Planning Postwar Science

In the summer of 1944, while he was working in the Radiation Laboratory, Samuelson and Rupert Maclaurin turned their attention to the problem of science policy after the war. This was controversial owing in part to the efforts of Harvey Kilgore, the populist U.S.

Samuelson had worked on Maclaurin's project in the summer of 1941, but been forced to withdraw very early on because of his commitments to the NRPB. His interest in the science funding would appear to have grown out of his work in the Radiation Laboratory, where he had first-hand experience of what federal support for science could achieve, as well as discussions with his extensive network of contacts in Washington and his conversations with Guerlac. The immediate stimulus to write about the subject came from the appointment of a committee chaired by Charles Wilson, president of General Electric, which had been formed to advise on the best way to carry out the fundamental research needed by the military after the war, following on from the wartime success of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).²⁰

Samuelson was especially worried about the possibility that government- supported research would be scaled down substantially once the war ended, and he expressed his concern about the plans of the Wilson Committee even before they were published.

Coil shared Samuelson’s letter about the Wilson Committee with Bruce Bliven, the editor of The New Republic, who asked him to find someone who might write an article on the subject. When Bliven, with whom Samuelson had been in correspondence earlier in the summer about two articles on the problem of postwar unemployment, contacted Samuelson directly, Samuelson suggested Guerlac, though he feared that because of his role as Radiation Laboratory’s official historian, Guerlac might feel he was party to too much confidential information to be able to write on the subject.^22,6 When Samuelson suggested to Bliven that he might write an editorial him­self, he got an enthusiastic response.^23,f

Samuelson eventually produced a draft editorial for Bliven, but by this time their original concern had been overtaken by events. The Wilson report had been published, and on November 17, 1944, Roosevelt invited Vannevar Bush, the MIT engineer who was head of the OSRD, to prepare a report on the problem. Samuelson explained to Bliven that the situation was not as bad as it had been in August, for it looked as though the policy of rapidly wind­ing up government research activity had been reversed.²⁴ “However,” he con­tinued, “there are still no indications of an adequate postwar program.

Samuelson then listed a number of points that he had not been able to make in his draft, which Bliven had asked to be less than a thousand words.

e. Samuelson’s other articles in The New Republic are discussed in chapter 23 this volume.

f. While Samuelson was having these discussions with Bliven, Maclaurin drafted a proposal to study, through a survey, the relation between fundamental research at universities and industrial development. This proposal was Maclaurin’s, but it contained ideas that so clearly echoed Samuelson’s thinking that it is virtually certain that they had discussed it. Though defense might be the initial motivation, “Military research should be simply the opening wedge in a forward program of encouraging technical progress” that would be of benefit to industry. Government research might lead to a reduction in the “relative prestige” of large companies, currently responsible for much research, but they would not suffer in any absolute sense. Smaller companies that did not have research capabilities would, of course, benefit and the result would be healthier competition. Samuelson also drew on his own experience in the Radiation Laboratory to claim that “centralized research in OSRD laboratories” was much more effective than research funded by federal grants-in aid.

Given both the appearance of the Wilson report and the publication of Roosevelt’s letter, it was inevitable that Bliven would ask for altera­tions: the material was more topical than ever, but it did not reflect what had happened. He told Samuelson that he had been impressed with a recent article in Science, written by Rear Admiral J. A. Furer, a navy repre­sentative on the Wilson Committee.²⁵ Furer made a case for the commit­tee’s proposals, citing the example of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics as a precedent for a coordinating body made up of “civil­ians of distinction in science, engineering and industry” plus military offi­cers.

Samuelson, in his reply to Bliven, agreed that the Wilson report was “somewhat impressive, especially in view of what might have been expected from it,” but he was not convinced.²⁷ He responded to Furer’s argument about the NSRB’s not having its own laboratories by pointing out that the Radiation Laboratory’s being at MIT was “a mere formality.” In fact, he pointed out, it “has little to do with M.I.T. and it is the OSRD” (emphasis in original). Making his point with non-MIT examples, he continued,

Ask any producing scientist whether grantsinaid to the Applied Mathematics Panel or to, say, the Radio Research Laboratory at Harvard[,] are more productive. He is sure to select the latter and this is always the case.

The most productive research had been organized in precisely the way Furer was arguing against. He suggested Bliven talk to Merle Tuve, a geophysicist at Johns Hopkins, who had “the best grasp of the problem of anyone on the committee.” Though he made it clear that he was not in any way questioning his integrity, he argued that Jewett's position reflected a way of thinking that stemmed from his position as president of the National Academy of Sciences. The implied message was that Bliven should continue to work for better policies; it was only “because of continuous pressure” that the Wilson Committee had made reasonable recommendations.

Bliven proposed that they add a new introduction, because Samuelson jumped into the middle of the problem without explaining that science had contributed much to the war effort and that science would continue to play an important role. Bliven also translated Samuelson's comments on the attitudes of those involved into more diplomatic, though still hard-hitting language:²⁸

A good many well known scientists, however, take their coloration from the conservative business men who are their associates, and seem terribly alarmed lest government aid to scientific research should interfere with the sacred fetish of “private enterprise.” There is a real danger that they may cripple scientific research by turning it over to the same auspices which helped bring us to such a perilous condition in 1941.²⁹

Samuelson thought this revised introduction “first rate,” though it perhaps underestimated the extent to which the scientists themselves held conserva­tive views.³⁰ Bliven's introduction led straight into an account of the Wilson Committee, pointing out that it was concerned narrowly with “techni­cal military scientific research,” and describing it as “an able but cautious report which shows the marks of compromise.” In arguing that the president should appoint the board, he suggested that giving this responsibility to the National Academy of Sciences would be like suggesting “that the carpenters' union should elect members of a board which is to plan public works.”³¹ Given conservative attitudes toward unions, this was a strong claim.

Explaining that the full extent of scientific advance was still a military secret (the first atomic bomb had not yet been dropped on Hiroshima), Samuelson picked out a few achievements that relied on scientific advances (interception of enemy aircraft, victory over submarines, continuous blind­bombing of Germany), and emphasized that this had involved “a great deal of luck,” because before 1939, “only pitiful driblets were available for funda­mental research in the same fields which now engage hundreds of physicists and electrical engineers.” The need for luck should be reduced by establish­ing an organization that would provide grants-in-aid to universities and laboratories, and undertake sustained fundamental research and develop­ment.” Samuelson argued that the country could no longer afford not to do this: imaginative plans were also needed in nonmilitary fields. If scientists did not come up with an adequate program, there was the danger that others might do so, and the result would be something that was less effective.