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FRAMEWORK: SOME BASIC EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES

The EU is “blind” to the internal territorial arrangements chosen by the Member States.4 It does not propose a model.5 Instead the States maintain the prerogative of choosing a model for territorial organization: federation, a unitary model, or some form of decentralization.

The principle of “European blindness” to the internal territorial and constitutional choices of its Member States is expressed by Article 4, paragraph 2, TEU. According to this provision, “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions.” This principle should not be interpreted so broadly that it prevents the Union from achieving the objectives stated in the Treaty and carrying out the policies adopted pursuant to it, nor so narrowly that basic domestic ideas are ignored. Notwithstanding this, the EU has taken certain steps towards decentralization as a guarantee of respect for the democratic clause (especially for the new Member States) or as the best administrative way to achieve European goals.

The “regional blindness” is also expressed by the principle of unity. Since the 1990s, the European Court of Justice has ruled that “Member State, for the purposes of the institutional provisions, refers only to government authorities of the Member States of the European Communities and cannot include the governments of regions or autonomous communities, irrespective of the powers they may have.”6 In other words, it is the Member State that is responsible vis-à-vis the Commission for due performance of its obligations and, consequently, subject to possible legal action pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU).7 The State cannot allege that provisions, practices, or circumstances existing within its internal legal system justify a failure to comply with obligations and time limits laid down by European Union law.

Article 4, TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, explicitly combines the principle of autonomy, or “European blindness regarding the national constitutional choices,” with another basic principle: the principle of co-operation.8 This principle is double-tracked.

It is able to affect the relationship between the EU and the Member States (and vice-versa), and from a horizontal perspective it may also have an effect upon relationships among Member States. Indeed, Article 4, paragraph 2, states that “[p] ursuant to the principle of sincere co-operation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” In other terms, this new provision points out the bi-univocal dimension of the principle, which implies that the EU is obliged to cooperate with the Member States.9

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Source: Burgess Michael (ed.). Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: Sub-National Perspectives. McGill-Queen's University Press,2012. — 352 p.. 2012
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