CONCLUSION

In principle, online markets are prone to similar competition concerns as offline markets and competition policy can address many of the concerns by well-established competi­tion policy tools.

In addition, Internet markets are typically more dynamic than long-established goods markets. Any intervention has to balance safeguarding a fair and level playing field against maintaining incentives for innovative players in the markets. We conjecture that competition concerns at the service level can be widely solved by competition policy, whereas there is some scope for regulation at the infrastructure level. The degree of regu­lation and competition policy intervention certainly depends on competitive conditions, which differ in Europe and in the USA.

Areas for future research include the precise effects of APPAs, which are less well understood than traditional best-price clauses. In addition, major research efforts are necessary to better understand the value of data for competitive processes and the con­ditions under which databases may become essential for competition. Under what cir­cumstances do data become an essential facility? If data constitute a bottleneck, under what conditions should access be granted and how should the original data collector be compensated? Should data resources be specifically analyzed in merger proceedings? These questions lead to the further field of privacy and competition. While data sharing may be helpful to foster competition, if data are used as a resource, privacy concerns may arise, as subjects granting one company access to personal data may not be willing to do the same for another company.

NOTES

* We would like to thank Johannes Bauer for his extremely valuable comments on a draft of this chapter.

1. See, for example, Ellison and Ellison (2005), Evans and Schmalensee (2007, 2008), Evans (2013), Buccirossi (2013), Haucap and Heimeshoff (2014).

2. The capacity on one side of the market may be more limited than on the other. For example, the number of stands may be more limited at a trade show than the space for potential visitors.

3. This does not necessarily have to be the case though. Kaiser and Song (2009), for example, find in an empirical study of the German magazine market that readers tend to appreciate advertising in women’s magazines, business and politics magazines as well as in car magazines.

4. See also Evans and Noel (2008).

5. For a different conclusion see Luchetta (2014).

6. See ‘Algorithms’, accessed 22 August 2015 at http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/algo- rithms.html.

7. A much more detailed analysis of a potential antitrust case against Google and the costs and benefits of various remedies can be found in Pollock (2010), Manne and Wright (2011) and Bork and Sidak (2012).

8. See ‘Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialised search rivals - Frequently asked questions’, accessed 22 August 2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO- 14-87_en.htm?locale=en.

9. See ‘Statement on the Google investigation’, accessed 22 August 2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm.

10. See ‘Commission approves selective distribution system for Yves Saint Laurent perfume’, European Commission Press Release IP/01/713 of 17 May 2001, accessed 22 August 2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-01-713_en.htm?locale=en.

11. See United States of America v Apple Inc, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), Opinion & Order, p. 94, accessed 8 January 2016 at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=306.

12. See, for example, European Commission Decisions EL/2010/1113 and IT/2010/1103.

13. See Supreme Court of the United States, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).

14. See Supreme Court of the United States, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP (02-682), 540 U.S. 398 (2004), 305 F.3d 89, reversed and remanded.

15. Further surveys are provided by Faulhaber (2012) and Kramer et al. (2013).

16. See, for example, Director and Levi (1956), Posner (1979) and Bork (1993).

17. See, for example, Whinston (1990, 2006). Ahlborn et al. (2004) and Rey and Tirole (2007) provide over­views of post-Chicago models challenging the one-monopoly-rent hypothesis.

18. FCC File No. EB-05-ICH-0110, 2005.

19. The investigation was dropped under terms of a consent decree.

20. FCC File No. EB-08-ICH-1518, 2008.

21. Similarly, according to Section 2 of the Sherman Act dominant companies can be obliged to provide access to essential facilities. However, different from Europe, the FCC characterizes broadband services as information services and thus, cable net operators in the USA are not part of the Common Carrier obligation.

22. Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications net­works and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (Universal Service Directive).

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