recht und Politik: Festschrift für Rupert Scholz zum 70.

32 For analyses of the federalism reform on science and research, see Eberhard Schmidt-Aβmann, “Die Bundeskompetenzen für die Wissenschaftsforderung nach der Foderalismusreform, ” in Staat im Wort: Festschrift für Josef Isensee, edited by Otto Depenhauer et al. (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller Verlag 2007): 405–21, and Jorg Ennuschat and Carsten Ulrich, “Neuverteilung der Kompetenzen von Bund und Ländern im Schul- und Hochschulbereich nach der Foderalismusreform, ” Verwaltungsblätter für Baden-Württemberg, Heft 4 (1 April 2007): 121–5.

33 For a detailed analysis of current law concerning store closing hours, see Thorsten Kingreen and Bodo Pieroth, “Verfassungsrechtiche Grenzen einer Aufhebung der Landenschlusszeiten, ” Neue Zeitung für Verwaltungsrecht 25, Heft 11 (15 November 2006): 1221–6. Also Holger Schmitz, “Die Ladenoffnung nach der Foderalismusreform, ” Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 27, Heft 1 (15 January 2008): 18–24.

34 For analyses of the smoking ban in restaurants and some continuing problems of interpretation, see Carsten Wendtland, “Das Rauchen in Gaststätten: Ein Härtetest für die Kompetenzordnung nach der Foderalismusreform, ” Die offentliche Verwaltung (dov) 60, Heft 15 (August 2007): 647–52; Wolfram Forsterling, “Kompetenzrechtliche Probleme nach der Foderalismusreform, ” Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 22 (1, 2007): 36–61, and, for a view critical of giving this competence to the Länder, see Helmut Siekmann, “Die Zuständigkeit des Bundes zum Erlass umfassender Rauchverbote nach In-Kraft-Treten der ersten Stufe der Foderalismusreform, ” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 59, Heft 47 (20 November 2006): 3382–5.

35 Karl-Michael Reineck, “Die Foderalismusreform 2006,” Deutsche Verwaltungspraxis 57 (12/2006): 488.

36 Since 1949 all German governments have been coalition governments. The CDU/ CSU gained an absolute majority in 1953, but it formed a coalition government anyway.

37 Actual vetoes are small in number, though they do occur.

38 More common are forced compromises put together by members of the Bundesrat and Bundestag in the mediation committee.

39 See, for example, Peter M. Huber, “Klare Verantwortungstellung von Bund, Ländern und Kommunen?” Gutachten D zum 65. Deutschen Juristentag 33 (2004).

40 Of course popular discontent with politicians and parties is hardly limited to Germany.

41 Irene Kesper, “Reform des Foderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ” Niedersächsishce Verwaltungsblätter 6 (1 June 2006): 146; Stephanie Schmahl, “Bundesverfassungsrechtliche Neujustierung des Bund-Länder-Verhältnisses im Bereich der Gesetzgebung, ” in Jahrbuch des Foderalismus 2006 (Tübingen: Europäisches Zentrum für Foderalismus-Forschung 2006): 233 ff.

42 See note 32, above, on assessments of amendments regarding financing of scientific facilities and research.

43 An overview, discussion, and analysis of Federalism Reform I can be found in Ralf Thomas Baus, Henrik Scheller, and Rudolf Hrbek (Hrsg.), Der deutsche Foderalismus 2020 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2009).

44 The official report of the Commission, including its organization, deliberations, and results, can be found in Die gemeinsame Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der Bund-Länder Finanzbeziehungen: Die Beratungen und ihre Ergebnisse (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag und Bundesrat 2010).

45 For a general review of the provisions of the reform of 2009, see, for example, Christian Waldhoff and Peter Dieterich, “Die Foderalismusreform II–Instrument zur Bewältigung der staatlichen Finanzkrise oder verfassungsrechtliches Placebo?” Zeitschrift für Gesetzbegung 24 (2009): 97–123. A more comprehensive discussion of the changes can be found in the constitutional commentary of Dieter Homig (Hrsg.), Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 9th edition (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2010).

46 Waldhoff and Dieterich, Foderalismusreform II: 100.

47 For a series of articles in English assessing the 2006 federalism reform, see “Special Issue: German Federalism in Transition?” ed. by Wade Jacoby and Carolyn Moore, German Politics 17, no. 4 (December 2008).

48 For a discussion of the pros and cons of fiscal equalization transfers between fiscally stronger and weaker Länder, see Clemens Fuest, “Würde mehr Steuerautonomie die finanzschwachen Bundesländer benachteiligen?” Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtwissenschaft 91 (2008): 200–12.

49 See, for example, Leonardy, “Territorial Reform of the Länder, ” chap. 3; Gunlicks, “The Impact of Unification on German Federalism, ” 142–4.

50 For an argument that the federalism reform of 2006 will fail because of the unwillingness to address the financial and territorial reform required for more competitive Länder, see Christian Schimansky and Bernhard Losch, “Warum die Foderalismusreform keinen Erfolg haben wird, ” Recht und Politik 43, (1, 2007): 18–25; criticism of this assessment on the grounds that it is too simplistic and ignores the question of how far competition can go without giving up the advantages of being part of a larger unit can be found in Hans Peter Bull, “Foderalismusreform auf falscher Fährte, ” Recht und Politik 43, (2, 2007): 67–72.

51 Hans Peter Bull, cited above, raises questions about just how more Land autonomy would improve the lives of citizens and makes the point that globalization, climate change, nuclear power, and other challenges, including pressures from the EU, require responses at higher levels, not more Land autonomy. See also Fuest, “Würde mehr Steuerautonomie die finanzschwachen Bundesländer benachteiligen?” 200–11.

52 Lehmbruch, “Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland: Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel, ” 55–80; also Lehmbruch, “Strategische Alternativen und Spielräume bei der Reform des Bundesstaates, ” Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 2, no. l (April 2004): 82–93.

53 For an overview in English, see Beate Jochimsen, “Fiscal Federalism in Germany: Problems, Proposals and Chances for Fundamental Reforms, ” German Politics 17, no. 4 (December 2008): 541–58. For an overview in German, see, for example, the relevant selections in Der deutsche Foderalismus 2020.

54 Waldhoff and Dieterich, “Die Foderalismusreform II”: 109–10.

55 Ibid.: 111–17.

56 Ibid.: 120.

57 The Federal Constitutional Court said in a 2007 decision concerning the public finance system that “clearly there can hardly be any doubt that the current constitutional regulations need to be revised.” (BVerfGE 119, 96 [141]).

58 Ibid., 122.

59 Joachim Wieland, “Modernisierung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen, ” Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 91 (2008): 128.