The Bowman Committee

When Roosevelt asked him to prepare a report on postwar science policy, Bush immediately set up four committees to advise him, writing answers to each of the four questions that Roosevelt had posed.

Samuelson drafted the memorandum that formed the basis for discussion at the first meeting of the Steering Committee on January 3, 1945.³⁵ It began by establishing the breadth of Roosevelt’s directive, beginning with “pure (or fundamental) and applied research,” carried out in universities, private and government laboratories, and industry. It listed the reasons why research was desirable for the nation, as well as reasons why funding for research had declined: the distribution of income was becoming more equal, so that the wealthy could provide fewer funds; bond yields were low; too little research had been undertaken during the Depression and wartime; the purchasing power of the postwar research dollar had been halved; and universities were under pressure (high teaching loads and low salaries).

This memorandum, presumably prepared in collaboration with Maclaurin, flagged important issues to be discussed. Should economies of scale be sacrificed by decentralizing research across large and small univer­sities? Should research be used to aid backward industries (textiles, hous­ing, agriculture), and should it be used as a weapon against monopoly? Could government support research without controlling it? How were pure and applied research to be defined? What conditions were to be applied to the distribution of research funding? It concluded with a note on “possible instrumentalities”—branches of the Office of Education or the Department of the Interior, or an independent Executive Office combining military and civilian research agencies. It provided a comprehensive outline of the tasks to be undertaken.

One of the issues occupying the committee was how to define different types of science: Should they use the terminology of pure and applied science, or prefer terms such as “basic” or “fundamental” science? This was crucial because it was widely assumed that applied research, which resulted in ideas that could be protected by patents and exploited commercially, would be undertaken by industry, without any government support.

The dominant voices on the Bowman Committee were clearly those of the natural scientists and engineers. These came with deeply held views about sci­ence that they had been developing for many years. The key players—Bush, Conant, Compton, and Jewett—were all suspicious of government control, concerned with preventing federal support for science being provided in such a way as to reduce scientists’ freedom. Though they had different visions of the institutional setting in which scientists would prosper—laboratories in which scientists engaged in long-term collaborative projects, or common rooms in which individuals conversed—Conant and Compton were agreed on enhancing the role of pure scientific research driven by the curiosity of the scientist. But although it was the scientists on the committee whose views

g. Samuelson recommended that Guerlac would be a good person to deal with the problem of defining pure science, but the committee did not take up this suggestion. dominated, the members of the secretariat were not mere scribes. They had strong views of their own, and their role gave them the power to influence the committee’s discussions.

Samuelson, with his recent experience at the Radiation Laboratory, and Guerlac, whose views went back to his PhD thesis on military research in eighteenth-century France, were convinced that wartime experience of planned research could carry over into peacetime.³⁶ They had a powerful ally in Rabi, who could also see the importance of planned science. However, theirs was a minority view, for most committee members were fearful that planned science would undermine the freedom of the individual scientist, and that government funding would likely lead to undesirable government control. It was necessary to find a balance that would ensure adequate fund­ing while minimizing the control and interference by nonscientists feared by committee members.

The term “scientific high command” was the heading on an undated note, presumably written early in the Bowman Committee’s deliberations, and clearly not intended for wider distribution on account of its sharp criticism of prominent scientists, especially ofJewett.³⁷ Its tone and conclusions reflect the position taken in Samuelson’s editorial in The New Republic, suggesting he might have been its author.³⁸ It assessed the current situation, described the sentiments of leading scientific decision makers in scientific matters, and provided an inventory of possible solutions. The last ran from the most con­servative to the most radical: letting the army and navy do everything, using existing institutions such as the National Academy of Sciences, or creating a permanent government bureau.

There had been, so this document argued, a “gradual realization” even among the more conservative voices that “some planning” was necessary to ensure “adequate use of science by the State.” Cooperation between civilian scientists and the armed forces had been successful in wartime, and a way should be found to continue this. Moreover, the reality of the situation was that there was a “small number of scientists” who would remain in “key positions” regardless of what would happen.^h This is what the document described as a “close inner gang” of “Eastern seaboard and MIT” Republicans, who were anti-bureaucratic and, though conservative, were patriotic rather than reactionary. This group had done an “extraordinary job” in bringing civilian scientists to the study of war-related problems, and they determined to go “all out” in keeping this active after the war. The document then

h. Such as Bush, Jewett, Conant, Hunsaker, Tuve, and Compton. discussed alternative organizational forms, but subsequent discussions in the Bowman Committee exposed the sensitivity of any such proposal.

A draft report, partly written by committee members and partly by the secretariat, was discussed at the end of March, in a meeting held at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.³⁹ The minutes, written by Samuelson and another member of the secretariat, show that even at this point there was deep disagreement over the need for federal funding.

The dispute was resolved by prefacing the report with what Bowman called a “statement of social philosophy.”⁴⁰ Starting with the familiar trope of the closing of the frontier, it argued that even if the geographical frontier had closed, “there always remains one inexhaustible national resource—creative scientific research.”⁴¹ It expressed pride in existing institutions and spelled out arguments against federal control made by committee members, before explaining that federal funding was a conclusion to which the committee had been “forced.” It then argued that the committee’s proposals for federal funding were rooted in American traditions.

Basically this problem is but one example of a continuing series of similar problems raised by the American experiment.

Setting up a new institution was presented as a necessity to which the com­mittee had agreed only reluctantly, and it must be done in such a way as to avoid centrally planning science.

The organization or instrument finally set up should be such as to eliminate political influence and to escape undesirable pressures. It should not itself attempt to play the role of an all-seeing, all-wise planning board attempting to guide in detail the normal growth­processes of science.⁴³

The report was agreed upon and transmitted to Bush, who used it as the basis for his own report, published in July 1945 as Science: Endless Frontier, to which it was published as an appendix.^44,i

In a letter to Bush, Bowman pointed out the importance of what he called the statement of social philosophy.

This statement was very carefully drafted. It contains the best judg­ment of the committee. It is a deliberate judgment following wide differences of opinion at the beginning. It is a unanimous judgment. Without these few pages on social philosophy about half of the com­mittee would be unwilling to sign our report. I would be among that half. We must express our fears regarding Federal control and we must state explicitly how we would avoid such control. Having done so, we are ready to present our recommendations regarding the scale of sup­port and the method of distribution.⁴⁵

Samuelson’s involvement with the Bowman Committee might seem far removed from his other concerns, for none of his own publications had dealt with the topic, but it was not. Working with Hansen, he had become con­vinced that government had an important role to play in sustaining a mixed capitalist economy. The same political philosophy, emphasizing individual freedom and initiative, but with government action to undertake tasks that private business would neglect, can be seen in his work on the management

i. This explains why Samuelson could include the Bush report in his bibliography, with a note saying that he had written much of it.

of science and economic management.’ And, at least since his undergraduate years, science had been a particular concern; mixing with scientists in the Society of Fellows, at MIT, in the Radiation Laboratory, and in the Bowman Committee was undoubtedly very important to him. Being able to bring his expertise as an economist to help create an environment in which sci­ence could flourish would have been something to which he attached great importance. The Bowman Committee also exposed him to the arguments that were used to attack not just government-funded science but government involvement in the economy more generally. These arguments were wielded by people whose scientific credentials he respected and that merited being taken seriously. The experience of producing a document that was accept­able to the entire committee would have been a lesson to Samuelson in how to present state intervention in a manner that was acceptable to those who equated being American with opposing government control of individual activities.