PREPARING THE GROUND FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The literature on distributive justice is divided into two strands, a large normative one and a small descriptive one. The previous sections have considered the normative foundations of EOp.
This section and the next review the empirical evidence showing that in many societies, ordinary people distinguish between two causes of inequality: those for which individuals should not be held responsible, and those for which they should be. If people do make this distinction when discussing inequality, then implementing opportunity-equalizing policies may be politically more feasible than otherwise. The issue of social acceptance of the principle is even more important if one follows Roemer’s (1993) view according to which the cut between circumstances and effort should be a social and cultural decision, rather than a metaphysical one. Each society should determine the precise set of variables that describe the circumstances and the effort variables according to the views of its population. Intercultural differences in social preferences will obtain in this pragmatic view of EOp. Empirical work on intercultural differences in the attribution of the responsibility is then relevant. The state of our knowledge on these matters is still weak. Below, we list the most obvious candidates for an empirical assessment.The first issue concerns the so-called responsibility cut. In the philosophical literature, there is a debate between those who advocate that people should be responsible for their preferences (for example, Dworkin, 1981a,b; Fleurbaey, 2008) and those who argue that the responsibility variables should be those under the control of the individual (prominently, Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989).
The second issue concerns the correlation between effort and circumstances. Lifestyle choices (patterns of alcohol use, exercise, smoking, diet, and so on) are examples of variables under proximate personal control.
These choices are, however, influenced by family and social background. As we have said, for the measure of effort to be appropriate for the theory, it must be sterilized of the impact of circumstances upon it. “If we could somehow disembody individuals from their circumstances, then the distribution of the propensity to exert effort would be the same in every type” wrote Roemer (1998). As we wrote earlier, Roemer’s technique for sterilizing effort of the effect of circumstances upon it is to measure the degree of a person’s effort by her rank on the distribution of effort of those in her type. The same issue arises with preferences: If a large number of persons in a given type have preferences which, let us say, degrade the value of education, one must recognize that educational choices of such persons are influenced by their circumstances, and are not autonomous in the appropriate sense. Dworkin’s (1981b) opposition to this move is to claim that not holding persons responsible for their preferences is to disrespect them. Another philosopher who opposes sterilizing the effort distribution of its circumstantial causes was Brian Barry, who believed that persons should be rewarded for hard work, even if that was induced by familial culture and pressure.The responsibility cut must also to be drawn among the different kinds of luck.[146] As we wrote, Dworkin (1981b) distinguished between brute and option luck. A typical example of option luck is the outcome of a deliberate gamble. As we wrote, Fleurbaey (2008) does not advocate holding individuals responsible for the entire consequences of option luck. He attempts to disentangle the risk-taking aspect from the purely random aspect of a gamble, considering the latter to be a circumstance. Various compensation schemes respecting this distinction are proposed.
Implementing EOp may be viewed as weakening the traditional role of the family. Roemer (2004) has proposed that parents affect the opportunities of their children through four channels: (C1) the provision of resources and social connections, (C2) the formation of beliefs and skills in children through family culture and investment, (C3) genetic transmission of ability, and (C4) the formation of preferences and aspirations in children.
He views the first three as circumstances, deficits in which should be compensated by an equal-opportunity policy. Preferences and aspirations are more complicated. If a coal miner loves coal-mining culture and instills in his child the desire to become a miner, this is a legitimate influence that does not call for compensation. What better conception of immortality is there than transferring one’s values to one’s children? If, however, the parent instills that desire because he views no other career as being available to the child, that transfer of preference is not legitimate—that is to say, preferences which are themselves induced by resource deficits comprise grounds for compensation. We know of no study that attempts to disentangle the kinds of preferences parents pass on to their children in this way.One consequence of viewing (at least some) preference transmission to children from parents as morally legitimate is to recognize that even a perfect regime of equal opportunity should not aim at equalizing the rows of the intergenerational mobility matrix. Parents may legitimately induce differential preferences in their children, leading to differential incomes, even if the effects of all other circumstances were miraculously compensated for. If one does not admit this, then it is difficult to justify why we do not advocate raising children collectively. At some point, when the unacceptable differential effects of socioeconomic circumstances have been largely eliminated it will become important to address the distinction discussed with respect to channel (C4).
Finally, the importance of the nature of the objective must be taken into account. Three important objectives appear frequently in the empirical discussion. First, education, which takes place mainly during childhood and adolescence; second, income, which is closely related to conditions in the labor market; and third, health, which matters for a lifetime. Education is peculiar because a good part of it occurs before the “age of consent,” that is, the age at which people should be held at least partially responsible for the various choices they make. Health, by many, is viewed as a right, in which matters of choice should not count. Thus, the scope of equal-opportunity policy may differ substantially depending upon the nature of the objective.[147]
4.9.