Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument
Those are the constraints on the players in the original position: they are self-interested but not envious, and they operate behind the veil of ignorance.
The game requires them to agree unanimously on a system of ground rules for the state, those rules being the principles of justice. We need now to consider the argument for the claim that the two principles would be unanimously chosen by self-interested, nonenvious rational people behind the veil of ignorance in the original position.Rawls' arguments for this claim are long and complex. They depend, in essence, on comparing his two principles with other principles of justice—such as utilitarianism, which says that what is just is what maximizes utility—that have been offered. He then shows why the players in the original position would prefer his two principles both to these other options, and, of course, to the state of nature.
But the core of his argument is that maximin considerations require people behind the veil of ignorance, who are ignorant of their own position, to accept only principles that protect the worst-off; that way they will be maximizing the worst that can happen to them once the veil of ignorance is lifted and they discover what their position is to be. That is why they will want to guarantee themselves equality with others, unless protecting the worst-off requires some inequality.
Many kinds of criticisms can be raised of Rawls' defense of his two principles. Some of them have to do with detailed aspects of his presentation, and these I shall not consider. But there are crucial objections that can be made to his arguments, objections that go right to the heart of his project.
I shall mention one preliminary criticism only to put it aside: given the difference principle, Rawls is committed to interpersonal comparisons of utilities. This is because we are to consider all the possible social institutions and see which one does best for the worst off.
But since different people will be worst off in different institutions, Rawls must be able to compare the utilities of different people. I have already said that there is reason to doubt that this can be done, but, for the moment, let us suppose that it can.Rawls' argument is
a) that his principles would be chosen as the result of a certain n-person non-constant-sum bargaining game and
b)"Times New Roman"'> that, once we understand why that game is constructed as it is, we shall see that this offers grounds for thinking that his principles are indeed just.
There are, therefore, two major sorts of criticism we can make of his work. First, we can argue—against (a)—that he has not shown that his principles would be chosen by rational people in the game he describes; second, we can argue—against (b)—that they would not be justified, even if we could show that they would be chosen in that game.
Let me start with an objection to (a).
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