CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM FROM A SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The study of constitutional federalism is usually approached from the vantage point of the federal constitution. Analyzing constitutional arrangements in such a top-down fashion encourages one to frame questions from the perspective of the federal government: what powers does the federal government have, what constitutional impediments stand in the way of it achieving its objectives, and to what extent does the federal constitution mandate certain constitutional structures for the sub-national units of the federation? Much less common is the view from below; indeed, subnational constitutions remain as low-visibility constitutions to citizens and scholars alike.¹⁵ Yet the sub-national perspective yields insights that tend to be ignored or slighted by the national perspective.¹⁶ More specifically, it highlights four questions: (1) what range of discretion ( “constitutional space”) is available to constituent units in designing their constitutional arrangements, and how are the boundaries of that space policed, (2) what factors influence the scope of sub-national constitutional space in various federal systems, (3) why have sub-national units occupied or failed to occupy the constitutional space available to them, and (4) what have been the consequences of sub-national constitutionalism for horizontal and vertical relations within the federal system?¹⁷