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The Civilizing Process

State and civil society thus engaged in a pas de deux. Over the past four millennia, the state's role has expanded enormously—as we have seen here in the single sphere of crime control.

Yet, despite absolutism's or even totalitarianism's pretensions, the state never acted alone. First of all, starting some five thousand years ago, the state could rely on humans' own evolutionary history. Compared to our surviving primate cousins, humans are generally less violent within our own communities. We slaughter others in planned and organized raids, skirmishes, and wars, but to those we live with we are roughly a hundred times less violent than chimpanzees. Even more so than the fairly pacific bonobos, humans are self-domesticated. Like dogs and other domesticated animals, but unlike other human or near-human species such as Neanderthals, we have developed smaller brains and teeth, more gracile limbs, and shorter faces, males becoming more like women and adults like children. Such attributes of the domestication syndrome go hand in hand with the most basic change, the taming of our propensity for violence, allowing us to associate peacefully and cooperatively to solve problems col­lectively. Humans' evolutionary advantage lay in our ability to learn from each other, including elders and ancestors, profiting from accu­mulated wisdom and experience. From deep time to the present, the most successful groups have arguably been those that self-selected for cooperation, cultural accretion, and collective problem solving.43

Though they are strikingly clever, no other primates could cooper­ate sufficiently to form a state. Humans are not happy cheek by jowl on long-haul flights, but three hundred chimps crowded together in similar circumstances would tear each other apart.44 Elias's civi­lizing process is arguably but the tip of a massive evolutionary iceberg of behavioral adjustment that has brought forth today's ultrasociable humans.

Elias described behavioral changes that were culturally driven as pacification was rewarded in increasingly com­plex and interdependent human societies. But those changes built on a broader evolutionary logic of how humanity has housetrained itself into sociability. The state relies both on this evolutionary self­domestication and on society's informal self-regulation.

This has not been a simple trade-off across the board. From the state's perspective, some forms of antisocial behavior were best tackled through voluntary means. Others required a bit of steel. One could in theory mandate healthy living to achieve public­health goals, and to some extent we still do. Public smoking is banned today in the most liberal societies, as it once was in auto­cratic eighteenth-century Prussia. But on the whole states seek to convince citizens to adopt healthy habits. They do not mandate daily push-ups or muesli for breakfast.

Yet not every public good can be achieved by jollying along wor­thy habits. Vaccination has to be required and enforced, lest free riders undermine herd immunity. Even the most law-abiding soci­eties, with few citizens in jail, have kept their police departments. The better its policing, the less the state has to rely on prison. Yet on the whole the relationship between authority and citizen has become less enforced and more voluntarily compliant. Today, taxes are deducted at source or via bank transfer and not wrested in kind from barns and lofts by collectors' thugs. Military recruits muster up; they are no longer dragged off at bayonet point.45 The triumph of informal behavioral molding is confirmed more than one hun­dred thousand times daily in each airplane safety briefing. Passen­gers politely ignore the stewards' demonstrations, idly wondering, “Where be this mythical creature who in this day boards a plane actually ignorant of how to buckle a safety belt?”

Today we are nearly all socialized into the conduct that makes dense metropolitan life tolerable and safe.

Behaviors we now regard as innate have in fact often been only recently learned. The basic politeness and civility analyzed by Elias dated mostly from the six­teenth century.46 Yet, like human evolution, the civilizing process continues to socialize us into behaviors that we quickly come to regard as necessary or even natural, not recognizing how recent is their pedigree. Behaviors as functionally imperative as toilet train­ing developed only gradually and recently and still vary widely. In many earlier societies, sphincters did not require strict control. Nor was privacy in the act prized. The Spaniards conquering Mexico in 1519 were amazed that the locals had set up shelters of reed or straw along roads to allow discreet excretion and to save the results, which they used to tan hides.47 In most agrarian societies as late as the 1950s, scheduling and timing toilet use was not pressing. In cities, such controls are now being extended from humans also to their pets. Already in the 1890s, a quarter of all fines imposed by French auxiliary police were for public excretion—human and canine.48 It even rose to become a labor issue: How frequent and lengthy bathroom breaks did workers need?49 The Indian govern­ment has recently unrolled a massive campaign to discourage out­door excretion, which spreads disease and allows rapists to prey on women. Even among industrialized nations, toilet training has varied dramatically—early, communal, and draconian in East Ger­many, for example, but more prolonged and forgiving elsewhere.50 Mainland Chinese still often permit toddlers to relieve themselves in the street, while Hong Kong frowns on such crudity.51

Spitting, too, was once regarded as an irrepressible natural instinct, like breathing or urinating. In the 1890s, Chicago streets could be walked only gingerly, picking one's way among the expectorations. The trams were even worse.52 Nineteenth-century public-health offi­cials, rightly fearing that public spitting spread tuberculosis, cam­paigned against it.

Spittoons became a fixture of urban life. During the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918, New York City punished open cough­ing or sneezing in public by a $500 fine, close to an average annual wage.53 Largely involuntary, coughing and sneezing remain beyond the law's reach, but public spitting has generally been socialized out of everyday behavior. Spittoons are but curiosities. Today we judge it much as our grandchildren will regard smoking: a nasty habit worthy at best of country bumpkins—or the occasional baseball pitcher.

In other aspects of personal hygiene, we have come far from even our recent forbears. Asians have long adopted modern habits, but among Europeans washing and cleanliness were until recently con­sidered enervating and debilitating.54 Oral hygiene today is a $40 billion industry. But cleansing teeth—except perhaps using urine, as the Dutch thought was practiced among the Spanish in the 1500s—was uncommon before the twentieth century.55 Today, any­one as dirty as many Europeans were even in the 1950s would be ostracized. In those days, an English landlady could eject an Ameri­can tenant who bathed daily—not so much for wasting water but for the contagious dermatological disease self-evidently betrayed by such peculiar behavior. Even English toffs, who self-identify by scorning bourgeois propriety, are reasonably clean these days. Prin­cess Margaret once humiliated one of her ladies in waiting by giving her a loo brush for Christmas, having noticed the absence of one while visiting her home.56 In fact, the mortified lady—as posh of course as the princess herself—had merely hidden it while Margaret was staying, too embarrassed to leave it out in the open because of the implied suggestion that a royal might be expected—Gandhi- like—to scrub her own toilet.

To epater les bourgeois, hippies of the 1960s made a virtue of being smelly. More recently, habits have become so squeakily clean that our children's asthmas and allergies are likely aggravated because their immune systems simply lack practice on now banished micro­organisms.

In the Korean movie Parasite (2019), a chauffeur mur­ders his employer for humiliating him by complaining about his odor—an olfactory class divide now largely unthinkable in the West. Westerners, in turn, still suffer a certain chronic humiliation, know­ing that the Japanese consider them smelly.57 Once extravagances of the rich, mani- and pedicures have become everyday groom­ing. The depilation craze has made pubic hair exotic, akin to mut­tonchop sideburns. The Brooklyn hipster beard is admittedly a bit anomalous, yet the sheer variety of product and the specialized implements required for it reveal it to be not a return of untamed nature but stylized hirsute adornment.

Belching, farting, and urinating in public, once commonplace, are now frowned upon or illegal. Kibbutzniks in postwar Israel delib­erately upended the dining rituals of the shtetl. To signal rejection of their proper upbringing, they ate communally, unceremoniously, and each at their own pace.58 While eating habits are informalizing everywhere, the purely bodily aspects have tightened up. We may eat dinner off paper plates, supine on the couch before the television, but we have also coined a word, misophonia, for the agony of dis­gust that others' open-mouthed chewing now inflicts. Something as biologically unremarkable as mouth breathing is today lambasted as uncouth and evolutionarily harmful.59 Drinking to oblivion on Sat­urday nights used to be commonplace in the northern and eastern European countryside, accompanied by swaggering and fisticuffs. In those nations that drink, alcohol consumption remains high, but some binge-drinking cultures are shifting to more Mediterranean habits, favoring beer or wine over spirits and consuming more mod­erately with meals.60 Seatbelts were installed in cars beginning in the late 1960s, and their use was required globally as of the mid-1980s. Thirty years later, compliance (front-seat use) has become largely universal.

A few nations (Cambodia, Italy, Argentina) lag, but most of the developed world arrays itself in serried ranks, from 90 per­cent compliance up through the most obedient, the French at 99 percent.61

Gay sexuality has been normalized over the past several decades. In the 1970s, in the first flush of gay liberation but before the AIDS epidemic of the early 1980s, male homosexuals celebrated their new­found erotic freedoms with festive abandon—their polymorphous hookups and unabashed promiscuity. The gay bathhouse culture of San Francisco and New York, with its pansexual anonymous delights, explicitly challenged the bodily restrictions of monoga­mous heteronormative society. As a visiting professor at Berkeley, Foucault may have consciously risked a va banque wager between prudently avoiding HIV infection and the Dionysian delights of

San Francisco's bathhouses.62 This was the world of John Rechy and his vision of gays as erotic outlaws, defiantly upending convention­ality. Promiscuity was then seen as the core of gay male sexual prac­tice, the “righteous form of revolution.”63

This revolution was, alas, an ambition cruelly dashed by AIDS and the gradual realization that unprotected promiscuity was epide- miologically risky.64 Forty years on, the hot topics of debate are no longer glory holes, doors on bathhouse cubicles, or condom use but gay marriage. Safe sex has gone from being regarded as the public­health authorities' attempt to squelch gay self-expression to the price of admission for intercourse. Once resisted as a plot hatched by sexual Quislings to bring homosexuals to heel, gay marriage is now considered a major rights victory for formerly shunned out­siders. By abandoning the riskiest sexual practices, male gays were able to stave off coercive public-health interventions during the AIDS epidemic. They won broad social acceptance as a group distin­guished by the object of their sexual desire but no longer meaning­fully by their erotic practices. Heteronormatized, gaydom became accepted precisely because it had domesticated itself.

Besides producing ever cleaner and more circumspect citizens, the interaction of law and socialization in the civilizing process also led to behavioral shifts more closely related to our theme here and ultimately more important. We have followed the process by which law's adjudication and enforcement became the state's man­date, removing such functions from the hands of kin and commu­nity. For most of history, civil society was crime's primary punisher. Once the state began playing a role, too, civil society did not of course vanish, but the division of labor between the two parties changed. Formal detection, adjudication, and enforcement fell to the authorities. Civil society was relegated to socializing humans into citizenship—in effect ensuring that they would intersect with formal sanctions only rarely. Meeting the state halfway, civil society's ability to regulate itself meant the modern state grew less repressive and interventionist. Political freedom was arguably the reward for self-discipline.

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Source: Baldwin Peter. Command And Persuade: Crime, Law, And The State Across History. MIT Press,2021. — 475 p.. 2021
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More on the topic The Civilizing Process:

  1. Notes
  2. STRUCTURES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
  3. A CLOSER LOOKAT SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
  4. 2.1. The Laissez-Faire Revolution
  5. DIPLOMATIC NORMS AND PRACTICES COMPLICATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION
  6. From National Liberation to Personal Empowerment
  7. Introduction
  8. Historical Perceptions