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CONCLUSION

Which is the optimal solution in the trade-off between realism and complexity in an Agent Based Model? Answering this question seems to become more and more important since Agent Based Models may become a standard tool for Central Banks to understand complex interac­tions of market participants and of several events from perspectives other than those offered by the mainstream tools.

This has become evident in the wake of the crisis, in which Central Banks sought for further methods, besides the classic economic research tools, to understand the rapidly changing environment and to calibrate their interventions in the market anticipating the possible impacts. Network topology is one example of a new in­teresting tool recently added to policy makers’ toolbox to tackle the crisis (Haldane, 2009). In the same way, Agent Based Modeling in the field of the payment system and money market seems a promising possible complementary tool which should allow Central Bankers to take heteroge­neous behaviours into consideration.

Under these conditions, new application fields could be imagined for Agent Based Modeling, which could be addressed in the future to Central Banking issues. ABM could, for instance, be used to assess the effectiveness and the risks of the unconventional measures introduced from central banks as a response to the crisis (e.g. BoE’s and FED’s quantitative easing, ECB’s Securities Mar­ket Program, and so on). It could be also applied to evaluate the impacts and the second round effects of new regulations, which are currently discussed on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. the new EU regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act) and fostered by all international fora (FSRB, G20, and so one). Among these cases, ABM seems to be potentially fruitful in assessing the possible impact of banks delaying payments in response to the introduction of regulatory requirements, as e.g.

those recently introduced by the UK Financial Services Author­ity, which require banks to calibrate their liquid asset buffers to meet the intraday liquidity needs (Ball, et al., 2011). Finally, simulating the interac­tions of market participants’ behaviours could be helpful, for example, to deepen the debate on the mandatory use of central counterparty for OTC derivatives transactions, on the new regulation of rating agencies as well as on the impact of short selling restrictions. In this sense, Agent Based Modeling seems to have a brilliant future as support for policy makers and regulators, to evaluate proposals that could shape not only the payment system and the money market but the whole financial system of tomorrow.

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Arciero, L., DAurizio, L., Ilardi, G., Picillo, C., & Terna, P. (2010). Modelling banks’ treasurers behaviours in an RTGS system. Paper presented at 8th Bank of Finland Simulator Seminar and Workshop. Helsinki, Finland.

Armantier, O., McAndrews, J., & Arnold, J. (2008). Changes in the timing distribution of fedwire funds transfers. Economic Policy Review, 14(2), 83-112.

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Beyeler, W. E., Glass, R. J., Bech, M. L., & Soramaki, K. (2006). Congestion and cascades in payment systems. StaffReports 259. New York, NY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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(2011). An agent­based model of payment systems. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 35(6), 859-875. doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2010.11.001

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ENDNOTES

1 The opinions expressed herein are those of authors and do not commit the Banca d’Italia.

Some RTGS systems provide participants with queue management facilities which resubmit automatically payment without coverage every time an increase in the debited settlement account occurs (see BIS, 1997). These kinds of simulation exercises have been carried out with reference to DNS system operating in several countries: see e.g. Humphrey (1986), Angelini, Maresca, and Russo (1995), Kuussaari (1996), and on the Finnish interbank payment system, McAndrews and Wasilew (1995), Bech, et al. (2002).

To come back to the Angelini model: 1) the restriction only two banks and two periods (morning and afternoon); 2) the absence of reserve requirements and transaction costs related to borrowing or lending; 3) the risk of neutrality of agents.

The Financial Network Analyzer (FNA) de­veloped by K. Soramaki is another example of payment system simulator.

10

11

12

13

It should be noted that, in principle, the BoF-PSS2 can be enriched with behavioral functions, but this requires developing ad­ditional routines to be performed separately. An elegant but not definitive attempt to introduce behavioral reactions in a model simulating outages at participant level is carried out by Ledrut (2007), who assumes that banks stop sending payment to the hit participant when their exposure breach a pre-determined threshold.

Besides the cases discussed in this chapter other contributions are provided by Gal- biati and Soramaki (2010) and Beyeler et al. (2007).

The authors assume that outgoing payments stem from liabilities, which are negotiated in other departments in the bank and afterwards sent to the treasury for immediate settlement. Two settlement methods for the queued payments are tested both in the “opening liquidity” as well as in the “just-in-time” set up: first in first out criteria and a priority based on the size of the queued outflows. The first one appears to be the most efficient.

The discussed model extension is forthcom­ing by Arciero, D 'Aurizio, Ilardi, Picillo, and Terna.

A possible reference for an electronic platform for money market exchanges is the e-MID market: managed by an Italian company, e-MID SIM; this platform allows European banks to exchange deposits in euro from overnight to twelve months, by posting transparently on the screen their intention to buy or sell liquidity.

Without modeling the Central Bank and its monetary policy decisions, the system that can be simulated is similar to a framework in which the Central Bank has committed to keep rates unchanged so that the banks do not have interest rate expectations. The interest rate will, therefore, be expected to follow a mean-reverting process centred in the policy rate.

This work was previously published in Simulation in Computational Finance and Economics, edited by Biliana Alexandrova- Kabadjova, Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo, Alma Lilia Garcia-Almanza and Edward Tsang, pages 84-102, copyright 2013 by Business Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global).

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